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ABSTRACT 
 
This study investigates the economic consequences of illness and of paying for health care in 
Zimbabwe. It explores the incidence of out-of-pocket (OOP) payments, catastrophic health 
expenditure (CHE), impoverishment and the factors, (particularly socio-economic factors) 
associated with them.  In addition, this study determines the strategies that households 
employ to cope with the financial burden of OOP payments in Zimbabwe. 
 
Data was collected from 499 households in Harare urban and Seke rural districts of 
Zimbabwe.  Total monthly household OOP health expenditure was defined as ―catastrophic‖ 
if it exceeded the threshold level of 40% of a household‘s monthly capacity to pay.  Logistic 
regression analysis was used to identify the factors that influence the incidence of CHEs. A 
non-poor household was impoverished by OOP health expenditure if its total household 
expenditure after deducting OOP payments was lower than the subsistence expenditure.    
 
The results of this study indicated that, the incidence of CHEs was very high amongst the 
study population. Households at all levels of wealth incurred catastrophic health 
expenditures, and the proportion of households incurring CHEs was similar across the asset 
quintiles. Out-of-pocket payments precipitated impoverishment of non-poor households. 
Poor households, households with members above 65 years, female headed households, 
households with member(s) suffering from chronic illness and households with greater use 
of health services were at higher risk of incurring CHEs. On the contrary, households with a 
disabled member were less likely to incur CHEs.  Besides ‗avoiding seeking care‘, selling of 
assets and borrowing were the 2 most popular strategies used to cope with OOP health care 
payments. 
 
An analysis of these results suggests that, targeted exemption of vulnerable households, as 
well as provision of subsidised health services could reduce the economic impact of illness 
on households.  The results of this study also point out to the need for strengthening risk 
pooling mechanisms through the implementation of community based health insurance 
schemes and enhancing tax collection. In addition, other strategies that extend beyond the 
health sector such as economic empowerment of women could be effective in mitigating the 
economic impact of illness amongst female headed households in Zimbabwe 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1. BACKGROUND 
Ill health and its associated costs are of major concern amongst families throughout the 
world (Gertler & Gruber 2002).  This is particularly so since illness is often unexpected and 
the consequential costs are burdensome even for well-to-do families (ibid).  In the developed 
world, financial protection mechanisms such as public and private health insurance, as well 
as publicly subsidised health systems have been established (Hatt 2006).  The aim of these 
financial protection mechanisms being to protect families from the devastating effects of out-
of-pocket health care payments whilst ensuring that health care is accessed when needed.  
However despite the abovementioned, the World Health Organization (WHO) has estimated 
that of the 150 million people worldwide who experience catastrophic health expenditures
1
 
(CHEs) yearly, 20 million reside in Europe (World Health Organization 2008). This is apart 
from the fact that more than 40% of the health care in Europe is publicly financed (Savedoff 
2004). In addition, about seven million people suffered impoverishment as a result of the 
catastrophic medical expenses in Europe.  With fewer financial protection systems in place 
in low and middle-income countries compared to Europe, the effects of catastrophic health 
expenditures are likely to be even more severe.  
 
Out-of-pocket payments are however not the only determinant of catastrophic health 
expenditures. The combination of poverty and poor access to health services have also been 
shown to contribute greatly towards household exposure to catastrophic economic 
consequences (Xu et al. 2003; O'Donnell et al. 2008).  With respect to poverty, poorer 
households are more vulnerable as even the smallest health care expenditures can push them 
deeper into poverty (Gilson & McIntyre 2005).  Whereas wealthier families may use savings 
to buffer such expenses, poorer families often have to make agonizing choices that affect 
their families‘ livelihoods.  Such choices may include selling of assets, reducing investment 
                                                          
1 Catastrophic health expenditures (CHEs) are health expenditures at such a high level as to force 
households to reduce spending on other basic goods (e.g. food and water), to sell assets or to incur 
high levels of debt, and ultimately to risk impoverishment (McIntyre 2007).  A full discussion of 
CHEs is done in chapter 2. 
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in education, food and housing over and above other things (Knaul et al. 2006).  This 
situation initiates a vicious cycle of poverty and ill health.   
 
The vicious cycle of poverty and ill health describes the situation whereby poverty is 
not only a cause of ill health, but ill health in turn becomes a cause of poverty.  On the one 
hand, the poor through sheer material deprivation are unable to purchase pre-requisites of 
health such as nutritious food, shelter, adequate housing and proper sanitation (Edejer 2001).  
On the other hand, the low productive capacity and income deprivation due to ill health 
conditions and the related health and social costs implies that, the poor become even more 
vulnerable and less able to recover their former condition, and are in greater
 
danger of 
moving down the poverty spiral (Haines & Smith 2000) 
 
Catastrophic health expenditure is also only observed when households need and use 
health services, whilst ignoring those who cannot use health services due to geographical 
and/or financial constraints (Kawabata et al. 2002).  However, through the consequent 
deterioration of health, the latter households probably suffer a greater welfare loss (through 
lost earnings) than those incurring catastrophic payments through medical spending 
(O'Donnell et al. 2008).  Thus, an understanding of the pattern of health service access and 
use becomes imperative in CHE studies, as it gives an indication of the potential magnitude 
of the economic burden that households (particularly in low-income countries), face due to 
health care payments.   
 
The devastating consequences that catastrophic health expenditures have on families 
have been internationally recognised (Knaul et al. 2006).  In 2005, the WHO member states 
made a call for countries to develop health systems that have as one of the primary goals;  
 
―Access to health care without risking financial catastrophe or impoverishment‖ 
 
 Yet despite this recognition, little has been done in many of the developing countries 
to determine the financial consequences of illness and of paying for health care (Hatt 2006).  
An important context in which to pursue this type of research is in Zimbabwe. With a 
collapsing health system which has directly affected health care access and use, high rates of 
poverty plus declining risk-pooling mechanisms; Zimbabwe notably fulfils the criterion of a 
country where households are at high risk of catastrophic health expenditures. Thus in the 
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present work, the economic consequences of health care payment in Zimbabwe are 
measured, by estimating the catastrophic health expenditure and the impoverishing impact 
caused by OOP payment for health care services.  It is hoped that the results of this work will 
inform policy targeted at protecting vulnerable households from the devastating effects of 
OOP payments.   
 
1.1 OVERVIEW OF ZIMBABWE 
1.1.1 Socio-economic status of Zimbabwe    
 Zimbabwe is a low income country located in Southern Africa with a population of 
approximately 13 million people.  Its GDP and GNI per capita are estimated to be US$2,038 
(purchasing power parity) and US$340 respectively (World Bank 2008). Over the past 
decade the country has been experiencing a severe economic recession.  Real GDP growth 
registered a negative of -7.3% in 2000; -5.9% in 2002; -3.6% in 2004 and -4.6% in 2007.  
Thus representing a cumulative decline in real GDP growth of above 40% since 2000 
(ZEPARU & TARSC 2006).  The economic recession has spurred the cost of basic goods 
and services including health care services, whilst the incomes of the majority of the 
population have continued to decline (ZEPARU & TARSC 2006).  The consequence of this 
is that households are finding it more difficult to save in order to meet future unexpected 
expenditures such as those resulting from unexpected illness. In addition, the country is 
currently experiencing high unemployment which was estimated at 80% in 2007, and an 
increase in the informal sector market (Kapp 2007).  This has led to reduced contribution to 
health through tax and insurance mechanisms. Furthermore, this situation has spurred-an 
over-reliance on regressive taxes such as VAT, fuel levies and capital gains taxes to finance 
health care (Loewenson & Masotya 2009).  The latter taxes impose an additional burden on 
households whose income security has already substantially reduced due to unemployment 
and increase the potential for poverty that is induced by medical spending. 
 
 Poverty has also increased dramatically in Zimbabwe.  According to the 2003 Poverty 
Assessment Study Survey
2
 (PASS), the proportion of households living below the Food 
Poverty Line (very poor) increased from 20% in 1995 to 48% in 2003, representing an 
                                                          
2 The 2003 PASS is the most recent poverty assessment study survey conducted nationwide that used 
expenditure based methods (more appropriate in the developing country context) to calculate the 
poverty line. The latest study conducted in 2005 estimated income to define the poverty levels.  
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increase of 148% (Turugari 2005).  On the other hand, the proportion of households below 
the Total Consumption Poverty Line (very poor and poor) rose from 42% in 1995 to 63% in 
2003.  This study also found that about 63% of rural households were living below the Total 
Consumption Poverty Line (TCPL) in comparison to 53% in urban areas, suggesting greater 
poverty in rural areas.  However, between 1995 and 2003, there was a higher percentage 
increase in incidence of poverty in urban areas (63%) compared to 42% in rural areas 
(MoHCW 2008).  This suggests that proportionally, households in urban areas are becoming 
increasingly poorer.   
 
The authors cited the deteriorating macroeconomic environment, shrinking formal job 
opportunities and negative GDP growth rate as the possible causes.  Since the conduct of this 
national survey, all the conditions highlighted above have worsened suggesting that the 
country is experiencing even greater poverty.  Estimates from the most recent data on 
poverty suggests that between 1990 and 2005, 56% of people were living on under US$1 a 
day and 83% earned below US$2 a day (Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) & UNICEF 
2007).   In addition, 72% of female headed households in Zimbabwe are considered poor 
compared to 58% of male headed households (Crew 2006).  However, since 2005, poverty 
levels have not been measured in Zimbabwe (Loewenson & Masotya 2009).  
 
1.1.2 Health profile in Zimbabwe 
The major health indicators of morbidity and mortality show a concerning decline in the 
performance of the health sector since the country‘s independence in 1980.  Mortality 
indicators in Zimbabwe showed an improvement in the health status of the population within 
a decade after independence.  However, since the early 1990s, the same indicators either 
became static or deteriorated.  Crude death rate for example dropped from 10.8 per 1000 
population in 1982 to 6.1 per 1000 population in 1987 and then rose to 9.4 per 1000 
population in 1992 (MoHCW 2008).  The overall crude death rate for the country was 
estimated at 17 deaths per 1000 population in the 2002 census and 20 deaths per 1000 in 
2003 (ibid).   
 
 The increase in the national crude death rate during this period has been attributed 
mostly to the HIV epidemic, which in 2002 accounted for 60-80% of deaths among adults 
aged 15 to 49 years old and children below the age of 5 years (MoHCW 2008; Mutyambizi 
2002).  It should however be noted that the crude death rate also dropped from the 20.1 
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deaths per 1000 to 17.2 deaths per 1000 population between 2003 and 2007.  This decrease 
has also been attributed to the decline in adult HIV prevalence from 25% in 2003; to 20% in 
2005 and 15.6% in 2007.  The decline in HIV prevalence has been credited partly to the 
change in sexual behaviour among younger people (MoHCW 2008). 
 
Life expectancy at birth (LEB) which is an indicator that is generally used to measure 
general health status followed a similar trend to crude death rate, increasing between 1980 
and 1990 from 56 years to 61 years (MoHCW & CSO 2007).  In the mid 1990's there was a 
levelling off in LEB and a real decline is now being experienced to the extent that LEB 
dropped to below 60 years by the year 2000 and in 2007 was estimated to be 45 years 
(MoHCW 2008). 
 
The 2005-2006 Zimbabwe Demographic and Health Survey (ZDHS) revealed that, 
despite the existence of cost-effective interventions, the prevalence of nutritional 
deficiencies, communicable diseases, pregnancy and childbirth conditions, and the 
conditions of the new born are still high in the country (Central Statistical Office 
(Zimbabwe) & Macro International Inc. 2007).  Ten priority conditions have also been 
identified on the basis of the number of people affected by them and the seriousness of their 
effects.  These conditions are: 
1. HIV/AIDS and STDs;  
2. Tuberculosis;  
3. Acute Respiratory Infection (ARI)  
4. Malaria  
5. Reproductive Health Conditions  
6. Cardiovascular conditions e.g. hypertension  
7. Diarrhoeal diseases;  
8. Nutritional conditions/problems deficiencies (e.g. PEM, micro-nutrients,diabetes) 
9. Injuries and disabilities 
10. Mental Disorders (psychiatric and alcohol, drug abuse) (Central Statistical Office 
(Zimbabwe) & Macro International Inc. 2007) 
 
The selected conditions correspond to the top five (Diarrhoea, Malaria, Tuberculosis, 
HIV and AIDS and Malnutrition) most commonly reported health problems according to the 
sampled households in the 2007/8 Malaria indicator Survey report (MoHCW 2008).  
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It is also important to highlight that at the time that this study was conducted; there was still 
a nationwide outbreak of cholera in Zimbabwe.  
 
1.1.3 Health system structure in Zimbabwe 
Health care in Zimbabwe is provided by the public health sector, private health sector as well 
as Non-Governmental Organizations.  Public health care is delivered based on a four-tiered 
referral system (MoHCW 2001).  The points of entry for uncomplicated cases are the Rural 
Health Centres (RHCs) and the clinics at the primary level of the system.  The first referral 
level comprises district hospitals while the second referral level is to provincial and general 
hospitals. Central and specialty hospitals comprise the third referral levels.   
 
In theory, patients are required to present at the primary level first and then to be 
progressively referred to the secondary up to the quaternary level depending on the 
complexity of illness (MoHCW 2008).  It has however been shown that, the referral system 
has largely broken down with more patients (estimated at more than 75%) self-referring to 
central hospitals such as Harare and Mpilo central hospitals (MoHCW 2008; Normand et al. 
1996).  Reasons for self-referral include poor administrative measures that hinder adequate 
enforcement of the referral chain and most importantly the deterioration in quality of health 
services particularly at the primary care level.   
 
Self-referral, apart from indicating the gross misuse of resources through the use of 
high cost services by patients with primary care needs, also has financial implications for 
individuals and households.  This is because the official policy in Zimbabwe is that patients 
who enter the health care system at the primary level and are referred to a higher level pay 
no further consultation fee (Normand et al. 1996).  Thus, those individuals who by-pass the 
lower levels are not shielded from costs of consultation at higher levels.  Even with this 
policy in place, studies have shown that patients perceive the consultation fee very small in 
proportion to the total bill at an institution (Normand et al. 1996).  This perception implies 
that, exemption from paying consultation fee alone is unlikely to induce patients to comply 
with the referral system.   
 
1.1.4 Health sector reforms  
The early post-colonial era (early 1980s) saw the implementation of the health sector reforms 
that were geared towards redressing inequities that were inherited during the colonial period 
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(Mutyambizi 2002).  Of particular significance to this study was the implementation of the 
policy of free health care in 1980 to anyone earning below $Z150.00 per month (about 
US$220.00 at the time) provided they were properly referred (MoHCW 2001).  In 1995, 
access to health care for all citizens attending rural public health facilities was also made free 
regardless of income (Loewenson & Masotya 2009; MoHCW 2001).  Other groups that were 
specifically exempted from paying user fees (up to district level) were pregnant women, 
children under 5 and adults over 65 years of age.  In addition, user fees were also reduced as 
a health financing source (Loewenson & Masotya 2009).   
 
1.1.4.1 Challenges experienced (1980-2006) 
There have been several challenges faced with this policy reform.  Firstly, managing the 
exemption system has been shown to be costly (Normand et al. 1996).  In addition, the 
exemptions have not always been targeted at the rightful beneficiaries (ibid).  The result 
being, poor individuals have been paying for health care whilst other richer people have been 
avoiding health care payments.  In addition to this, higher income earners obtained a number 
of tax funded public subsidies, including tax relief for medical insurance subscriptions 
(Loewenson & Masotya 2009). 
 Other challenges that have been reported include drug stock outs at the Government 
Health Centres that have resulted in private purchases of medicines by categories of 
individuals who are officially supposed to be exempt from health care fees.  Thus, poor 
people in reality have been faced with ever-increasing OOP payments for health care 
(MoHCW 1999). 
 
1.1.4.2 Most recent challenges 
The most recent data from the ‗Access to health services‘ study conducted in 2007 revealed 
that, in rural areas, people are paying service fees at district hospitals and also in most rural 
health centres/clinics (MoHCW 2008).  Exemptions for low income earners have also 
continued to be difficult.  Official reports suggest that pregnant mothers, children under 5 
and the elderly (over 65 years) are still exempt from public sector fees.  However, other
3
 data 
suggests that pregnant women are required to pay US$5 for their first antenatal visit, and a 
fee of US$8 for hospital cards is required at the first visit to the polyclinics for infants.   
                                                          
3
 This data was obtained at one of the primary level clinics in Harare from documents which were not 
yet made official 
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During the later half of 2008, public hospitals throughout the country also started 
closing down, leaving patients with the option of private health care (Médecins Sans 
Frontières 2009; Kevin 2009).  The private facilities that continued to operate were charging 
fees ranging from US$200 in cash for a consultation, US$500 for an in-patient bed, and 
US$3,000 for a caesarean section (Physician for Human Rights 2009).  With such high fees 
the financial impact on households and the impact on access to health care cannot be 
overlooked.  
 
The adoption of multicurrency national payments system in Zimbabwe in the later part 
of 2008 also had a significant impact on the medical aid
4
 industry and its associated 
members.  Firstly, by allowing some contributions to be made in the Zimbabwean Dollar and 
others in currencies such as the United States Dollar and the South African Rand, a ‗two-
tiered‘ system was created in which the relatively well-off who belonged to the latter 
schemes had access to a comprehensive benefit package which included access to specialist 
care.  Those who belonged to the former schemes (i.e., making payments in the local 
currency) however faced dire consequences.  Firstly, almost all health care providers refused 
to offer services to this group of people demanding payment to be made in cash (in any other 
currency other than the Zimbabwean Dollar) before any health services could be offered.  
Even worse, some medical aid societies abruptly cancelled membership for this group.  
Thus, while official figures for the percentage of the population owning medical aid in 
Zimbabwe still stands at 10% (Association of health care funders of Zimbabwe 2008); in 
reality a smaller percentage still derives benefits from medical aid.  
 
1.1.5 Health care financing in Zimbabwe 
With respect to health financing, Zimbabwe‘s health system is financed through four main 
sources: government funding, private voluntary medical schemes/health insurance, out-of 
pocket payments (OOPs) and external funding (MoHCW 2008).  The government has 
remained the major source of health financing in the public health system and taxes also 
have remained the major source of funding.  However, whilst the government still remains a 
major source of health financing in the public health system, household health financing 
continues to be significant (ibid).  The 2001 National Health Accounts estimated 
                                                          
4
 Medical aids are considered a form of health insurance as they provide coverage for medicine, visits 
to the doctor or emergency room, hospital stays and other medical expenses 
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government‘s contribution to be 39% of the overall resource package by source of health 
financing, while the contribution by households was 29% against 10.8% by employers 
(MoHCW 2001).   
 
The most recent national health accounts data of 2005 estimated that government 
funding was 44.8% of the total health expenditure whilst private expenditures comprised 
55.2% of the total health expenditure.  The share of OOP spending as a proportion of private 
health expenditure was 52%, which is significantly high when compared to other countries in 
Sub-Saharan Africa (WHO 2007).  Namibia and South Africa‘s share of out of pocket 
payments as a proportion of total health expenditure were 5.6% and 10.3% in 2004 
respectively, compared to 26.2% in Zimbabwe (WHO 2007).  Following on from earlier 
discussion on private medical aid in Zimbabwe, out-of-pocket payments are likely to have 
increased significantly since these last estimates.  Although, there have been policy 
intentions to implement a Social Health Insurance scheme in Zimbabwe since 1991, this has 
not yet been implemented.  This means that the unemployed (who comprise the majority of 
the population) and the poor have very little financial protection against health expenditures.   
 
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The consistent increase in out-of-pocket spending for health care in Zimbabwe (Munyuki & 
Jasi 2009) is of concern, given the increased economic burdens on households at a time of 
severe economic difficulty. The key issue in Zimbabwe is that the worsening economic 
conditions have driven the majority of households into poverty, escalated the cost of basic 
goods and services and led to significant reduction in public finance for health care 
(Munyuki & Jasi 2009).  The high poverty levels imply that households struggle to meet 
even the basic food needs and have no surplus cash for health expenses (Russell 2004). As a 
result, even a small illness cost could be an immense economic burden for such households.   
 
However, even wealthier households in Zimbabwe are vulnerable to disruptions in their 
living standards when one or member falls ill, particularly since they could incur large 
medical expenditures.  This is particularly so since public health facilities are currently not 
operating and the private facilities that are operating are charging fees that are beyond the 
reach of even the most affluent (PHR 2009). In addition to this, the cancellation of health 
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insurance memberships, which has affected the majority of the formal sector, implies that 
even more households are vulnerable to the catastrophic economic consequences of illness.    
 
Thus, when one considers the challenging economic environment in Zimbabwe and its 
implications for the standards of living of households, it becomes important to understand if 
OOP payments are adding to this economic burden and the extent and implications of this 
burden on household livelihood.  This study therefore measures the economic burden of 
OOP healthcare payments on households by estimating the catastrophic health expenditure 
and impoverishing impact caused by OOP payments.  
 
1.3 Policy reforms aimed at protecting households 
In recent years up to and including the present year, the Government has drafted and 
implemented several policies that are aimed at protecting individuals and households (either 
directly or indirectly) from the devastating effects of OOP health expenditures.  These 
policies include: 
1. Health Assistance policy targeted at the chronically poor.  This policy aims to assist 
the chronically poor and the vulnerable to gain access to health care, by provision of 
free health care.  Categories of individuals who fall under the vulnerable include 
children below the age of 5, the elderly above the age of 65 and those living in rural 
areas.  This policy has been discussed in earlier sections 
2. The government implemented the National AIDS policy and National AIDS Trust 
Fund (NATF) in 1999.  The NATF is a 3% levy collected from taxable income from 
all sectors.  This fund is aimed at mitigating the impact of HIV and AIDS by 
increasing the availability of free ARVs amongst other goals (United Nations 2008).   
3. The government also implemented a Malaria policy and a Malaria project that was 
funded in 2003 by the Global Fund (WHO 2004a) 
4. Other disease specific policies include the policy on free treatment for tuberculosis 
(TB) patients at government facilities in Zimbabwe (WHO 2004b).   
5. The Macro-Economic Policy Framework for 2005-2006 set the basis for the creation 
of a specific fund for the poor with disabilities and other extraordinary ailments 
(Government of Zimbabwe 2003)  
6. The ―National Health Strategy for Zimbabwe 1997-2007‖ also aimed at providing 
free treatment for the majority, but also stated that the policy of free health would 
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create disincentives for people to join the private medical insurance schemes 
(Loewenson & Masotya 2009).   
The Ministry of Health and Child Welfare (MoHCW) is currently drafting a new national 
health strategy for 2008-2012, and has circulated a working consultative document, 
―Developing a national health strategy for 2008-2012‖.    
 
The policies described above though good policies fail to account for a variety of 
issues that are important if policies that protect households from OOP health expenditures 
are to be implemented successfully in Zimbabwe.  One is the fact that the poverty 
distribution itself seems to have changed, with urban households becoming increasingly 
poorer in comparison to rural households.  Thus the current focus on the rural population has 
the potential of missing out many urban households for whom social protection policies are 
indeed a major necessity.  In addition to this, current developments in the private health 
insurance (PHI) system have left even the few households that previously had health 
insurance at risk of CHEs from OOP payments.  Thus, the emphasis on restricting free health 
care so as to promote enrolment with the PHI schemes may result in even more households 
facing devastating financial consequences as a result of OOP health expenditures.   
 
1.4 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
The overall objective of this research is to identify the economic consequences for 
households of illness and of paying out-of-pocket for health care. Specifically the research 
aims at accomplishing the following: 
1. To determine the incidence of catastrophic health expenditures in Zimbabwe 
2. Investigate how incidence of catastrophic payments varies across groups of different 
socio-economic status 
3. To identify the determinants of catastrophic health expenditures in Zimbabwe 
4. To determine incidence of poverty that is related to catastrophic payments 
5. To determine the crisis coping mechanisms for meeting the cost burden of illness 
and its implications for future livelihood of households. 
6. To evaluate current health policies in Zimbabwe aimed at reducing the economic 
burden of illness with a view to ascertain if these are in line with the findings of the 
research. 
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1.5 JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY 
Despite, the likelihood that OOP payments could have a significant economic impact on 
households in Zimbabwe, economic analyses are still scarce.  Out of the studies that have 
investigated the impact of OOP payments, most have focussed on the impact on utilization 
(Russell 1996; Nanda 2002; Makuto & James 2007).  Other studies have gone a step further 
to finding out how households cope with the direct and indirect cost burdens of illnesses 
such as HIV in Zimbabwe, but with no explicit estimation of the impoverishing and 
catastrophic impact (Mutyambizi 2002; Mutangadura et al. 1999).  This study contributes to 
the aforementioned literature with estimation of the burden of OOP payments for health care, 
utilizing recently developed methods of catastrophic and impoverishing impact assessment.   
 
The findings of this study will also provide empirical evidence on the incidence and 
intensity of impoverishment and catastrophic health expenditures.  The availability of such 
evidence is a crucial step towards developing a health system that offers households financial 
protection from OOP health expenditures.  In addition, policy makers also need to know the 
groups of people that are most vulnerable to CHEs as well as the general risk factors for 
catastrophic health expenditures. Since this research is diverse and spans over these multiple 
issues, the findings of this study will be useful in formulating targeted and equitable social 
and financial protection policies.  Furthermore, the results of the incidence of poverty due to 
OOP payments will provide relevant evidence that could be used to enhance the 
effectiveness of the already existing poverty alleviation strategies.   
 
Notwithstanding the issues raised above, it is also important to note that ill health in 
itself has wider economic implications for the country.  The World Bank in its 1993 report 
(‗Investing in Health‘) defined a role for health in the pursuit of economic development 
(Suhrcke et al. 2006).  In 2001 the Commission on Macroeconomics and Health (CMH)
 
significantly reinforced the strength of the economic argument for investing in health (ibid).  
At a time when Zimbabwe is facing severe economic challenges, investing in health could be 
of immense benefit. 
 
Finally, Zimbabwe recently witnessed a major political move when the two opposition 
parties formed a Government of National Unity.  This situation opened a window of 
opportunity for new policies to be put onto the political agenda.  Taking into consideration 
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that existing policies seem to marginalise the groups of people that are considered to be 
vulnerable to catastrophic medical expenditures, the findings of this study will be an 
important contribution to this policy making process. 
 
1.6 ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS  
This section presents an outline of the rest of the thesis.  Chapter 2 provides a review of the 
literature that is relevant for this study.  This includes: literature on health care financing; 
different measures of assessing household financial protection and literature on catastrophic 
and impoverishing health expenditures and household coping strategies.   
 
Chapter 3 presents a conceptual framework for analyzing the determinants of catastrophic 
health expenditures and draws on the literature presented in chapter 2.  Chapter 4 provides a 
detailed description of the research methodology.  In this chapter the data required to 
successfully complete the study are set forth.  This chapter also presents the methodologies 
that were employed by other researchers analyzing catastrophic and impoverishing health 
expenditures. The rationales for choice of analytical techniques chosen for this study are 
presented 
 
Chapter 5 presents the results of the data analysis.  Demographic analyses are 
presented which are important in understanding the results for determinants of catastrophic 
health expenditures.  The results for the incidence of catastrophic health expenditures; 
incidence of impoverishing health expenditures and determinants of CHEs are presented.  
This chapter concludes with a discussion of the strategies that households employ to cope 
with the financial burden of OOP payments. 
 
Chapter 6 discusses the results presented in chapter 5 in the context of the objectives 
set forth.  The conclusions and policy recommendations presented in chapter 7 complete the 
study
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CHAPTER 2 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter reviews literature on relevant concepts for this study.  Literature on health care 
financing; catastrophic health expenditures; crisis coping mechanisms of households and the 
methodological issues around catastrophic health expenditure studies is reviewed. 
 
2.1 HEALTH CARE FINANCING 
Health care financing is defined as the activity of raising or collecting revenue to pay for the 
operation of a health care system (Yu et al. 2008).  Schieber et al. (2006) expand on this 
definition by saying, ―...it is also a key determinant of health system performance in terms of 
equity, efficiency, and health outcomes.‖  Health care financing comprises the basic 
functions of revenue collection, pooling of risks and purchasing of health services (McIntyre 
2007).  Revenue collection is concerned with the sources of funds, their structure and the 
means by which the revenues are collected.  Risk pooling, involves the collection and 
management of financial resources so that large unpredictable individual financial risks 
become predictable and are distributed among all members of the pool (Gottret & Schieber 
2006).  Purchasing refers to the manner in which pooled resources are transferred to health 
service providers in such a way that appropriate and efficient services are available to the 
population (Kutzin 2001).   
 
At country level, these health financing functions translate into the following 
objectives: 
1. Raising sufficient and sustainable revenues in an efficient and equitable manner, so as 
to offer individuals, both a basic package of essential services and financial protection
5
 
against unpredictable catastrophic financial losses caused by illness or injury. 
2. To manage these revenues so as to equitably and efficiently pool health risks and, 
3. To ensure the purchase of health services in an allocatively and technically efficient 
manner (Salehi 2007; Saadah 2008) 
                                                          
5
 Ensuring financial protection means that no household spends so much on health care that it risks 
falling into poverty and (if already poor) not overcoming poverty. 
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 Based on these policy objectives, one can infer that the health financing objectives 
are centred on the principles of equity, efficiency and sustainability and embodied in these 
principles is the goal of financial risk protection and ensuring universal access to health 
services.  The following section gives a brief discussion of the principles of equity, 
efficiency and sustainability placing emphasis on the role they play in ensuring financial 
protection of households. 
 
2.1.1 Equity 
Equity in health financing is a term generally used to describe how the burden of financing 
health care is distributed amongst the population.  A key question in assessing equity in 
health care financing is; ―How is the burden of financing health care distributed across 
groups of different socio-economic status?‖  The evaluation of equity in health financing 
generally takes 2 forms, namely; horizontal equity and vertical equity (Mwase 1998).  
According to Culyer (2001), horizontal equity refers to the equal treatment of equal 
individuals.  In health care financing, this would imply that those with the same ability to 
pay (ATP) make the same payments for health care.  Vertical equity on the other hand, refers 
to the unequal yet equitable treatment of unequal individuals.  Stated another way, this 
means that those with different ability to pay should make appropriately dissimilar payments.   
 
There is still debate on what the latter means: Should relative shares of income 
contributed be the same (proportional) for all income groups or higher (progressive) for the 
richer?  The literature on this subject suggests that: high poverty levels, the inability of many 
households to afford even relatively small health care payments and substantial inequities in 
the distribution of income across households, particularly in low income countries, imply 
that; those at higher levels of wealth should contribute a higher percentage of their income 
than lower income groups (ZEPARU &TARSC 2006; Cissé et al. 2007).  A study conducted 
in Malawi found that although the average cost of malaria to households was over 7% of 
household income, for the poorest households these costs were as much as a third of their 
income (Ettling et al. 1994); Thus highlighting the importance of progressivity and not just 
proportionality in health financing.   
 
With respect to its impact on financial risk protection, an equitable health financing 
system ensures that, cross-subsidies from the rich to the poor (equity subsidies), and from the 
healthy to the ill (risk subsidies) can occur (McIntyre 2007).  Such cross-subsidies, which are 
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a result of risk pooling, ensure that no household is impoverished by the need to use health 
services and that unexpected health care costs do not fall solely on the individual (ibid).  
Regarding equity subsidies, 3 alternatives often co-exist for generating revenues and 
financing equity subsidies (Schieber et al. 2006).  These are: subsidies within a risk pool; 
subsidies across different risk pools and direct public subsidies through transfers from the 
government (ibid).  These alternatives will be explored in much detail in later sections.  
However, it is still important to mention that the second and third alternatives for financing 
equity subsidies are of significant importance when 2 conditions exist.  These include: (i) a 
situation whereby risk pools are fragmented such that low-risk or low income individuals are 
in one pool and; (ii) a situation whereby significant portions of the population cannot afford 
health insurance (Saadah 2008; Bitrán et al. 2000).   
 
Based on the above discussion, it is apparent that the concept of equity is also directly 
linked to the health systems goal of fairness in health financing.  Fairness in health financing 
reflects the view that, the risks each household faces as a result of health care costs should 
not be distributed according to risk of illness but a household‘s ATP (Economou et al. 2004). 
 
2.1.2 Feasibility, Sustainability and Efficiency  
The heath financing principles of efficiency, sustainability and feasibility though of indirect 
relevance to the subject of financial protection of households are also worth mentioning.  
These principles influence to a great extent whether a proposed health financing mechanism 
is acceptable to stakeholders and can be implemented (feasible) and whether it will be 
sustainable in the long term.  A sustainable health financing mechanism is critical since it 
can maintain its level of funding and has the potential to generate more revenues in response 
to growing health needs (Ekman et al. 2008). This in turn means that, such a financing 
mechanism can maintain its breadth and depth of coverage, thus ensuring that the 
beneficiaries of such a financing system are protected from the financial risk of illness in the 
long term. Efficiency, particularly efficiency in revenue collection is also critical to 
achieving financial risk protection.  Generally, a health financing mechanism
6
 is considered 
to be efficient if it generates a large amount of revenue thus precluding the need for multiple 
funding mechanisms with each generating a limited amount of funds (McIntyre 2007). 
                                                          
6
 The categories of funding mechanisms that exist include general taxation, mandatory health 
insurance and out-of-pocket payments.  These will be discussed in more detail in later sections. 
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Exclusion of multiple funds ensures formation of a large risk pool and consequently better 
opportunity to redistribute risks within the pool (Schieber et al. 2006). Additionally, 
administrative costs and the costs of fund collection are low with an efficient financing 
mechanism; leaving sufficient revenues for use in actual health service provision (McIntyre 
2007). 
 
2.2 HEALTH FINANCING MECHANISMS 
The World Health Organization defines health financing mechanisms (HFMs) as 
organisational options for a health financing system of how to offer financial risk protection 
to people against the costs of healthcare (WHO 2009a).  Generally, health systems are 
financed mainly through three mechanisms: i) government funds via general and specific tax 
revenues, donor funds and deficit financing ii) health insurance which can either be 
mandatory or voluntary and (iii) Out-of-pocket (OOP) payments (McIntyre 2007).  The mix 
of financing among these three categories tends to differ substantially between countries 
 
2.2.1 Out-of-pocket payments 
The term out-of-pocket (OOP) payment refers to payments that are made directly to the 
health care provider by the patient. These payments can be placed into four categories:  
 user fees paid directly to health care providers in public or private health facilities; 
 co-payments made by members of a health insurance scheme, which reimburses 
only a portion of the cost of a health service paid by the members (Belli et al. 2004); 
 semi- official charges made for consumables such as drugs and medical supplies and  
 Under-the-table (unofficial) payments made as a so-called gift and in some instances 
as precondition for service to health care providers (Mastilica & Bozikov 1999; Belli 
et al. 2004). 
 
Because OOP payments are made at the point of health service access, individuals and 
households are not shielded from the unexpected burden of health care costs.  Furthermore, 
there is little risk pooling with OOP payments such that the heavy financial burden of the 
health expenditure falls solely on an individual or household.  This situation poses major 
challenges for equity and financial protection of households (Al-Duaj 2009).  With respect to 
its impact on equity, OOP payments tend to place a disproportionately higher burden on the 
poorer households.  A study in Croatia that examined the burden and distribution of OOP 
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payments among income groups found that, the lower income groups paid as much as six 
times the share of income paid by high-income groups. This study therefore highlights the 
extent of regressivity
7
 of OOP payments as a source of health financing (Mastilica & Bozikov 
1999).  The results of this study are also consistent with those by Wagstaff and van Doorslaer 
(1992)  who investigated equity in the financing of health care in 10 high-income countries.  
Counterintuitive evidence from studies conducted in low and middle income countries has 
however been presented which suggests that, OOP payments can be progressive if the lowest 
income earners, who are least able to afford health services, rarely use them (O‘Donnell et al. 
2008).  The term progressive in this case is argued as misleading since it refers to equitable 
financing yet inequitable access to services (McIntyre 2007).   
 
In addition to its impact on equity, the heavy financial burden that OOP payments impose 
on vulnerable households also leave households facing the options of not seeking health care or 
risking financial catastrophe.  A recent systematic review of studies that examined the impact of 
user charges on health service utilization found that; reducing or removing user fees increased 
utilization of curative and some preventive services, while increasing or introducing user fees 
had the opposite effect in most instances (Lagarde & Palmer 2008).  The unpredictability of 
illness further implies that, those households that opt to seek health care end up using ready cash 
that would otherwise have been intended for other things.  According to a study in Ethiopia, 
households that had used available cash to pay for health care had intended to use the money 
for basic consumption necessities such as food, fuel, clothes and education (Russell & 
Abdella 2002)  
 
Families that opt to seek health care despite not having ready cash risk jeopardize their 
future livelihoods.  This is so since households are often forced to borrow money at ruinous 
interest rates or sell assets such as livestock so as to meet the costs of health care (McIntyre & 
Gilson 2005; WHO 2009b).  A recent study that explored factors associated with household 
coping behaviours in the face of OOP health payments in 15 African countries (including 
Zimbabwe) found that: in most countries, around 30% of all households financed out-of-
pocket health expenditure by borrowing and selling assets with the situation being 
predominant amongst the lowest income quintile group (Leive & Xu 2008).  
                                                          
7
 Regressive contribution refers to a financing mechanism whereby low-income groups contribute a 
higher percentage of their income than high income groups (Yu et al. 2008) 
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In spite of the evidence that out-of-pocket payments are inequitable, there is also evidence 
that these payments have helped increase revenues (though marginally) in public hospitals, 
facilitated the expansion of hospital services and helped improve the quality of services 
(Akashi et al. 2004). Such experiences have been reported in countries like Cambodia, 
Niger, Cameroon and Jamaica (Akashi et al. 2004; Lagarde & Palmer 2008).  In Cambodia, 
a study that investigated the effects of user fees on hospital performance and provider 
attitudes found that, following the introduction of user fees, there was increased availability 
of drugs at the National Maternal and Child Health Centre (NMCHC).  Other changes 
included the improved cleanliness of the facility since NMCHC allocated about 2% of user-
fee revenue for employing additional cleaners. Similar studies conducted for Niger and 
Cameroon also found that, utilization of health services also increased in facilities where 
introduction of user fees was accompanied by improvements in the quality of services (Diop 
et al. 1995, Litvack & Bodart 1993).  In addition to improved service delivery, enabling 
public hospitals to stay in operation is also possibly one of the biggest roles that user fees 
have played.  Jamaica for example, experiences a chronic problem of floods and fires which 
often leaves the facilities in desperate need of repairs (Lewis 1993).  These repairs are 
however only carried out once user fees have been returned to the hospital.  Other 
documented evidence of the beneficial impact of OOP payments include an improvement in 
the performance of workers as well as  a decrease in staff turnover in  countries  where user 
fees have been  used to compensate staff salaries (Akashi et al. 2004).   
 
The evidence presented above clearly indicates that OOP payments have not only ensured 
improved service delivery at some public facilities, they have also ensured that these 
facilities which are mainly utilized by the poor remain operational. However, when one 
considers that unofficial payments are still demanded in most of these countries (Akashi et 
al. 2004), the overall economic impact of OOP payments amongst the poor cannot be 
overlooked.  Moreover, the difficulty that most countries have faced in enforcing effective 
exemption policies for the poorest (Mohindra 2008) means that, the improved quality of 
services possibly benefits wealthier households more since they can opt for cheaper public 
services. The poorest households on the other hand continue to struggle with health care 
access.  In addition, poor revenue management in many low income countries has resulted in 
only but a few success stories such as the ones described above.  These challenges in turn 
reveal that the disadvantages of OOP payments, particularly in poor countries and amongst 
poor households are more substantial than the advantages they offer. Recognition of this, has 
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spurred a great move towards health financing mechanisms that offer prepayment and for 
which risk pooling is possible.  Prepayment funds are payments that are made by individuals 
via taxes or health insurance contributions before the need to use health services (McIntyre 
2007).  Such payments allow pool members to pay for average expected costs in advance, 
relieves them of uncertainty, and ensures compensation should a loss occur (Schieber et al. 
2006). Pooling coupled with prepayment thus enables the establishment of insurance and the 
redistribution of health spending between high- and low-risk individuals and high- and low-
income individuals (ibid).   
 
The next section discusses the different prepayment mechanisms, focussing attention on the 
extent to which each financing mechanism can offer households financial protection   
 
2.2.2 Government revenues 
Government funds are generally derived from tax revenues either direct taxes (from personal or 
company income) or indirect taxes such as value added tax (VAT) and customs duties (Al-Duaj 
2009).  Other forms of funds also include donor funding which can take the form of loans which 
have to be repaid along with interest charges or aid grants which do not have to be repaid 
(McIntyre 2007; Al-Duaj 2009).  State-funded systems are examples of health systems that rely 
primarily on government revenues and operate through either Ministries of Health or National 
Health Service (NHS) systems. 
These systems generally have three main features. First, their primary funding comes 
from general revenues.  Second, they provide medical coverage to the country‘s entire 
population and third, their services are mostly delivered through a network of public 
providers (Gottret & Schieber 2006).  These features, particularly the broad coverage and 
reliance on broad revenue base promote substantial risk pooling and circumvent problems of 
adverse selection
8
 and risk selection
 9
 giving the NHS systems the potential to be equitable.   
 
The extent of equity within these systems is however dependant on several other 
factors namely: the mix of general (direct and indirect taxes) and specific taxes; other public 
                                                          
8
 Adverse selection refers to the tendency for insurance to attract only higher risk individuals, thereby 
raising the average cost of insurance beyond the reach of many people 
9
 Risk selection refers to the process by which insurers screen potential clients and try to enrol 
individuals who present health risks that are below average 
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revenue sources and the types of external assistance received (Gottret & Schieber 2006).  
With respect to taxes, direct income tax has generally been found to be progressive.  This is 
particularly so in low and middle income countries where the highest income groups almost 
exclusively pay for these taxes (McIntyre 2007).  Indirect taxes on the other hand are 
generally regressive since they are usually levied as a flat rate and result in lower income 
earners paying a higher proportion of their incomes than the higher income earners 
(Wagstaff et al. 1999).  In low and middle income countries such as Hongkong, Thailand, 
and Nepal, indirect taxes have however been found to be slightly progressive since the basic 
foodstuffs are often exempt from value added tax (VAT), thus shielding the poor from 
paying these taxes.  Earmarked taxes which are collected for a specific purpose such as the 
AIDS levy in Zimbabwe, though promoting greater willingness to contribute towards taxes 
tend to displace funding from general tax revenue.  In addition, these taxes tend to impose a 
greater burden on the tax-payer, particularly if the percentage of those who are formally 
employed and can actually contribute is very small (Kaulem 2006).  Taking into account the 
relative progressivity of the different types of taxes, NHS in which direct taxes make the 
greater proportion of tax revenues are likely to be more equitable and offer greater financial 
protection from health care costs.   
 
In ‗pure‘ National Health Service systems such as the British NHS, 74% of the 
resources of the NHS came from general taxation in 2001 (with heavy reliance on income 
tax) while 20% came from national insurance contributions, making this system highly 
equitable (Gottret & Schieber 2006).  In addition to this, the coverage is universal with most 
health services being accessed for free. This implies that, within this system the largest risk 
pool has been attained and consequently income cross subsidies are significantly high thus 
raising the potential of this system to financially protect households from health care costs. 
 
Unfortunately, not all state funded systems offer the same extent of financial 
protection.  Others such as Brazil's Sistema Unica de Saude (SUS) despite achieving 
universal coverage and offering public health service for free still experience high levels of 
catastrophic health expenditures (Barros & Bertoldi 2008). According to a recent study, out-
of-pocket payments for medicines are the major reason why households still face 
catastrophic health expenditures; thus suggesting the inadequacy of the benefit package 
offered for beneficiaries within the system (ibid).  The comprehensiveness of the benefit 
package is generally limited by the amount of revenues that a health system can collect.  In 
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Brazil for example, the government revenues account for only 40.4% of total health 
expenditure in comparison to 81% in Britain (Gottret & Schieber 2006; Savedoff 2004).   
 
Other state funded systems which are mainly found in developing countries have been 
less successful for a variety of reasons.  Firstly, since NHS systems are financed from the 
general budget, the amount of funding available depends on the outcome of annual budget 
discussions and is vulnerable to changes in political priorities or external shocks (Salehi 
2007; Al-Duaj 2009; Drouin 2007).  Such external shocks include military conflict that 
requires additional defence spending (ibid).  Also, the low tax base, and high reliance on 
donor funding (which is generally unpredictable) usually results in an under-funded system 
which although theoretically should cover the entire population ends up disproportionately 
serving the richer (ibid).  The richer generally benefit more, primarily because the poor have 
less access to the services and secondly because the poor end up paying for health care in the 
form of under-the table payments at primary health facilities.  A study in Hungary that 
investigated the inequity of informal payments in health care found out that informal 
payments were in fact a highly regressive form of health financing (Szende & Culyer 2006). 
 
2.2.3 Mandatory health insurance 
The term mandatory health insurance (MHI) refers to a health insurance scheme to which 
certain groups or the entire population must belong to by law (McIntyre 2007).  When a 
subsection of the population belongs to such an insurance scheme, the term generally used is 
Social Health Insurance (SHI) while National Health Insurance (NHI) is used for the latter.  
Mandatory health insurance (as it shall be called hereafter) is distinguished from general 
revenue-funded systems by the presence of independent or quasi-independent insurance 
funds and a reliance on compulsory earmarked payroll contributions (Gottret & Schieber 
2006; Salehi 2007; Saadah 2008).  There is a clear link between these contributions and a set 
of defined rights for the insured population in this scheme (ibid). 
 
Equity within a mandatory health insurance (MHI) scheme is generally influenced by 
a variety of factors. The first is the coverage and composition of the risk pools.  Generally, 
MHI schemes tend to begin coverage with the formal sector (owing to the reliance on payroll 
taxes) before extending to the rest of the population (McIntyre 2007; Rakoloti 2006).  When 
the coverage is restricted to the formal sector or a sub-sector of the population, certain 
groups, who are typically the poor and unemployed are excluded.  When no attempt is made 
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to subsidize the poor, the impact of a MHI scheme on ensuring financial protection becomes 
limited to only those individuals who belong to the scheme.  The Philippines SHI for 
example reached 84% coverage in the election year of 2004 through government subsidies to 
the indigent.  However, since then government subsidies to the indigent have reduced which 
resulted in consequent reduction of enrolment to about 63% (Hsiao & Shaw 2007).  In 2007, 
the probability of facing catastrophic health expenditures was reported to be increasing in 
higher income groups, while the probability of being impoverished by health expenditures 
was still predominant in the lowest income decile in Philippines (Ico 2007).   
 
Extending the health insurance to the rest of the population especially the poor and the 
unemployed requires efficient management of revenues so as to effectively pool health risks.  
This is usually the case, since the process of extending coverage often requires injection of 
extra funds in the form of subsidies from the general revenues or subsidies from external 
funds.  These funds can be pooled into one insurance fund as in Hungary or as has been the 
case in many countries such as Argentina, Chile, Colombia, France, Germany and Japan, 
separate funds can exist for the different subpopulations (Gottret & Schieber 2006).  The 
presence of many insurance funds, as explained earlier, can have an impact on the equity and 
extent of financial risk protection of households, particularly if no attempt is made to link up 
the funds.  Such an example of fragmented risk pools can be found in Austria, where health 
care is organized by sickness funds based on employment sector (Smith & Witter 2004).  
The plans not only vary in health care needs, they also vary in revenue bases.  In addition to 
this there is no formal attempt to effect transfers between plans (ibid).  The result of this, as 
can be expected has been substantial variations in premium rates between funds for both 
employers and employees.  
 
On the other hand, even though Japan has multiple insurance funds, cross-
subsidization amongst these funds and government subsidies to the high risk pools such as 
those for the elderly and low-income has led to Japan‘s health system being able to maintain 
equity at the same time ensuring financial protection for its population (Rodwin 1994).  The 
Colombian SHI is one other health insurance which has managed to maintain equity by use 
of a solidarity fund which is used to cross-subsidize membership by the poor.  This solidarity 
fund allows a portion of contributions for SHI from urban and formal sector workers, who 
are relatively well-off, to be used to cross-subsidize contributions by rural and informal 
workers (Hsiao & Shaw 2007). 
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Other factors that threaten the extent to which a MHI scheme can protect its citizens 
are the depth and range of services included in the benefit package (McIntyre 2007).  
Colombia for example has two contributory funds, a contributory regime (CR) and a 
subsidised regime (SR) both of which have separate benefit packages.  The wealthier 
segments of the population belong to the CR, and are covered by a comprehensive benefit 
package while the benefits package is more limited in the SR to which the poor belong.  
Although, the financial impact of health care costs has generally reduced since the 
introduction of the SHI, the limited benefit package for the SR is considered one of the 
probable reasons why financial protection has not achieved its full potential (Giedion & 
Uribe 2009).  The comprehensiveness of the benefit package as already discussed earlier is a 
function of the revenue generating capacity of the health financing mechanism.  Within the 
SHI schemes, factors such as the size of the formal sector and the level of government 
subsidies to the poor become important when designing a benefits package (Hsiao & Shaw 
2007).   
 
2.2.4 Voluntary Health insurance 
Voluntary health insurance is health insurance to which an individual or group can subscribe 
without the legal requirement to do so (Salehi 2007).  Two types of voluntary health 
insurance can be identified: private health insurance and community based health insurance 
2.2.4.1 Community Based Health Insurance 
Community-based health insurance (CBHI) schemes are insurance schemes to which the 
members of the local, often rural but also peri-urban community pay a small contribution and 
which then pays the fees charged by local health services (McIntyre 2007).  Community-
based health insurance schemes have been in existence for a long time and are precursors to 
SHI schemes such as those in Germany, Japan and Korea and currently they are predominant 
in Sub-Saharan Africa (Gottret & Schieber 2006; Chankova et al. 2008).  Recently CBHI 
schemes have been gaining increasing attention as a potential instrument to protect low-
income populations from the impoverishing effects of health care expenditures especially in 
developing countries (Jakab et al. 2001).  Proponents suggest that, CBHI schemes promote 
the establishment of insurance in groups that would otherwise not have access to health 
insurance; thus increasing financial protection from health care costs amongst these 
populations.   
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A systematic review of studies that have looked at CBHI in low income countries that 
was conducted by Ekman (2004) concluded that; there is strong evidence that CBHI offers 
some financial protection by reducing OOP spending for health care.  On the contrary, other 
studies are not so optimistic.  A systematic review of 258 CBHI schemes that was conducted 
by the International Labour Organization (ILO) concluded that, the evidence did not justify 
the assertion that CBHI schemes had been effective in providing financial protection in 
health care (Sun et al. 2009).  The reasons for these diverse views can be attributed to the 
inconsistencies in the interpretation of term ―financial protection‖.  Ekman (2004) 
considered any reduction in OOP payments for health care as financial protection, whilst the 
ILO study considered people to be financially protected when they did not have to draw an 
excessive proportion of their income to finance health care (Sun et al. 2009).   
 
Evidence from literature also suggests that CBHI schemes are not without challenges.  
These include exclusion of the poorest in the community from the financial protection 
benefits of CBHI schemes (McPake et al. 1993; Criel et al. 1999; Arhin 1994).  The main 
reason for this exclusion seems to be that, the small premiums that are contributed within 
these schemes can be out-of-reach for the poorest.  Risk pooling within CBHI schemes is 
also another major challenge.  Often, the risk pools are small and fragmented and in certain 
instances comprise only the poor people (especially when they focus on rural and informal 
workers only) (McIntyre 2007).  Thus cross-subsidies end up being between the poor only, 
putting an even greater burden on the poor.  The average expected cost of health care is also 
often higher and difficult to predict.  Lastly, the funds generated from these schemes are 
usually low, making sustainability an immense challenge 
 
2.2.4.2 Private health insurance 
Private health insurance (PHI) is characterised by contributions that are made via non-
income based premiums (Gottret 2007).  Usually, PHI is voluntary except in countries such 
as Switzerland and Uruguay where it is compulsory for an entire population or a 
subpopulation (Gottret & Schieber 2006).  The literature on PHI suggests that, this health 
financing mechanism is preferable to OOP expenditures, even though its impact on financial 
protection and access to health services is restricted to those with the ability to pay (Salehi 
2007).  This latter reason, has invoked much debate regarding how appropriate PHI is, for 
developing countries.  Opponents of PHI suggest that, these schemes tend to serve the 
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wealthier and healthier segments of the population, a result brought about by the problems of 
cream skimming
10
 and adverse selection that are predominant within the PHI market (Al-
Duaj 2009).  Evidence from South Africa, also suggests that, when PHI schemes are not 
under legal obligation to community-rate
11
 their premiums, this creates an incentive for risk-
rating (Soderlund & Hansl 2000).  Risk-rating as shown in this study is associated with 
higher premiums for the higher risk groups (ibid).  Higher premiums as can be expected can 
result in severe financial burden for individuals and households.  A study in Brazil also 
found out that private health plans are the second reason why households still experience 
catastrophic health events despite the country having achieved universal health coverage 
through its state funded system and public health services being offered for free (Barros et 
al. 2008; Bos & Waters 2008).  The authors highlighted that a significant proportion of the 
population (estimated at 25%) still buy private health plans, which as Bos & Waters (2008) 
pointed out have premiums that are quite expensive.   
 
Not all literature on PHI opposes the application of this health financing mechanism in 
developing countries.  In fact, proponents of this method suggest that provided the insurance 
schemes are well managed, PHI could play a positive role in improving equity and access in 
developing countries (Sekhri & Savedoff 2005).  Sekhri and Savedoff (2005) highlighted 3 
critical points to justify this.  The first point is that, PHI provides an opportunity for 
households to avoid large OOP expenditures, in countries where OOP spending still remains 
the predominant source of health financing.  Secondly, the authors highlighted the large 
informal sector as a major challenge for generating sufficient revenues that are required to 
fund SHI and NHI systems.  Referring to the latter, PHI is therefore regarded as an initial 
step towards risk pooling and pre-payment, until publicly funded coverage can expand 
sufficiently.  In addition, the existence of PHI is viewed as an opportunity to target publicly 
funded resources towards the most vulnerable groups whilst those who can contribute 
towards these schemes can do so.  The last point considers the fact that some SHI systems 
have in fact evolved from PHI systems.   
                                                          
10
 Cream-skimming refers to the practice whereby an insurance scheme enrolls a disproportionate 
percentage of individuals who present a lower risk than average risk of ill health 
 
11
 Community rating of health insurance policies is a method of setting premiums that spreads risk 
evenly across the entire community. Everyone pays the same rate regardless of age, health status, or 
claims history (Montgomery 2008) 
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2.2.5 Health care financing in African health systems 
The health financing systems in most parts of Africa are funded predominantly by OOP 
payments and general tax revenues (Hsiao & Shaw 2007).  In Sub-Saharan Africa, OOP 
expenditure is estimated to account for more than half of total health expenditure whilst 
virtually all the public health expenditure comes from general tax revenues (Gottret & 
Schieber 2006).  The high level of OOP expenditure observed in Africa can be attributed to 
the low revenue-raising capacity of general revenues that precludes their use as the main 
source of health financing.  This challenge is also the major reason that led to the 
implementation of user fees in most African countries in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
partly in response to pressure from international organisations
 
such as the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund (Gilson & McIntyre 2005).  These fees were intended as a cost-
recovery mechanism.   
 
Literature on the revenue-generating capacity of user fees suggests however that user 
fees were largely unsuccessful in raising significant resources in many countries.  The results 
of a review of user fee implementation in 19 African countries showed that, on average 
revenue from user fees accounted for 6.9% of the public health budget (Yates 2009).  
However, this increase was accompanied by declines in the utilization of health care services 
of about 5% to 8% with the declines greater and more sustained in the rural than in the urban 
areas as shown by a study conducted in Ghana (Badasu 2004).  Utilization studies in other 
countries such as Zaïre, Swaziland, Lesotho and Kenya show a similar pattern (Bethune et 
al. 1989; Bennett 1989; Yoder 1989; Moses et al. 1992).  Given that the impact of user fees 
on net revenue generation, efficiency, and equity are influenced by the rate and pattern of 
utilization, these empirical findings are predictive and of profound importance (Bethune et 
al. 1989).   
 
User fees also greatly contributed to increasing the exposure of poor households to the 
financial risks associated with illness.  Firstly was by initiating the vicious cycle of poverty 
and ill health.  Secondly, evidence suggests that by delaying to seek health care, many poor 
households ultimately incur even greater costs that are potentially impoverishing if the 
illness becomes severe and requires expensive health care (McIntyre 2007).  Recognizing the 
realities of the worsening economic conditions of their citizens, a number of African states, 
such as Ghana, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Tanzania adopted policies to exempt the poor and 
other categories from paying user fees (Badasu 2004).  However, exemption policies had 
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little success in most countries because of several reasons.  Some of these include the 
confusion at the local level of how the exemption system was supposed to work (Save the 
Children (UK) 2005).  In addition, health workers had little incentive to promote exemptions 
because they could personally benefit from the user fees since some of their salaries were 
being subsidised by user fees (ibid).  In Ghana, for example, only 1 in 1000 patients was 
exempted from user fees in 1995 despite the recognition that 15-30% of households lived in 
poverty (Nyonator & Kutzin 1999).  A study in Zambia also reported similar findings; thus 
suggesting that either the poor were not seeking health care or the exemption policy was not 
being fully implemented (Yates 2009). 
 
Recognition of the financial burden that user fees impose on households has led to the 
current move towards their removal with some form of prepayment mechanism that allows 
risk pooling being strongly advocated for.  The World Health Assembly that convened in 
May 2005 emphasized this by passing a resolution that recognises the absence of financing 
mechanisms offering risk pooling and prepayment mechanisms in most developing countries 
(Knaul et al. 2006).  As already mentioned, CBHI schemes seem to have gained the greatest 
attention in Africa with social health insurance being a fairly recent innovation.  Several 
countries have already implemented some form of CBHI.  Amongst these are Rwanda and 
Senegal.  Ghana is one of the few African countries that recently implemented its national 
health insurance which after three years had coverage of about 60% (Sulzbach 2008).  
Private voluntary health organizations are not really widespread and are predominant in a 
few countries such as Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa (Sekhri & Savedoff 2005). 
 
Another form of health financing that falls under general tax revenues that has not 
been discussed in detail is donor funding.  The share of total national health expenditures 
that comes from donors is high in many Sub-Saharan African nations (Hsiao & Shaw 2007).  
These funds which are channelled through the government account for more than 25 percent 
of the public health budget in many countries (ibid).  The problem with external funding is it 
is generally unreliable, and when it comes in the form of loans that have to be repaid (deficit 
financing) it can further reduce government expenditure through debt servicing (McIntyre 
2007). 
 
Several critical issues that have an impact on financial protection can be learned from 
African health financing systems.  Firstly, the heavy reliance on out-of-pocket payments for 
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health care that is predominant in these countries exposes many households to high financial 
risk that is associated with illness. In countries of Sub-Saharan Africa for example out-of-
pocket payments still account for, on average, about 41 percent of total national health 
expenditures (Hsiao & Shaw 2007).  The presence of a variety and most often fragmented 
risk pools in one health financing system is another issue.  Risk pool fragmentation 
significantly impedes effective risk pooling, and in many instances can lead to a sizeable 
portion of the population being missed out from any risk pool (Schieber et al. 2006; 
McIntyre & Gilson 2005).   
 
2.3 ASSESSING FINANCIAL PROTECTION AND EQUITY IMPACT OF OOP 
PAYMENTS 
Until recently, the literature on the distributional aspects of health care financing has been 
distinctly egalitarian, and has explored, either implicitly or explicitly, the impact of health 
care payments on income inequality (see Wagstaff & van Doorslaer 2003 for full list of 
references).  This information, as can be expected is of ultimate importance in determining 
the fairness or equity impact of the different forms of health care financing.  However, a 
limitation of this approach can be regarded as its failure to account for the economic impact 
of health care payments, particularly OOP payments on household welfare.  Understanding 
the economic impact of OOP payments is imperative if the extent to which households are 
financially protected (or need to be protected) from health payments is to be established.   
 
More recently, 2 alternative approaches have been developed, that attempt to fill the 
gap of the inequality or egalitarian based approaches mentioned above.  The first approach, 
termed the ‗catastrophe approach‘ is based on the view that, total OOP health care payments 
in excess of a certain threshold of household resources
12
 are catastrophic.  The rationale 
behind this is that, at or beyond a certain level (threshold) households would be forced to cut 
down on basic consumption, sell productive assets, incur debt and ultimately risk 
impoverishment (Wagstaff & van Doorslaer 2003).  The problem with this approach 
however is the need to use one‘s judgement as to when standards of living are disrupted.  As 
a result, there is no complete consensus regarding the ‗specific threshold’ for defining 
catastrophic health expenditures (Xu et al. 2007).  Most authors have used threshold levels 
of 2.5%, 5%, 10% 15% and 20% of total household income (Berki 1986; Wagstaff & van 
                                                          
12
 Household resources are measured either as household income, expenditure or consumption 
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Doorslaer 2003; Wyszewianski 1986).  Other threshold levels include expenditure equal to 
or above 40% of household‘s capacity to pay13 (Xu et al. 2003) ; and expenditure equal to 
10% of total consumption (Berki 1986; Xu et al, 2003; Devadasan et al. 2007).   
 
The second approach, termed the ‗impoverishment‘ approach, considers health 
spending to be ‗impoverishing‘ if it is sufficiently large to make a household poor or poorer 
as determined by shifts along the poverty line (Wagstaff & van Doorslaer 2003).  The core 
idea here is that, no one ought to be pushed into poverty or further into poverty by health 
expenses.  This approach, unlike the ‗catastrophe‘ approach shows how far ‗catastrophic‘ 
payments actually cause hardship.  Wagstaff (2008) gives an example of 2 households to 
illustrate this point: one with OOP expenditure which is 25% of pre-payment income, and 
yet nowhere close to the poverty line and another with a mere 1% of pre-payment income, 
yet that percentage brings it below the poverty line.   
 
A variety of issues arise with the use of these approaches.  One is the focus on the cost 
of medical care.  Several authors have argued that other direct costs such as income losses 
that arise from illness may be more important in terms of their impact on household welfare, 
as observed in a study that was conducted in Indonesia (Gertler & Gruber 2002).  Omitting 
income losses has however been justified on the grounds that these measures aim at 
measuring financial protection vis-à-vis health care expenses and that household protection 
against income losses is an issue of the social protection system more generally and is not 
specific to the health financing system (Wagstaff 2008).   
 
The second is the assumption that all OOP payments are non-discretionary and that 
such spending automatically deprives the household of resources.  The latter issue assumes 
that a household budget is fixed, thus if families finance some of their health spending 
through borrowing, savings or selling of assets, the impacts on their current budgets will be 
overstated (Hatt 2006)..  The third issue deals with the fact that these two approaches 
identify only the households that incur catastrophic and impoverishing medical expenditures 
and ignore those that cannot meet these expenses and so forgo treatment (O'Donnell et al. 
2008). Through the subsequent deterioration of health it is assumed that such households 
                                                          
13
 Capacity to pay is defined as expenditure net of spending on basic necessities (Xu et al. 2003). 
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possibly suffer a greater welfare loss than those incurring catastrophic payments (Pradhan & 
Prescott 2002).   
In spite of these limitations, medical spending in excess of a substantial fraction of the 
household budget is informative of at least part of the catastrophic economic consequences 
of illness, without fully identifying the welfare loss from lack of financing protection against 
health shocks.  This study therefore describes measures of financial protection based on 
these two approaches. 
 
2.3.1 Catastrophic expenditures: Empirical Studies 
A recent global health review of surveys in eighty-nine countries covering nearly ninety 
percent of the world‘s population suggests that; 150 million people globally (nearly 2.3% of 
households) suffer financial catastrophe annually because they pay for health care (World 
Health Organization 2008; Xu et al. 2007).  In this review which used a 40% threshold of 
household‘s CTP, Xu et al. (2007) estimate that catastrophic expenditures range from 0% in 
the Czech Republic, Slovakia and the United Kingdom to more than 10% in Brazil and 
Vietnam.  Several OECD countries—Portugal, Spain, Switzerland and the United States—all 
record rates in excess of 0.5% (Wagstaff 2008).  A separate study conducted in Georgia 
using the data from the Health Utilization and Expenditure Survey (HUES) of 2007 reported 
rates of CHEs which were as high as 11% for the entire sample population.  The threshold 
level used was again 40% of CTP.   
 
Another study conducted in Kenya reported CHEs of about 4% (Saksena et al. 2006).  
However, in order to counteract one of the limitations of CHE which is the focus on those 
who sought health care whilst ignoring those too poor to afford care, this study used a 
simulation approach to investigate what the level of CHE would have been if all those who 
were ill had in fact sought care.  Based on this simulation, the authors find that CHE would 
in fact have been as high as 19.05% in the lowest quintile group alone.  A major limitation of 
this approach however is the assumption that all reported illnesses in the survey was 
perceived as serious enough to require health care.  Yet, even with this limitation, this 
approach is at least informative of the total potential burden of OOP health payments.   
 
2.3.1.1 Determinants of catastrophic health expenditure 
At a national level, the share of OOP spending in health financing is seen to play a 
predictably large role (O‘Donnell et al. 2005). In the two studies by Xu and colleagues 
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described above, rates of catastrophic spending were higher in poorer countries and those 
with limited prepayment systems than in higher-income countries.  The latter are considered 
to have advanced social protection institutions such as social insurance or tax-funded health 
systems (World Health Organization 2008).  Van Doorslaer et al. (2007), in a similar study 
investigated catastrophic health expenditures in 14 Asian countries and concluded that the 
low incidence of catastrophic payments in Sri Lanka, Malaysia and Thailand can be 
attributed to the low reliance on OOP spending to finance health care, and the limited user 
fees in the public sector.  The high rates of catastrophic payments observed in South Korea 
are said to reflect the high co-payments in the country‘s social insurance system and the 
partial coverage of inpatient care (Wagstaff 2008). 
 
A significant portion of the literature on CHEs is also dedicated to assessing the 
performance of existing health insurance schemes in terms of their impact on financial risk 
protection of households.  Knaul et al. (2006), in a series of articles, investigated the impact 
of the Popular Health Insurance (SP) (termed Seguro Popula) in Mexico on incidence of 
CHEs.  These authors find that, since the introduction of this health financing reform in 
2001, incidence of CHEs has reduced.  The strength of this particular study was the use of 
data collected from the same surveys (i.e. National Household Income and Expenditure 
Surveys).  Use of data collected from the same surveys allows more accurate monitoring of 
time trends since information regarding health expenditure for example is asked in the same 
way.  The latter reduces variability in the estimations of expenditures, such as OOP 
expenditures.  Lu et al. (2009) recently pointed this out and argued that the survey design 
can significantly influence the estimate of OOP payments obtained in a study.   
 
Another important piece of evidence that is brought up by this study is the important 
symbiosis and mutual reinforcement that can exist between health insurance and integrated 
social programmes.  Prior to the implementation of SP, Opportunidades
14
  was already 
running and covered 5 million households living in poverty in Mexico, most of whom had no 
insurance. 
 
                                                          
14
 Opportunidades is an integrated social development and poverty alleviation programme that 
includes health, nutrition, micro-finance, and education components 
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A study that investigated the impact of two Indian community health insurance 
schemes (ACCORD and SEWA) focussing on hospitalization costs also concluded that, both 
health insurances halved the number of households that would have experienced CHEs by 
covering hospital costs (Devadasan et al. 2007).  Limwattananon et al. (2007) also find that, 
following the introduction of universal health scheme in 2001 in Thailand, rates of 
catastrophic spending amongst households reduced but were not eliminated.  This partial 
reduction as in the earlier case, points out to the limitations of health insurance to reduce or 
eliminate catastrophic spending.  Such limitation is a function of several factors; the most 
cited being the low maximum at which the benefits are capped (Devadasan et al. 2007).  
Limwattananon et al. (2007) also cite factors such as by passing the designated providers 
(which is prohibited under the capitation contract model without proper referrals) as one of 
the major causes why households still incurred CHEs.  Other studies that have reported 
similar findings include a joint ILO, WHO and OECD study covering three developing 
countries namely South Africa, Kenya and Senegal (Scheil-Adlung et al. 2006).  This study 
finds that though membership in health insurance schemes contributes to reducing the 
probability of incurring catastrophic health expenditures, in South Africa this only concerns 
the richest quintile that can afford comprehensive benefit packages (ibid).   
 
Other studies have however provided counterintuitive evidence of the impact of health 
insurance on catastrophic health spending (Ekman 2007).  In a study conducted in Zambia, 
Ekman (2007) finds that insurance increased the risk of catastrophic spending.  The author 
proposes that the amount of care per illness episode may have increased, as a result of either 
supplier induced demand or moral hazard (Wagstaff 2008).  What the results of this study 
misses out though is the fact that in the absence of health insurance, these households may 
have incurred even greater OOP costs resulting in greater welfare loss; or alternatively, these 
households would not have sought care at all.  Thus, in the absence of adequate data to check 
the health seeking behaviours before and after ownership of health insurance (as is the case 
in this study), concluding that HI is a risk factor for CHEs may be misleading.   
 
Nonetheless three other studies conducted for China support Ekman‘s findings.  The 
first study by Wagstaff and Lindelow (2008) finds that, the urban insurance in China 
increases the risk of catastrophic OOP spending.  The authors suggest that weak regulation 
of providers alongside fee-for-service payments system and a fee schedule that allows 
providers to make profits on drugs and high-tech care leads to a case where insured patients 
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receive more complex care and from higher-level (and hence more costly) providers 
(Wagstaff 2008).  The other study that focussed on China‘s rural scheme also concluded that 
these schemes have not resulted in a reduction in risk of CHE.  The authors attribute this to 
the high deductibles and low reimbursement ceilings and similar supply side response as 
those discussed earlier (Wagstaff et al. 2009).  Interventions on the supply side in China 
including introduction of treatment protocols and essential drug lists, have been shown to 
reduce the incidence of catastrophic health spending (Wagstaff 2008). 
 
Going beyond measurement, one would want to know what characteristics make a 
household vulnerable to incurring catastrophic payments.  Several studies have thus been 
conducted that have investigated the determinants (or risk factors) for catastrophic health 
expenditures.  In one such study, Xu et al. (2006) investigated the impact of eliminating user 
fees in Uganda on utilization and incidence of catastrophic expenditures.  The regression 
analysis for this study revealed that, whilst 2.92% of households incurred catastrophic 
expenditures, higher risk of CHEs was associated with being poor, use of health services 
(particularly private health services), elderly household members (above 65 years), having a 
household head with little education, and being a female headed household.  The latter was 
however only significant for non-poor households.  Lower risk of catastrophic expenditure 
was associated with living in an urban area.  Similar results were found in Indonesia and 
Lebanon, with additional findings that, formal education, ownership of health insurance, and 
having a bigger family also significantly reduce the risk of incurring catastrophic 
expenditures (Xu 2003).  For the latter, it is likely that pool of income is higher in bigger 
families.  The threshold level used was 40% of capacity to pay in all three studies 
 
Another study by Knaul et al. (2006) which investigated the impact of Seguro Popula 
in Mexico using National Health Income and Expenditure Surveys (NHIES) found that, 
households (HHs) in the richest quintile were less likely to suffer from CHEs.  However, this 
result was only significant when disposable income included money not only from income 
but savings, selling of assets and borrowing etc.; thus highlighting the fact that richer HHs 
generally can finance health from other sources such as savings and not just income.  Female 
headed households were less likely to suffer from CHE whilst having a household head who 
was 50 years or older; having at least one household member who was 65 years or older and 
having children less than 5 years old were all risk factors for CHEs.  Unlike the previous 
studies however, in this study the authors found out that larger HH size was a risk factor for 
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CHE whilst education of the HH and location of residence (urban vs. rural) had no effect on 
CHE risk.   
 
Ekman (2007) in a study that investigated the impact of health insurance in Zambia 
also finds that higher income, living closer to a health facility, being formally employed or 
being a farmer and having malaria in comparison to other illnesses or injury reduces the risk 
of catastrophic health expenditures.  However, contrarily this study finds that compared to 
renting a house, owning a house or having access to free accommodation increases the risk 
of catastrophic health expenditures.  This latter finding could be a reflection of the problems 
in the manner in which the data was collected.   
 
Other studies such as the one conducted by Gumber (2001) have investigated 
determinants of OOP health expenditure in India.  This study used primary survey data in 
Gujarat to find the effect of micro health insurance (SEWA), a women‘s union, on access to 
health care and OOP expenditure (Gumber 2001).  This study found that; social insurance, 
health care provider and demographic characteristics of the household are all important 
determinants of OOP expenditures.  A limitation of this study however, is the fact that it 
used a purposive sample covering 1200 households from Ahmedabad and neighbouring 
areas (Joglekar 2008).  Thus, the sample for this study is not representative of India and the 
results are only valid for the sample.  O‘Donnell et al. (2005), also estimate the probability 
of incurring CHEs in six Asian countries including India, using a two part model.  This study 
utilizes household level consumption expenditure data collected by the National Sample 
Survey Organization for the years 1999-2000 for India.  The results of this study showed 
that, as consumption expenditure increases, the probability of catastrophic OOP expenditure 
increases.  However, inclusion of household‘s total expenditure as one of the explanatory 
variables in an economic model has been shown to lead to endogeneity problems.  Thus use 
of alternative measures such as wealth or asset quintiles has been proposed in literature so as 
to circumvent this problem (Joglekar 2008).   
 
Other authors have directed their focus on the incidence of catastrophic health 
expenditures amongst the poorer communities.  Su et al. (2006) investigated determinants of 
CHEs in a low income district in Burkina Faso using cross-sectional surveys.  The variables 
tested were: illness and treatment episodes; utilization of professional (modern) care; having 
a disabled member in the family; having a member with chronic illness; household 
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characteristics such as educational status and gender of household head; size of household; 
and location of household as well as economic status.  Using the framework for analyzing 
determinants of health care utilization, which was proposed by Andersen and Newman 
(1973); all the factors investigated in this study are all related in some way to health care 
utilization.  As such, these factors can be distinguished into predisposing factors, enabling 
resources and illness level factors - a distinction which was proposed by these authors.  
Predisposing factors are regarded as those factors that increase the propensity of individuals 
to use health services, for example age, sex and educational level of the individual.  Enabling 
resources would be those factors that allow an individual to use health care services for 
example high levels of disposable income.  Illness level represents types of illnesses, number 
of illness episodes and disability.  It can be expected that, all the factors that are predictive of 
health care utilization (or higher health care utilization) would also be predictive of CHEs, 
since OOP expenditures are incurred through utilization of health care.   
 
The multivariate logistic regression analysis for this study confirms some of this 
theoretical analysis.  This study finds that; any type of care seeking following illness, a 
households‘ health care utilization especially for professional care, average number of illness 
and treatment episodes amongst household members, as well as the presence of chronic 
disease in household were all important factors that lead to catastrophic health payments (Su 
et al. 2006).  Limwattananon et al. (2007) who find that households using inpatient services 
at private facilities are at higher risk of incurring CHEs, reinforce the finding on utilization 
of modern care.  
 
Other studies have also focused on the economic impact of specific diseases 
particularly, malaria, HIV/AIDS and TB.  Castillo-Riquelme et al. (2008) investigated the 
economic impact of malaria between two countries, Mozambique and South Africa using as 
thresholds for CHE the 10% of household income and 40% of non-food expenditure.  The 
results showed a 32-34% and 9-13% incidence of catastrophic payments amongst households 
in Mozambique and South Africa respectively (Castillo-Riquelme et al. 2008). Many other 
studies have also been conducted on the economic impact of malaria in countries particularly 
in Africa (Ettling et al. 1994; Sauerborn et al. 1991, Asenso-Okyere & Dzator 1997; 
Attanayake et al. 2000; Chuma et al. 2006; Onwujekwe & Okonkwo 2000; Konradsen et al. 
1997). A distinct difference between these studies stems from the cost categories included in 
the calculation of catastrophic payments. Whilst Castillo-Riquelme et al. (2008), considered 
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both direct and indirect costs such as patient transport, caregiver transport, cost of medicines, 
consultation fees, cost of diagnostic tests and other costs incurred while waiting to be 
attended, other studies do not include costs for food and transport. Apart from malaria, CHE 
studies in Africa have also focused on the burden of HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis amongst 
households (Russell 2004). 
 
Thuan et al. (2006) conducted a study to compare incidence of catastrophic payments 
that is associated with different types of illnesses both communicable and non-
communicable diseases. The results of this study showed that communicable illnesses are 
predominant amongst the poorer people who also incur the highest catastrophic health 
expenditures. In addition, this study showed that catastrophic health care spending for a 
household is usually not a result of one single disastrous event, but rather a series of events 
and is related more to ―everyday illnesses‖ in a developing country context (Thuan et al. 
2006).  Su et al. (2006) in a related study contrarily concludes that non-communicable 
diseases and the neglected diseases such as Schistosomiasis, Trypanosomiasis and 
Leishmaniasis, are responsible for a significant proportion of health care costs among the 
poor. Such diseases are also prevalent in countries such as Zimbabwe (WHO 2002). 
 
2.3.2 Impoverishing expenditures: Empirical studies 
A cross-country analysis conducted in Asia looked at the effects of OOP payments on 
poverty estimates in 11 low to middle income Asian countries i.e. the impact of catastrophic 
expenditures on the extent of impoverishment (van Doorslaer et al. 2006).  Using the poverty 
estimates used by the World Bank ($1-a-day and $2-a-day poverty lines), this study 
estimated changes in the poverty headcount
15
 and poverty gap
16
 after in-cooperating OOP 
payments.  The results of this study showed that poverty headcount increased from 19.3% to 
22% of total population (so plus 2.7% of population) or an extra 78.25 million Asian people.  
These people were previously not counted as poor. However, their out-of-pocket spending 
brought them below the poverty line.  This study also showed that largest relative increases 
were in Bangladesh, India, China and Vietnam and this magnitude was clearly linked to 
                                                          
15 Poverty head count refers to the proportion of individuals falling below poverty line 
16
 Poverty gap refers to the average amount by which resources fall short of the poverty line (%) 
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OOP finance share and to population share at risk. Yet substantial cross-country variation 
even at same OOP level seemed to suggest some exemptions to charges for poor were 
effective (van Doorslaer et al. 2006).  The findings of this study like those of CHEs need to 
be interpreted with caution, bearing in mind that OOP health expenditure is not always non-
discretionary and similarly household budget is not always fixed.  A household that chooses 
to spend excessively on health payments is not pushed into poverty because of OOP 
payments.  Similarly, a household that borrows or use savings will not suffer a decline of 
household expenditure that is proportional to the amount dedicated towards health care.   
 
Wagstaff & van Doorslaer (2003) also looked at health care payments and poverty 
during the years 1993 and 1998 in Vietnam.  In 1998, the difference between the prepayment 
and post-payment poverty headcount (referred to as the poverty headcount adjustment) was 
around 3.5% whilst, the poverty gap adjustment (%) (Post payment normalised gap minus 
pre-payment normalised gap) was about 1% (Wagstaff 2008).  In 1993, the poverty 
headcount adjustment was about 4%, meaning that the fall in the headcount was larger for 
post-payment than pre-payment income.  These results show that the share of income 
absorbed by health spending fell over this period (Wagstaff 2008) 
 
Other studies such as the one by Sheil-Adlung et al. (2006) also estimated poverty due 
to OOP payments focussing on 3 African countries, namely: South Africa, Senegal and 
Kenya.  This study found that impoverishment due to OOP health payments ranged from 
1.5% to about 5.4% across these 3 countries.  In addition, OOP payments also deepened the 
poverty level of those already poor. These findings suggest that OOP payments not only 
precipitate poverty, they also place poor households into a poverty trap from which they may 
not escape.   
 
Several other studies have also looked at the impact of health reforms on 
impoverishment.  Knaul et al. (2007) finds that the proportion of people living on less than 
$2 a day declined continually between 1998 and 2004 in Mexico, a period during which SP 
was also introduced.  However, the authors attribute the decline to a combination of 
macroeconomic policies and poverty reduction programmes such as Opportunidades. 
Limwattananon et al. (2007) in a similar study, investigates the incidence of impoverishing 
expenditures due to household OOP payments, comparing the periods before and after 
universal health coverage (UC) in Thailand.  This study found that rates of impoverishment 
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were lower following introduction of UC in 2001 but were not zero.  The failure of the 
scheme to eliminate impoverishment is attributed to OOP expenses that people incurred as a 
result of by passing their designated provider.  The household characteristics that are risk 
factors for impoverishment are similar to those described earlier for catastrophic health 
expenditures. 
 
2.4 GAPS IN LITERATURE  
Despite the substantial evidence that CHEs are a significant problem in African developing 
countries, which are characterized by poverty and high levels of OOP payments, there seems 
to be no study that has been conducted specifically for Zimbabwe.  Amongst the countries 
that have been studied, none experienced the extraordinary challenges that Zimbabwe has 
been currently facing.  These include; closure of public sector facilities, inconceivable costs 
of private health sector fees as well as abrupt cessation of medical aid membership for the 
majority of beneficiaries of both private and public medical aid schemes. These challenges, 
which are very context-specific, make it almost impossible to fully understand and address 
the problem of CHEs in Zimbabwe using studies from other countries, particularly questions 
regarding the level of CHEs. 
 
In addition to giving insight regarding CHEs, this literature review also gave an 
indication of the impoverishing impact of OOP payments.  However, much of the literature 
on the impoverishing impact of OOP payments has been derived from studies conducted in 
Asia, with very few studies conducted in Africa.  This study will add to the aforementioned 
literature by giving evidence of impoverishment from a country which is already 
experiencing high levels of poverty.  This evidence could be of utmost benefit to countries, 
particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa that are experiencing similar poverty levels to that 
experienced in Zimbabwe.   
 
2.5 METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES  
This section discusses some of the limitations of catastrophic expenditure studies that have 
not been discussed in previous sections.  Specifically are the methods for measuring OOP 
and catastrophic private health expenditures. 
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Lu et al. (2009) recently investigated the effect of survey design, specifically the number of 
items and recall period on estimates of household OOP and catastrophic expenditure on 
health.  Using the World Health Surveys these authors investigate the impact of using a one 
item question (that asks for total OOP health spending in previous 4 weeks) or an eight item 
measure (which asks 8 detailed questions of health expenditure within 4 weeks) on the 
estimate of health expenditure.  These authors find that in 37 out of 43 countries, the single 
item measure yielded an estimate of annual health expenditure that was lower than the eight 
item measure, the result being statistically significant at the 95% level of confidence (Lu et 
al. 2009).  Thus, in most countries a lower level of disaggregation (fewer questions) gave a 
lower estimate of annual health expenditures.  In addition to this, the ratio of the percentage 
of households experiencing catastrophic health spending derived from the single-item 
measure to that derived from the eight-item measure ranged from 0.166 in Slovakia to about 
1.965 in Uruguay. This implies that the use of a single item measure relative to that of an 
eight item measure, can either under-estimate CHEs, give similar results or over-estimate the 
impact of CHEs.  These authors suggest that this observed variation implies that the methods 
used to collect health expenditure information can significantly confound analyses of the 
determinants of catastrophic spending and their variations over time. 
 
Another issue that is investigated by these authors is the impact of recall period on 
estimates of health expenditure.  Using the World Health Surveys for 43 countries, these 
authors find that the average annual household OOP spending on hospitalization derived 
from a one month recall period is significantly larger than the one derived from 12 month 
recall period.  Similar results were observed with the Nepal Living Standards Measurement 
Study (LSMS).  When the authors investigated the combined effect of recall period and 
number of items, it was however difficult to predict which one had the greater influence.  
Another important point that is raised in this study relates to the type of study that is used to 
collect information on heath expenditures.  In two Living Standards Measurement Studies 
from Bulgaria and Jamaica, these authors find that, questions about health expenditures that 
are fielded into a health module where people have been primed to think about the recent 
health experiences generally result in estimates that are higher than those from a health care 
consumption module. 
 
The use of cross-sectional data in estimating CHEs has often been pointed out as a 
limitation of CHE studies. Van Damme et al. (2003) and Duryea (2007) have argued that 
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cross-sectional data fails to capture the inter-temporal variations in the incidence of CHEs. 
They argue that a household incurring expenditure today, may after a few months be worse 
off, or have recuperated entirely from such expenditures depending on duration of illness, 
use of savings etc. These authors argue in favour of longitudinal studies that capture 
household coping strategies in analysis.  Recently, Wagstaff (2008) also proposed a method 
of measuring catastrophic health expenditures that reflects the proceeds of asset sales or 
funds received through a gift or loan.  Another problem with using cross-sectional data when 
investigating the type of illnesses that lead to the highest catastrophic impact is that some 
diseases are seasonal and sampling during such periods when the diseases prevalence is high 
overestimates the catastrophic impact of health payments for those illnesses.  
 
Notwithstanding the arguments presented above, the approaches that have been used 
thus far have merit in that they capture the amount of money that households have, (or have 
to find) to finance health care and relating it to standard of living.  In addition to this these 
studies at least in part are informative of the possible magnitude of the problems that 
countries have in a bid to protect citizens from health expenditures that are catastrophic and 
they can in fact form the stepping stone towards more detailed and expensive panel data 
analysis. 
 
2.6 SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 
This chapter discussed the different financing mechanisms (out-of-pocket payments 
government revenues, mandatory health insurance, and private voluntary health insurance) 
and their implications on equity and financial protection of households.  Out-of-pocket 
payments besides being the least equitable also offer the least financial protection on 
households.  The different prepayment mechanisms presented also offer differential financial 
protection to households as determined by several factors.  First is the size of the risk pool; 
with bigger risk pools offering greater potential for spreading risks across an insured 
population.  Second is how equitable the system is; with a system whereby the richer 
contribute more towards health financing offering greater financial protection.  Thirdly, is 
the composition and fragmentation of the risk pools with risk pools in which the poor only 
subsidise each other being less equitable. 
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In African health systems a combination of the different financing mechanisms exist 
in any one country.  Risk pools are often fragmented giving rise to risk pooling challenges.  
The high OOP payments still predominant in Africa also raise critical questions as to the 
extent to which health systems are providing financial protection to households.  Lack of 
financial risk protection from OOP payments, is a major threat to household welfare.  Thus, 
this review presents two measures of assessing household financial protection, namely; the 
―catastrophe‖ approach and ―impoverishment‖ approach.  Empirical evidence on the 
incidence of catastrophic health expenditures (CHEs) and impoverishment as well as the risk 
factors for CHEs was also presented. Based on the empirical literature, the incidence of 
CHEs and impoverishment (worldwide) ranges from between (0% to 10.5%) and (0% to 
5.5%) respectively.  The chapter ended with a discussion of the methodological limitations 
of catastrophic health expenditure studies 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
3 INTRODUCTION 
The preceding literature review gave information regarding the factors that are considered to 
be determinants of catastrophic health expenditures (CHEs).  These factors range from 
household characteristics such as income, to factors related to the health care system, 
particularly policies on health care financing.  Using the information gathered from the 
literature review, this study outlines a conceptual framework for analyzing how the different 
factors influence whether a household incurs a catastrophic health expenditure or not.   
 
Based on the literature review, incidence of catastrophic health payments is presumed 
to be a function of two components:  
(i) the level of OOP payments incurred by the household and; 
(ii) the ability of the household to meet such health care costs  
Since OOP costs are presumed to be driven by the type and quantity of health care consumed 
and the extent of third party coverage of the services; factors that are predictive of health 
care use alongside health insurance coverage would be expected to determine to a large 
extent the level OOP expenditures a household incurs (Crystal et al. 2000).  These factors 
together with some measure of a household‘s ability to pay (such as household income or 
consumption); capture the characteristics that make a household vulnerable to catastrophic 
payments.  The conceptual framework in fig 2.1 below, which has been adapted from 
Horstman (2007), is used in this study to show the possible pathways by which these factors 
influence the occurrence of a catastrophic health event. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1 REVIEW OF THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
Figure 3.1: Conceptual framework for analyzing determinants of catastrophic health expenditures 
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According to the conceptual framework that is outlined in figure 3.1 above, 
incidence and intensity of catastrophic health expenditures is a function of three main 
components: 1) household characteristics; 2) health services utilization and 3) the 
environment - which is divided into the health care system and the ―external‖ 
environment 
 
3.1.1 Household Characteristics 
Household characteristics are distinguished into predisposing characteristics, enabling 
resources and level of illness.  This distinction is based on the framework proposed by 
Andersen and Newman for evaluating determinants of health care utilization (Andersen & 
Newman 1973).  According to these authors, pre-disposing factors would be those factors 
that increase the propensity of households to incur health care costs as a result of use of 
health services.  Such factors include: (i) demographic composition of the household; (ii) 
household size; (iii) educational level of the household head and (iv) employment status of 
the household head.   
 
Enabling resources are regarded as those resources that make it possible for households to 
use health care services.  These resources include the household income and whether a 
household has access to health insurance or not.  Illness level includes: (i) the types of 
illnesses (perceived or diagnosed) that household members suffer from; (ii) Illness episodes 
(iii) presence of disabled member(s) in the household.  Various inter-relationships exist 
between these household characteristics as will be explained below. 
 
With respect to predisposing characteristics, it can be expected that risk of CHEs is 
higher for households with very young or very elderly members
17
.  This is so since health 
care utilization for these particular groups is generally high and consequently more of the 
household resources tend to be devoted towards health care (Habibov 2009).  Elderly 
members for example are at higher risk of chronic illnesses which usually entail the use of 
expensive prescription medications and lifetime treatment.  Young children, for reasons such 
as weakly developed immune systems are susceptible to various illnesses that also 
necessitate the use of health care more frequently (Andersen & Newman 1973).   
                                                          
17
Children aged 5 years and below are usually considered the very young in literature whilst the 
elderly are usually those above age 65 (Riveira et al. 2006).   
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In addition to this, elderly members and young children do not fully participate in the 
income generating activities of the household.  This implies that, households with a higher 
proportion of these individuals may also have fewer available resources than those with a 
higher proportion of economically active individuals (Habibov 2009).  Taking these 2 factors 
together, the expectation is that, these households will spend more on health care from fewer 
available resources which significantly increases their vulnerability to catastrophic health 
expenditures.  The same explanation would apply for households with illnesses that are 
severe, and households with disabled members.   
 
The other predisposing factors such as educational level and employment status of 
household head plus household size tend to influence the occurrence of catastrophic health 
expenditures through their effect on enabling resources.  Attaining an education for example 
increases one‘s opportunity to be employed and earn a salary or wage.  At the same time, 
average earnings increase measurably with higher levels of education (Bauma & Paeya 
2004).  Using the law of demand and supply, it is expected that, the more disposable income 
a household has, the more likely they are to utilize health care especially higher level care 
since they can afford it (King et al. 2002).  Consequently, one would expect the health care 
costs incurred to be much higher for wealthier households.   
 
Although health care costs can be much higher for wealthier households, OOP costs 
may not necessarily be high.  This is so since wealthier households also have greater ability 
to purchase health insurance, especially private health insurance as is the case in Zimbabwe.  
Thus, even with higher total costs of health care, the ownership of health insurance would 
shield wealthier households from incurring high OOP costs that could lead into financial 
catastrophe.  However, the protective effect of health insurance would be limited to services 
within the benefit package (BP) such that excessive use of services beyond the BP would 
explain why some wealthier households would end up incurring CHEs.  Despite this, 
differences in ability to pay between wealthier and poorer households can be so substantial 
that even with high OOP costs in the former group, the share of income (or expenditure) 
dedicated to health care would still be proportionally lower for the wealthier than poorer 
households.   
Education has also been shown to influence the way people understand health and their 
responsibilities in securing their health and that of others (MoHCW 2008).  For that reason 
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households in which the head of the household is educated are more likely to place greater 
value on preventive health care, such that the probability of household members falling ill 
reduces (Joglekar 2008).  Consequently the need to use more expensive curative health 
services also decreases.   
 
Household size can be expected to have either a positive or negative influence on the 
incidence of CHEs depending on how the size of the household impacts on the household 
resources.  On the one hand, larger households through the pool of income can reduce the 
vulnerability of the household to catastrophic health expenditures.  On the other hand, larger 
households could also mean more demands on the household resources for basic needs such 
as food and education particularly if the household has fewer economically active 
individuals.   
 
3.1.2 Health service use 
The type and level of health services used by households as already mentioned also 
determines whether households are at risk of financial catastrophe or not.  Type of health 
services refers to the different health services that households utilize, for example; 
pharmacy, private practitioner, public hospitals, traditional healers etc.  The level of care 
refers to primary care, secondary care and tertiary care.  The different levels of care are an 
important determinant since costs of care tend to vary across different levels of care 
(Normand et al. 1996).  Costs vary across the levels of care as a consequence of the type of 
services offered at each level.  Primary level facilities for example deal with uncomplicated 
health cases and also focus on preventive more than curative health care.  On the other hand, 
tertiary level facilities offer the most sophisticated services such as Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging (MRI) Scans, which require the of use expensive equipment and expensive 
specialist services (MoHCW 2008).  Consequently, the cost of such services is high.  Non-
use of health care services, as can be expected would result in a household not incurring any 
OOP health care costs.  This would therefore mean households in which no care is sought do 
not experience CHEs even though they may still experience greater welfare loss from not 
seeking care. 
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3.1.3 Environment 
The environment is another significant factor that influences the vulnerability of households 
to catastrophic health expenditures.  The environment as can be seen in the conceptual 
framework is distinguished into the health care system and the external environment.  The 
health care system is characterised by health policies that influence whether households 
incur OOP costs or not.  Such policies include user fee exemption policies and policies on 
free health care.  Exemption policies for example are usually targeted at the vulnerable 
groups such as the poor, the elderly and the very young; thus protecting them from 
catastrophic health expenditures.  Supply factors on the other hand such as the shortages of 
medicines within the health system (or exclusion of medicines from the benefit package), 
would increase vulnerability of households to CHEs even if the health care itself is free.  
This is so since households would have to resort to purchasing medications from private 
healthcare providers who are more expensive (Habibov 2009).   
 
The external environment concerns policies indirectly related to the health system, for 
example the government‘s concern about AIDS.  It can be hypothesized that a higher 
concern about AIDS by the government, will lead to lower levels of out of pocket spending 
on HIV/AIDS, due to more financial support through the health care system (Horstman 
2007).   
Other social protection policies include grants to the poor which increase their level of 
resources.  In addition to this, government‘s concern about environmental factors such as 
access to clean drinking water, proper sanitation, use of clean cooking fuels and housing 
conditions amongst others can reduce the health risks to which the households are exposed 
to.  Access to clean water for example reduces the incidence of water-related diseases such 
as diarrhoeal illnesses, whilst long exposure to household indoor pollution increases the risk 
of respiratory infections (Smith 2000).  In this regard, one would expect that households with 
poor access to safe drinking water and clean sources of cooking fuel and who have poor 
living conditions will have a higher probability of falling ill. Higher probability of falling ill 
would translate into higher OOP health expenditures provided health care is sought.  
 
3.1.4 Impact of catastrophic health expenditures 
Beyond just disrupting household consumption, CHEs can ultimately impoverish a 
household.  This can be expected if a household dedicates so much of its resources such as 
income or in some cases assets that can be readily converted into cash towards health care.  
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Since the incidence and intensity of CHEs determines whether households are impoverished 
by OOP expenditures or not, the same factors that determine whether households incur 
CHEs are also predictive of the incidence of poverty due to OOP health expenditures. Thus, 
factors that determine the incidence of CHEs, also determine why some households are 
impoverished by OOP health care expenditures.   
 
3.1.5 Summary 
This section presented a conceptual framework that outlined how the different factors 
namely; health system factors, external environment factors, household characteristics and 
health utilization factors influence the occurrence of a catastrophic health event.   
These factors as shown are inter-related in the manner in which they make households 
vulnerable to catastrophic health expenditures.  The conceptual framework outlined above 
will thus be used in the analysis of determinants of catastrophic health expenditure in this 
study
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CHAPTER 4 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
4 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter describes the methods of fieldwork and data analysis used in this study.  It 
outlines the sampling frame, study area, the sample size and the data collection techniques.  
The principles and rationale, for guiding decisions taken before and during data collection 
are also explained.  Further, the methods of data analysis that are used in this study and the 
rationale for choice of methods are explained.  
 
4.1 SURVEY SITE 
The data that was used for this study was collected via a household survey conducted by the 
researcher in the Harare province and Seke rural district in Zimbabwe.  The household 
survey was conducted within the periods: January to February 2009.  The two areas were 
selected for the survey for several reasons.  One is the researcher‘s familiarity with the 
locations, languages spoken and cultures in these areas.  The second is the urban-rural 
distinction.  The third reason is the close proximity of the rural and urban sites to each other 
that made it possible to carry out the surveys within the budget constraints.  
 
Harare, the capital city of Zimbabwe has an estimated population of 2,800,000 with 
1,600,000 living in its metropolitan area (Muronda 2008).  Harare is one of 2 cities (the other 
being Bulawayo) that has provincial status.  This province covers an area of 872 square 
kilometres (CSO 2004).  According to the basic administrative division of Zimbabwe, a 
province is sub-divided into districts, which are further sub-divided into wards.  In the case 
of rural areas, wards are classified even further into Village Development Committees 
(Vidcos).  Harare Metropolitan Province is divided into four districts: Harare Rural, 
Chitungwiza, Epworth and Harare Urban (Mutonodzo 2008).  Harare Urban comprises 
373,058 households, and has the largest proportion (76%) of the population (ibid).  This 
present study took place in Harare urban district, which is made up of 48 wards spread over 
27 suburbs.  The suburbs can be divided into three broad categories based on socio-economic 
stratification (Muronda 2008).  These are high, medium and low-density suburbs. 
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Generally, high density areas are densely populated areas where the low income 
people reside while low density areas are sparsely populated areas where high income 
earners mostly reside (Mutandwa & Gadzirayi 2006).  However, some middle income and 
low income earners also reside (either as domestic workers, lodgers or as tenants) in low 
density areas making this classification of socio-economic status by residential area less 
concrete.  Nevertheless to aid selection of a sample that represents urban population 
characteristics particularly heterogeneity in income, it was imperative to include households 
from high density, medium density and low density suburbs in this study.  The suburbs that 
were surveyed in this study are shown in table 4.1.1. 
 
Table 4.1.1 Suburbs in Harare urban district surveyed in this study by name and type  
Suburb Suburb type 
Malborough Low density 
Greencroft Low density 
Old Highfield High density 
Glenview 1 High density 
Kuwadzana 1 High density 
Old Highfield High density 
Warren Park 1 Medium density 
Tynwald South Medium density 
 
Seke rural district which is in the Mashonaland East province has 21 wards.  According to 
the 2002 population census, Seke district comprises 19 091 households with 39 213 males 
and 38 627 females.  The average household size is estimated at 4.1 persons.  For this study, 
only households in the communal lands were interviewed.  Communal land is one of the five 
land use sectors in Zimbabwe.  The others are: resettlement areas, small scale farming areas, 
large scale farming areas and urban and semi-urban areas.  Communal lands in Seke district 
were thus chosen to capture a representative rural population in which subsistence farming is 
the principal economic activity. 
 
4.2 SAMPLE SIZE 
The question of the number of households to be included in the survey was addressed 
statistically, to achieve a desired representative sample.  According to Duijnhouwer (1998), 
the sample size of household surveys in which both binomial variables and quantitative 
variables are measured can be calculated from the following formula 
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Where; 
  
  a constant to be used for samples larger than 60 and 95% confidence limits.   
  This constant is approximately 4.0 for 95% confidence limits 
  
  
 
  
   
 18  
 
  
 
The target sample size for this study was therefore: 
 
 
 
4.2.1 Unit of analysis 
The unit of analysis in this study was the household.  For the purpose of this study, a 
household was defined as a person or group of related and unrelated persons who live 
together in the same dwelling unit(s), who acknowledge one adult male or female as head of 
household, who share the same housekeeping arrangements, and who are considered one unit 
(Central Statistical Office (Zimbabwe) & Macro International Inc. 2007).  The household 
was chosen as the unit of analysis primarily because expenditures relating to health care and 
                                                          
18
 The design effect is the loss of effectiveness by the use of cluster sampling, instead of simple 
random sampling. The design effect is basically the ratio of the actual variance, under the sampling 
method actually used, to the variance computed under the assumption of simple random 
sampling(Frongillo 1996) 
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coping mechanisms usually affect the overall household budget and not just the sick 
individuals (Rahman & Ahmed 2006).   
 
4.2.2 Distribution of households within the study sample 
As seen in the equation above, the target sample size for the entire study population was 600 
households. The researcher aimed to interview 120 households (20% of households) from 
the rural areas and the other 80% (480 households) from urban areas. This is despite the fact 
that 80% of the population reside in rural areas in Zimbabwe.  Cost constraints related to 
travel and accommodation expenses motivated the choice of only 20% of households to be 
from rural areas.   
 
Out of the 480 households from urban areas, the researcher targeted 288 to be from high 
density suburbs, whilst the middle and low density suburbs had target sample sizes of 96 
households each. The proportion of households chosen from each stratum was done 
according to the population size in each stratum.  Although 5 enumeration areas would have 
achieved a target sample size of 480 households, the first day of interviews indicated that the 
number of households in each EA was on average 60 households and not the expected 100 
households.  The few households observed in each EA is suspected to have been a 
consequence of the ―operation restore order19‖ that took place in Zimbabwe in 2005, which 
led to destruction of homes in both rural and urban areas. Thus the decision was made to 
select 8 EAs in the urban areas to achieve a desired sample size of 480 households.  
Likewise, 3 EAs were chosen for the communal lands.  
 
4.3 SAMPLING STRATEGY 
This study used a multi-stage sampling procedure to select the study sample.  The first stage 
for selection of urban households involved stratification of the urban district into low 
density, middle density and high density suburbs.  In Zimbabwe residential areas have been 
historically divided into low density, middle density and high density suburbs.  High density, 
for the black people (where the poor now reside), middle density for the coloureds (where 
                                                          
19
 This operation resulted in the destruction of homes nationwide and it was expected that the number 
of households in each EA would be much lower than that reported in the last population census of 
2002 
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the middle income now reside) and low density meant for the white (where the better off 
now reside) (ZimVAC & SADC FANR VAC 2004). 
 
The second stage was random selection of suburbs within the 3 strata.  Random 
selection was performed using the dice roller 3.0 software package.  The number of suburbs 
chosen from each stratum was based on probability due to population size in each stratum.  
The third stage in sampling was random sampling of one enumeration area (EA) per suburb.  
Enumeration areas have an average of about 100 households each.  To identify the EAs, the 
Zimbabwe Master Sampling Frame (ZMS02) developed after the 2002 population census 
was used.  In total 8 EAs were selected.  The final stage involved sampling of all households 
within the EA.   
 
4.3.1 Selection of rural sample 
The first stage in the selection of the sample from the Seke rural district was purposive 
sampling of communal lands in the district.  According to the ZMS02, rural enumeration 
areas are stratified into: 
(1) Communal Lands 
(2) Small-Scale Commercial Farms 
(3) Large-Scale Commercial Farms 
(4) Resettlement Areas 
 
In this study, communal lands were purposively chosen for the reasons that were 
highlighted earlier.  The second stage was random selection of 3 EAs from the EAs within 
the communal lands.  The last stage in sampling was sampling of all households in each 
enumeration area. In total 11 EAs were chosen for this study. 
 
4.4 TRAINING AND FIELD WORK 
The researcher adapted an existing training manual from the CSO for this study (Central 
Statistical Office (Zimbabwe) 2004).  The training manual gave: the background of the 
study; aims and objectives of the study; sample design; role of fieldworker, team leader and 
supervisor; basic principles of conducting interviews amongst others.  Nine field workers 
who had previous experience in conducting household surveys similar to the one for this 
study were selected.  Two of these acted as the team leaders.  Fieldworkers were trained for 
three days.  This was followed by a carefully supervised pilot test on 50 households to assess 
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the competence of the interviewers.  The pilot test also informed changes on the survey 
instrument.  Some of the changes to the survey instrument included the inclusion of a section 
that specifically asked about pregnancy and pregnancy related costs.  This decision was 
made following the recognition that pregnancy related costs were not being reported even 
though some piloted households had incurred medical costs related to antenatal care. 
 
4.5 THE SURVEY INSTRUMENT AND DATA COLLECTION TECHNIQUE 
4.5.1 The survey instrument  
The main aim of this study was to identify the household economic consequences of paying 
for health care using out-of-pocket (OOP) payments.  The study also aimed to identify the 
risk factors for catastrophic health payments, and health payments induced poverty.  In order 
to do this, the survey instrument which was in the form of a household questionnaire was 
designed, translated into two dialects and divided into seven sections in which the following 
information was obtained: 
1. Household demographics  
2. Education  
3. Employment activity and household income  
4. Health incidence/ spending/expense  
5. Household consumption expenditure and food spending  
6. Health expenditure related to pregnancy  
7. Household coping strategies  
8. Asset ownership 
The full survey instrument is attached as appendix 1. 
 
4.5.2 Data collection technique  
After training, the team of fieldworkers including the principal researcher started intensive 
data collection which was completed in three weeks (from 15
th
 January 2009 to 7
th
 of 
February 2009).  The group was divided into 2 teams, each headed by a field supervisor who 
supervised the team during the entire field work.  Each team was deployed into an EA (one 
EA per team) and interviews conducted with all households in that EA before the team could 
move to any other EA.  In every household, efforts were made to interview the head of the 
household.  However where this was not possible, the most senior member of the household 
was interviewed.   
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The total number of households in the 11 EAs surveyed was 547 households. 
Interviews could only be conducted with 501 of these households.  Non-response rate in this 
study was therefore 8.5%.  The other 46 households could not be interviewed for the 
following reasons:   
i) 15 households in the rural areas had attended a funeral in the neighbouring village  
ii) 10 households in the low density areas and 8 households in middle density areas could not 
be interviewed as there was no one available at home during the time of the survey. Efforts 
had already been made to conduct the survey on a Sunday afternoon when most respondents 
are not at work. 
iii) 13 households could not be interviewed in the high density areas as they refused to 
respond.  The respondents felt that the project was politically affiliated
20
 and were afraid 
responding would place their lives at risk.  
The researcher felt that the households that could not be interviewed were atypical and 
would not have much of an effect on the results of the study.  More so, the budget constraints 
could only allow follow up of a few households.   
 
4.5.3 Data management and quality checks  
To ensure quality and accurate primary data collection, the researchers had three days 
training before field work and the instruments were field-tested.  In addition, completed 
questionnaires were checked for inconsistencies and errors at the end of each day both by the 
field supervisor and the researcher.  Any query or inconsistent questionnaire was returned to 
the fieldworker in question for re-interview with the respondent.  The field supervisors and 
the researcher also acted as ―quality controllers‖ as they were with the field workers all the 
time. 
 
4.5.4 Data management 
A double data entry system was used with data entry carried out at the Central Statistics 
Office (Zimbabwe) by data entry clerks and independently by the researcher.  Data entry ran 
                                                          
20 The survey was conducted at a time of political instability.  There were several reports of politically 
motivated violence especially in high density areas a few months prior to the survey.   
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concurrently with data collection and it took two weeks.  EPI INFO version 6 was used for 
data entry.  Data cleaning on the original data files was conducted using EPI INFO and SPSS 
(Statistical Package for Social Scientist) version 12.  Tabulation and further statistical 
analysis was conducted in STATA version 10.  Verification was done on almost 5% of the 
forms.  Data cleaning was also continuous up to report writing.   
 
4.6 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The University of Cape Town Research Ethics Committee and the Medical Research 
Council of Zimbabwe approved this study.   
 
4.7 DATA ANALYSIS 
This section presents the methods of data analysis used in this study.  First, a theoretical 
model that explains whether CHE is a reliable measure of welfare change is presented and 
justification for use of this method given.  Second, a discussion of the different methods of 
calculating catastrophic health expenditures and impoverishment due to health spending is 
presented.  A discussion on measurement of variables and definitions of concepts used in this 
study follows.  Finally, regression based models for determining risk factors for catastrophic 
health expenditures are presented. 
 
4.7.1 Catastrophic health expenditure as a measure of welfare change 
Until recently, the literature on catastrophic and impoverishing health expenditures has been 
supported almost entirely by empirical evidence.  This lack of economic theory has led to 
concerns regarding the plausibility of using CHE as a measure of change in household 
welfare. However, in 2008, Naga and Lamiraud proposed an economic framework which as 
the authors pointed out, is possibly the first economic framework to be developed in this 
field that addresses whether a budget share can indeed be informative about a sign of a 
change in welfare.   
 
According to these authors, a change in household welfare arises from either a change 
in household income (m), a change in one or more prices (p) or a change in both prices and 
income.  When the focus is placed on income as a predictor of change in household welfare 
(since income shocks are considered household specific and prices perceived to affect all 
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individuals alike), the resulting change in welfare can be approximated by the following 
equation: 
 
 
Where: 
  = Household‘s base period income 
  = Household‘s current period income 
 ) =  since the marginal utility of income ( ) is always positive 
  = change in welfare 
 
Letting , equation 4.1 can be rewritten as: 
 
 
 
What the equation 4.2 above simply shows is that the change in welfare is always of the 
same sign as the change in income.  In the presence of panel data, information on change in 
income can be easily obtained in order to assess whether household welfare has reduced or 
not.  However, in the absence of such data, cross-sectional surveys have been used and a 
budget share of OOP health expenditure (which is the basis for measuring CHEs) is used as a 
proxy measure of disruptions in household welfare.   
If one defines the budget share for good (i) in the current period as  
 
 
 
Then equation 4.1 can be simplified as shown in equation 4.4 below.  For a full explanation 
of the transformation, the reader is referred to (Naga & Lamiraud 2008).   
 
 
 
Because  and  have the same sign, and  
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
  
 
58 
 
a high level of the budget share is considered equally compatible with a scenario where 
 (for which ) and with a situation that  (corresponding to ).  
Simply expressed therefore, a budget share according to these authors is limited in its scope 
of identifying households with a change in welfare unless the sign of the income change is 
known. 
 
Other authors have previously used other theoretical explanations to support this 
finding (Wagstaff 2008).  These authors have suggested that, medical spending in its own 
does not automatically deprive households of resources since households in most instances 
are able to smooth out consumption through use of savings, borrowing, selling assets 
amongst other things.  What these arguments tend to miss out though, is the fact that even if 
households are able to smooth out consumption through the strategies mentioned above, they 
still incur costs in financing their OOP payments (Adhikari et al. 2009).  When households 
borrow money for example, they have to repay in subsequent periods, often at exorbitant 
interest rates.  On a similar note, when they sell assets or use savings, in subsequent periods 
they forgo returns on assets and savings (Wagstaff 2008).  In addition to this, poor 
households have been found to almost exclusively report reducing consumption in food, 
education and transport etc so as to finance increases in non-subsistence expenditure for 
example expenditure on health care.  This is so since non-subsistence expenditure is usually 
very low in poor households.  This can be hypothesized to be the situation in Zimbabwe 
owing to the high poverty levels in the country.   
 
Thus, whilst the catastrophic expenditure approach that is currently being used may be 
considered a naive approach in that it assumes that consumption drops concurrently with 
medical outlays; it still has its merits (Wagstaff 2008).  These include the fact that it still 
captures the amount of money that households have or have to find when they are faced with 
OOP medical costs and relating it to their standard of living.   
 
4.7.2 Measurement of economic consequences of health care payments 
Following on from previous discussions, two different measures are used to evaluate the 
economic burden and consequences of health care payments for this study: 
i. Catastrophic payments caused by OOP payment for health care services 
ii. The impoverishing impact of OOP healthcare payments 
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The choice of catastrophic and impoverishing health costs as measures of financial 
protection is based on the ethical principle that no household should spend more than a given 
fraction of their income on health care; such a fraction is defined in this study as .  As 
already mentioned in the previous chapter, the choice of  is somewhat arbitrary and 
depends on what the total household OOP health expenditure share is defined in relation to.  
In the literature reviewed OOP share of health expenditure has been defined in relation to:  
1. prepayment income   
2. total household expenditure (  
3. Household‘s ―capacity to pay‖  
Pre-payment income or expenditure in this study refers to income or expenditure before any 
deductions on necessities for example spending on food. 
 
4.7.3 Estimating catastrophic health expenditure 
The variable on catastrophic health expenditure is constructed as a dummy variable with 
value 1 indicating a household with catastrophic expenditure, and 0 without catastrophic 
expenditure as shown in equation 4.5 below. 
 
 
                   (Equation 4.5) 
 
Where; 
 
  
 
When  represents income , the threshold levels that have been commonly used are: 
2.5%, 5%, 10% 15% and 20% of total household income (Berki 1986); (Wagstaff & van 
Doorslaer 2003; Wyszewianski 1986).  Threshold levels of 5%, 10%, 15% and 25% have 
been used when the OOP payment share is defined in relation to total household expenditure 
(O'Donnell et al. 2008). 
 
The catastrophic threshold levels that have been used for health payments defined in relation 
to capacity to pay (CTP) have however varied depending on how capacity to pay is defined.  
According to the WHO methodology that was proposed by Xu (2005), catastrophic spending 
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occurs when health care for a household exceeds 40% of the household‘s capacity to pay 
( ). 
 
Where; 
 
                (Equation 4.6) 
                     (Equation 4.7) 
 
 denotes the total expenditure and FEXP denotes food expenditure.  SE stands for 
subsistence expenditure and is the average food expenditure for households whose food 
expenditure share of total expenditure is in the 45
th
 to 55
th
 percentile. 
 
The second approach by Wagstaff (2003) calculates capacity to pay as income net of 
spending on basic necessities (not just food expenditure).  The equation is shown below.  
The threshold levels that have commonly been used when CTP is defined in this way are: 
15%, 25% and 40% of household‘s CTP.   
 
                            (Equation 4.8) 
 
Where; 
  is the prepayment income;  is the deductions on necessities such as food  
     spending. 
Threshold levels used with this method are; 10%, 20%, 30% and 40%. 
 
4.7.3.1 Estimating catastrophic health expenditure in this study 
In this study the health payments share is estimated in terms of capacity to pay .  The 
WHO methodology for estimating capacity to pay (equations 4.6 and 4.7 above) is used.  
This method has been chosen for 2 main reasons.  Firstly, is the fact that this method has 
been commonly adopted in studies that estimate catastrophic health expenditures in 
developing countries (Xu et al. 2006; Thuan et al. 2006; Riveira et al. 2006).  Most 
importantly, CTP (roughly non-food spending) is chosen since non-food expenditure better 
distinguishes between the rich and poor; hence would be a better measure of assessing 
impact of OOP payments on household welfare in low income countries (O'Donnell et al. 
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2008).  In this study however, catastrophic health expenditures will be defined using a range 
of threshold values instead of the single threshold value of 40% of CTP.  As mentioned in 
the preceding literature review the 40% threshold level is arbitrary and use of a range of 
threshold levels (i.e. 15%, 25% and 40% in this study) allows the reader the opportunity to 
choose the threshold level to which they can give more weight.   
 
4.7.4 Measuring incidence and intensity of catastrophic health expenditure 
The extent to which a given sample of households has been exposed to catastrophic health 
expenses is measured using the headcount or incidence .).  This measure gives the 
(number) or fraction of households whose health care costs as a proportion of  
exceeded the threshold ) (Wagstaff & van Doorslaer 2003).  The formula for .) is: 
 
                                                      (Equation 4.9) 
 
Where;  
N is the sample size  
And;  
(Equation 4.10) 
  
Where;  
  is an indicator which is equal to 1 for households with catastrophic health expenditure 
 And is equal to 0 for households without catastrophic health expenditure  
 represents the household OOP health expenditure 
 is the non-food expenditure (CTP) for household i 
 is the threshold level as a percentage 
 
The catastrophic payment headcount, though indicating the incidence of catastrophic medical 
payments does not reflect the amount by which households exceed the threshold, or simply 
the intensity of the catastrophic occurrence.  This study therefore defines another measure, 
the catastrophic overshoot .  The catastrophic overshoot is calculated as: 
 
                  (Equation 4.11) 
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Where; 
 is the catastrophic overshoot for the entire sample 
N is the sample size  
 is the catastrophic overshoot for household i 
 represents the household OOP health expenditure 
 is the non-food expenditure (CTP) for household i 
 is the threshold level as a percentage 
  is an indicator which is equal to 1 for households with catastrophic health expenditure 
 And is equal to 0 for households without catastrophic health expenditure 
 
The catastrophic overshoot as reflected in equation 4.11 above captures the average degree 
by which payments as a proportion of CTP exceed the threshold ; Thus, giving an 
indication of the severity or intensity of the catastrophic occurrence. 
 
4.7.4.1 Catastrophic measures that are sensitive to household socio-economic status 
The incidence and intensity of catastrophic health expenditures (CHEs) described above, 
though providing information on the prevalence and magnitude of CHEs do not provide 
information regarding whether it is the poorer or better-off households who exceed the 
threshold (Wagstaff & van Doorslaer 2003; Adhikari et al. 2009).  In light of the fact that 
society in general and policy-makers specifically are likely to be more concerned if it is the 
former rather than the latter that exceed the threshold, measurement approaches that show 
how proportions of those exceeding the threshold vary across the income distribution have 
been defined in literature (Wagstaff & van Doorslaer 2003).   
 
The first approach by Wagstaff and van Doorslaer (2003) defines the concentration 
index for  and the concentration index for ( .  A positive  value indicates a 
greater tendency for the better-off to exceed the threshold, while a negative value indicates 
that the worse off are more likely to exceed the threshold.  Similar interpretations hold for 
the overshoot.  In order to take into account the distribution of catastrophic payments, a 
weighted headcount and overshoot are defined.   
 
                                             (Equation 4.12) 
                                                  (Equation 4.13) 
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Where;  
is the weighted headcount 
 is the unweighted headcount 
 is the concentration index for the indicator  
 is the weighted overshoot  
 is the unweighted overshoot  
 is the concentration index for the catastrophic overshoot for household i  
 
The weighted headcount is larger than H when is negative, indicating that from a 
social welfare perspective, the catastrophic problem is worse than it appears when H is the 
focus since it is poorer households that tend to exceed the catastrophic threshold (O'Donnell 
et al. 2008).  A similar interpretation holds for comparisons between  and  (ibid). 
 
An alternative approach that has been suggested by (Wagstaff 2008) involves 
tabulating the incidence of CHEs and the catastrophic overshoot by prepayment income 
quintile.  This latter method is the one that will be used in this study.  However, asset index 
quintiles rather than prepayment income quintiles will be used due to the reasons that will be 
highlighted in later sections of this chapter. 
 
4.8 IMPOVERISHING IMPACT OF OOP HEALTHCARE PAYMENTS 
Poverty is one of the predominant problems in Zimbabwe.  This study is therefore concerned 
with just how far catastrophic payments cause hardship, and not just the incidence of these 
expenditures.  The ethical position behind assessing the impoverishment impact of OOP 
payments is that no one should be pushed into poverty or deeper into poverty because of the 
need to use health care.  Taking this into perspective, this study defines measures of poverty 
that are reflective of the impact of OOP health payments. 
 
4.8.1 Measuring impoverishing impact of OOP payments  
The impact of health payments on impoverishment is measured in terms of poverty 
incidence.  The poverty incidence (or headcount index) quantifies the percentage of the 
population pushed below the poverty line as a result of health care payments.  Households 
that are already poor (i.e. below the poverty line) are therefore not impoverished; they can 
only be brought deeper into poverty.  
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To determine incidence of poverty due to OOP payments, a variable ) is created. 
is equal to 1 when a household is impoverished and equals 0 if household is not 
impoverished as shown by the equation below.  
 
 
(Equation 4.14) 
 
Where;  
  = equivalized household expenditure 
   = total household expenditure 
   = poverty line 
  = equivalent household size 
  = per equivalent household OOP spending on health care  
The equivalent household size  is calculated as:  
 
 
 
A household equivalence scale rather than the actual household size is used taking into 
account the economy scale of household consumption (Xu 2005). 
 
The equivalent OOP spending on health care is calculated as: 
                                                       (Equation 4.16) 
 
Where: 
   is the total OOP health care payments for the household 
 
Alternatively equation 4.14 can be rearranged as follows; 
 
    (Equation 4.17) 
 
Where  = subsistence expenditure and is the product of the poverty line and the household 
equivalent scale as shown below: 
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                                                   (Equation 4.18) 
 
4.8.2 Defining the poverty line 
To compute the poverty headcounts described above, one needs to first establish a poverty 
line that will be used.  Several poverty lines have been defined in literature ranging from 
absolute poverty lines to relative poverty lines.  An absolute poverty line defines poverty in 
relation to an absolute amount of household expenditure per capita whilst a relative poverty 
line is defined as some fraction of mean or median household expenditure (O'Donnell et al. 
2008).   
 
Wagstaff and van Doorslaer (2003) defined 2 poverty lines in their analysis of 
impoverishment impact of OOP payments in Vietnam.  The first poverty line was a food 
poverty line (FPL) that indicated the cost of reaching subsistence nutritional requirements 
(2100 calories a day).  This poverty line is also termed an absolute extreme poverty line.  
The second poverty line that they used which is termed a broader based poverty line made 
some allowance for non-food spending.  Other poverty lines that have been defined in 
literature have been derived from the country‘s per capita annual income adjusted for 
inflation (Adhikari et al. 2009).  World Bank estimates of US$1 per day and US$2 per day 
poverty lines have also been used (van Doorslaer et al. 2006).  According to Xu (2005), the 
weighted average of food expenditure in the 45
th
 to 55
th
 percentile range of the sample under 
study gives the subsistence expenditure per equivalent capita, which is also the poverty line.   
 
4.8.2.1 Computing the poverty line for this study 
The poverty line that will be used in this study is a nationally derived FPL for Zimbabwe for 
the month of February
21
 2009 that was estimated by the Central Statistics Office (CSO) of 
Zimbabwe.  A nationally derived FPL was chosen to allow generalizability of results to the 
population from which the samples were taken.  Calculation of a poverty line based on a 
small sample such as the one in this study could have resulted in inaccurate estimation of the 
FPL.  Consequently, households that could be considered non-poor in this study (based on 
their food share) could in actual fact be considered poor if a nationally representative sample 
was used; the converse is also possible.   
 
                                                          
21
 The period of estimation of the FPL coincides with the survey month.   
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According to the CSO, the FPL for a family of 5 in February was estimated at 
USD157.93 (USAID 2009).  Using a household equivalence scale described above, the 
poverty line (PL) per (equivalent) capita would be calculated as: 
 
 
 
 
 
A household would therefore be considered poor if its total household expenditure per 
(equivalent) capita is less than the  otherwise the household is considered non-poor.  
This is illustrated by the equations below. 
 
 (Equation 4.19) 
                  (Equation 4.20) 
 
Or alternatively  
 
 
Consequently, a non-poor household would be impoverished by OOP payments if total 
household expenditure per (equivalent) capita after deductions of household OOP payments 
per (equivalent) capita was less than USD64.13 as shown by the equations above.   
 
4.9 EXAMINING INCIDENCE OF OOP PAYMENTS 
This study, estimated the incidence of OOP payments (using average OOP payment) by 
socio-economic status.  The average OOP payment is the summation of all the OOP 
payments made by households in each quintile divided by the number of households in each 
quintile.  At this point, it is important to mention that, preliminary analysis of the distribution 
of OOP payments (appendix 3) indicated that, OOP payments of USD2940.00, USD1960.00 
and USD1526.00 that were made by 3 households in quintile 4 were much higher than other 
OOP expenditures reported in this study.  This study therefore considered these OOP 
expenditures outliers and removed them from all the analysis that incorporated estimates of 
OOP expenditures.  The latter excludes the estimates of catastrophic health expenditures. 
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4.10 MEASUREMENT AND DEFINITIONS OF CONCEPTS 
4.10.1 Computing total monthly OOP health expenditure 
The total household OOP health expenditure for this study was computed from 4 detailed 
questions that asked questions regarding health spending in the month preceding the survey.  
The first question captured the cost of medicines for each illness episode and for every sick 
household member.  The second question asked for the total out-of-pocket payments that 
were paid for the health services used and these included payments for consultation, in-
patient stay, laboratory tests, x-rays and any payments made either to prophets or faith 
healers.   Because of the short recall period used in this study, the OOP payments for 
inpatient and out-patient care were not differentiated.  The third question captured costs 
related to antenatal visits for pregnant women.  This category was added following the pilot 
test which informed that costs for antenatal care were not being reported even though a 
significant proportion of sampled households had in fact incurred OOP payments as a result 
of antenatal visits.  The fourth question captured costs related to any follow up or medical 
check-ups that any sick household member may have had. 
 
4.10.2 Computing total household expenditure 
To capture total household expenditure, the monetary value in United States Dollar (currency 
used in survey) for monthly household expenditure on the following: food, education, 
healthcare, fuel heating, household maintenance, transport, payment of domestic labour, rent 
and personal items etc were recorded plus the money value of home-made products.  To 
value home-made products households were asked how much they would have to pay if they 
were to purchase the product at the local grocery store and the market value of that product 
was the one used for the study.  This approach has its limitations in that it possibly 
overestimates the expenditure of home-made products which are usually cheaper.  However, 
the wide variation in prices even between suburbs in the same socio-economic strata would 
have made it more difficult to determine exactly what rates to apply since official figures for 
that month had not yet been released.  In addition official figures were also previously under-
estimating prices that consumers actually faced (USAID 2009). The total household 
expenditure was therefore measured as the sum of regular household expenditures and value 
of consumption of home made products.  
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4.10.3 Food expenditure and non-food expenditure 
Food expenditure in this study referred to the amount spent on all food stuffs by the 
household plus the value of the household‘s own family production consumed within the 
household for a period of one month.  Expenditure on alcohol and food consumption outside 
the house, for example in restaurants was excluded.  Non-food expenditure was computed as 
the difference between the total household expenditure and the food expenditure 
 
4.10.4 Construction of the Asset index 
To enable analysis based on groups of different socio-economic status (SES), an index of 
asset ownership was constructed in this study.  However, the approach that has normally 
been taken for studies on CHEs has been to use per capita consumption expenditure.  Using 
expenditure rather than assets has been argued by some to be of greater merit since it shows 
the household‘s ability to meet health care costs at a particular point in time.  Nonetheless, 
recent research suggests that asset-consumption correlation is quite close (Prakongsai 2006).  
In addition, the asset index though failing to reflect the amount of money a household has at 
a particular point in time, does manage to capture the household‘s capacity to finance OOP 
health expenditure through borrowing and selling of assets.  The latter is a common means of 
financing OOP health payments that is used in developing countries.   
 
Thirdly, most of the studies that used expenditure quintiles, calculated these quintiles 
based on distribution of per capita consumption expenditures over a large sample.  The 
distribution of expenditure from such a large sample closely resembles that of the population 
from which the sample was taken.  Large sample sizes thus reduce uncertainty in the 
classification of households into the different quintiles.  Different approaches have been 
taken to reduce uncertainty in the classification of sample households into quintiles when the 
sample size is small.  Thuan et al. (2008) compared the results from expenditure quintiles 
calculated in their study in Vietnam to results that were based on local leaders‘ classification 
of SES.   
In this study a different approach is taken.  Household asset scores are calculated 
using equation 4.21 below.  This equation is the general equation that is used for calculating 
an asset index.  However, the mean and standard deviations  and  were not 
calculated based on the sample under study.  Rather, the Demographic and Health Survey 
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(DHS) data
22
 for Zimbabwe for 2005-2006 which collected similar variables to the ones 
collected in this study was used to calculate the mean and standard deviations of the 
variables included in the equation below.  This approach reduces uncertainty in the 
estimation of the asset scores.  In addition, asset quintiles for this study are constructed using 
the cut off levels obtained from analysis of the ZDHS data as shown in appendix 6.  This 
approach ensures that, households for this sample would be placed in the same asset quintile 
in this study as they would, had a larger (nationally representative sample) been used.   
 
                                (Equation 4.21) 
 
Where: 
Aj is the household asset score of the j
th 
household (calculated from the study sample) 
f1 is the scoring factor for the first asset as determined by principal components analysis; 
aj1 is the j
th 
household's value for the first asset; and 
a1 and s1 are the mean and standard deviation of the first asset variable over all households in 
the ZDHS survey (not the study sample).  
The variables that were included in the equation and their respective scoring factors, 
standard deviations and means are shown in the table below.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
22
 Data was requested from archivemeasuredhs.com 
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Table 4.10.1 Scoring coefficients, mean and standard deviations 
Variable         Scoring Coefficient              Mean            Standard deviation 
 Assets 
   Bicycle    0.1295 0.2685 0.5308 
Motorbicycle     0.0957 0.0261 0.3765 
Animal cart    0.1193 0.1973 0.5315 
Car or truck     0.2455 0.0823 0.4721 
Boat with motor    0.0849 0.0208 0.3901 
Radio1     0.2268 0.4857 0.5515 
TV1    0.3233 0.3086 0.5174 
Mobile telephone        0.2992 0.1429 0.4385 
Non mobile telephone     0.2218 0.0890 0.3572 
Fridge       0.3230 0.1875 0.4460 
Livestock own       0.1011 0.6140 0.5325 
Access to land for agriculture    0.0780 0.6828 0.5352 
Watch     0.1671 0.5832 0.5663 
Electricity     0.2958 0.3675 0.5427 
Livestock       ownership 
   cattle        0.1630 2.1882 5.6812 
Horses/mules        0.0460 0.1637 2.6565 
goats        0.1144 1.9001 4.4427 
sheep      0.0993 0.1901 2.0547 
poultry   0.0048 5.1686 10.1027 
pigs        0.0790 0.1637 2.6565 
Source of water supply 
   piped water outside the house   0.0000 0.1005 0.3007 
piped water inside the house    0.1028 0.2494 0.4327 
well/borehole protected -0.2344 0.2640 0.4408 
communal tap      -0.0265 0.0489 0.2157 
well unprotected        -0.1119 0.1207 0.3258 
river or stream    -0.0092 0.0781 0.2683 
Type of toilet 
   Blair toilet     -0.4830 0.0200 0.0490 
none        -0.2539 0.3134 0.4639 
pit toilet     -0.1403 0.0460 0.2100 
flush toilet     0.0000 0.2956 0.4564 
Pit toilet with slab    -0.2267 0.0680 0.2520 
Type of roofing material 
   asbestos      0.0000 0.5272 0.4993 
tiles     0.2381 0.0184 0.1345 
metal    -0.0148 0.0490 0.2159 
thatch       -0.1024 0.3935 0.4886 
Rustic mat         0.0338 0.0011 0.0328 
wood         0.0341 0.0009 0.0293 
Other roof        0.0279 0.0012 0.0344 
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4.11 DETERMINANTS OF CATASTROPHIC HEALTH EXPENDITURES-
MULTIVARIATE MODEL 
For the analysis of determinants of catastrophic health payments, multiple logistic regression 
analysis was used.  The dependent variable, catastrophic health expenditures  is 
constructed as a dummy variable in which there are 2 outcomes.  These are 1 in the case of 
household incurring catastrophic health expenditure and 0 if otherwise.  This 2 outcome type 
measurement necessitates the use of a binary response model.  The binary response model is 
preferred over conventional linear probability model (LPM) when dealing with binary 
dependant variables because use of the LPM poses several problems.  These include: 
1. An error term (µ) which is not normally distributed but follows a Bernoulli 
distribution 
2. The variance of the error term is heteroscedastic23 because it depends on the values 
of  the independent variables (X) 
3. The conditional probability that a household will experience a catastrophic event (Y) 
given X  may fall out of the range 0-1. 
4. The values of R2 obtained as a measure of good fit are questionable 
 
Binary response models include the logit and the probit models.  Because the logit model is 
most popularly used in studies that investigate risk factors for catastrophic health payments, 
this study uses this model in estimating determinants of catastrophic health payments.  The 
following probability model which is a basic function form of the logistic regression model 
and has been established as an priori functional form between catastrophic health 
expenditures and any perceived determinants (hereafter independent variables) is estimated 
(Xu et al. 2006): 
 
                                                          (Equation 4.22) 
 
Where; 
  = the dependent variable 
 = the constant 
  = the independent variable(s) 
                                                          
23 Heteroscedasticity occurs when the variance of the error term (µ) is not constant for all observations 
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  = the coefficient of independent variable(s)  
  = the error term 
The logistic transformation of the success probability  (which is also expressed as 
 of facing catastrophic health expenditures is given by Powers & Xie 
(2000). 
 
                                (Equation 4.23) 
 
The coefficients of the logit model are presented as odds ratios (OR). 
Where; 
 
                                      (Equation 4.24) 
 
The odds ratio thus indicates the conditional probability of a household incurring 
catastrophic health expenses given X relative to the conditional probability of not incurring 
catastrophic health expenses given X.  An odds ratio which is less than 1 indicates therefore 
that the household is less likely to incur catastrophic health expenses, given a unit (or 
discrete) change in the X variables. 
 
4.11.1 Independent variables 
The independent variables that were used in this study as potential explanatory factors for 
determinants of CHEs were informed by literature.  These variables are shown in the table 
4.10.1 together with their expected signs.  The cut-off levels for age (i.e. above 65years and 
below 5 years) despite being informed by literature were also chosen so as to determine 
whether the exemption policy in Zimbabwe targeted at these specific age groups is indeed 
shielding households with such members from CHEs.  Before the regression analysis was 
performed, a test to detect any high linear correlations between the independent variables 
was performed.  Correlations amongst variables are common.  However when the linear 
correlation is very high, the following are the likely consequences: 
1. Large variances and covariances of the estimators, making precise estimation 
difficult 
2. Wide confidence intervals which lead to non-rejection of the ‗zero‘ null hypotheses 
more readily 
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3. The t-ratios of one or more coefficients tend to be statistically insignificant 
4. Although the t-ratios of one or more of the coefficients is statistically insignificant 
the R
2
 can be very high  
 
In this study high correlation amongst variables such as household asset score and education 
could be a problem since highly educated people are likely to be of higher socio-economic 
status (SES).  Location of the household could also be correlated with SES; with those living 
in the urban district being of higher SES than those living in the rural district.  These two 
examples are just but only some of the examples of variables that could be linearly related.  
To detect whether high correlations existed between independent variables, the beta 
coefficients in the model were checked for large standard errors.  In addition, a correlation 
matrix was generated of all the covariates, to check for coefficients of 0.7 or higher which 
indicate associations that may be of concern (Kennedy 2003).   
 
4.12 SUMMARY 
This chapter presented the methods of data collection and data analysis that were used in this 
study.  The principles and rationale guiding decisions taken before and during data collection 
were explained.  A discussion on the different approaches to measurement of catastrophe and 
impoverishment was given and the rationale guiding choice of the measurement approaches 
used in this study explained.  Furthermore the concepts used in this study were defined.  This 
section concludes with a presentation of the multivariate model used in this study.   
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Table 4.12.1: Independent variables for determinants of catastrophic health expenditures 
Variable Note 
Expected 
sign 
Dependant variable 
(Dummy)  Catastrophic expenditure at threshold level of 40% CTP   
CATA40 0 = No catastrophic health expenditure   
Independent 
variables     
Medaid Dummy variable  identifying at least one sick household member owning medical aid   
  0 = No medical aid  Negative 
  1 = has medical aid   
Age_65 Dummy variable for identifying households with elderly members above 65 years  Positive 
 0= No elderly  
 1 = Elderly in HH  
Age _5 Dummy variable for identifying households with young members below 5 years Positive 
 0 = No Young HH member  
  1 = Young member in HH   
Gender_hh 
This variable identifies each person that comes from a household that is headed by a 
female. This is a dummy variable:   
  0 = from female headed household  Negative 
  1 = from male headed household   
Head_edulevel Treated here as a numerical variable  Negative 
      
District Dummy variable where:   
  0 = HH located in rural area  Negative 
  1 = HH located in urban area   
Utilization Continuous variable identifying number of treatment episodes  Positive 
Disable_memb Dummy variable where:   
  0 = No disabled member  Positive 
  1 = has disabled member   
Chron_illness Dummy variable identifying a household where at least one member has chronic illness   
  0 = No   Positive 
  1 = Yes   
HH_size Continuous variable indicating size of HH   
Employ_HH Dummy variable identifying that household head is employed  Positive 
  0 = No  
 1 = Yes   
Poor Dummy variable that identifies poor households  
 0 = Non- poor Positive 
 1 = Poor  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
RESULTS 
 
5 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the results of analyses for this study and it shall be organized as 
follows.  Section 5.1 presents descriptive statistics for the study population with regard to 
demographic and socio-economic characteristics, epidemiological profile and patterns of 
health care utilization.  This section provides information that is useful in understanding 
results of later sections such as the trend in occurrence of catastrophic health expenditures 
across socio-economic status.  Section 5.2 provides the results of incidence of OOP 
payments in the study population.  Section 5.3 provides detailed analyses of the incidence of 
CHEs whilst section 5.4 presents results of the incidence of poverty due to OOP payments.  
Section 5.5 presents results from the multivariate statistical analyses on determinants of 
CHEs.  This chapter concludes with a discussion on household coping strategies in section 
5.6.   
 
5.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
5.1.1 Demographic and socio-economic analyses 
This section presents results of the demographic and socio-economic analyses of the study 
population that are of relevance for this study.  The tables 5.1.1, 5.1.2 and 5.1.3 overleaf 
show the results of these analyses.  As shown in table 5.1.1, the total number of households 
that were successfully interviewed in this study was 499.  Of this, more than 63% fell into 
the ―poor‖ category.  This figure is about 5 percentage points higher than the estimate from 
the last poverty survey that was conducted in 2003 in Zimbabwe (Loewenson, Masotya 
2009).  This survey estimated the proportion of people living below the food poverty line in 
Zimbabwe at 58% in 2003 (ibid).  Given the significant changes that have taken place since 
2003 in Zimbabwe, one would expect that poverty has indeed increased.  Thus the 
proportion calculated in this study could be an indication of trends in poverty.  In addition to 
this, poverty analysis by district shows that the proportions of poor households in Harare 
urban district and Seke rural district are both significantly high.  As can be expected 
however, rural households are still relatively poorer in comparison to urban households.  
This finding is also consistent with the results of the PASS survey, which suggested that 
urban households are becoming increasingly poorer since 2003 (WHO 2008).   
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The classification of households into the different wealth quintiles reveals that, about 66% of 
households that were sampled in this study belonged to the fourth and highest quintiles.  
According to the Zimbabwe Demographic and Health Survey (ZDHS), more than 98% of the 
urban households were represented in the fourth and highest asset quintiles in 2006, while 
Table 5.1.1: Descriptive statistics for demographic and economic characteristics of the study 
population  (N = 499 Households) 
Variables Options Frequency  Percentage 
    Economic Variables      (N = 499) 
Poor  Non-poor (Total sample) 180 36.07 
  Poor (Total Sample) 319 63.93 
 
Rural Poor 71 70.30 
 Urban Poor 248 62.31 
Asset quintiles 1 (Poorest) 68 13.63 
 
2 15 3.01 
 3 88 17.64 
 
4 262 52.51 
 
5(Richest) 66 13.23 
Employment status of  Employed 324 64.93 
 household head Unemployed 175 35.07 
Occupational status of  Formally employed 198 39.68 
 household head Self-employed 98 19.64 
  Casual labourers 28 5.61 
Health Insurance  
At least one household member has 
medical aid  96 19.24 
 (Medical aid) 
No household member owns 
medical aid 403 80.76 
Educational level of No schooling 10 2.00 
Household head Primary 84 16.83 
 
Secondary 326  65.33 
 
More than secondary 79 15.83 
Demographic variables       
Demographic composition Elderly > 65 years 54 10.82 
  Child < 5 years 173 34.67 
Sex of household head Female 136 27.25 
  Male 363 72.75 
Household (HH) size  
Average HH size in urban district = 
4.1     
  
Average HH size in rural district = 
4.4     
  
Range of HH size in urban district  
= (1 - 17)     
  
Range of HH size in rural district 
 = (1 - 14)     
Regional variable       
Urban-rural location Seke Rural District 101 20.24 
  Harare Urban District 398 79.76 
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about six in ten households in rural areas were in the lowest and second wealth quintiles 
(Central Statistical Office (Zimbabwe) & Macro International Inc. 2007).  Bearing in mind 
that, in this present study, more than 80% of the study sample was from urban areas, one 
would expect that the proportion of households represented in the fourth and highest 
quintiles would be much higher than the value found in this study.  Nonetheless, these 
findings reinforce the earlier findings that suggest that, households, particularly those in 
urban areas, seem to have become poorer over the last few years. 
 
 
Table 5.1.2: Descriptive statistics for Equivalized
24
 (per capita) household expenditure by asset 
index quintile 
Asset quintile Total (USD) Mean (USD) Standard deviation 
1(Poorest) 3916.80 57.60 67.67 
2 611.25 40.75 40.72 
3 5836.16 66.32 120.08 
4 22012.41 84.99 117.39 
5(Richest) 9349.56 141.66 108.35 
Total sample 41728.48 84.13 133.24 
 
 
Table 5.1.3: Descriptive statistics for Equivalized (per capita) household food expenditure by 
asset index quintile 
Asset index quintile Total (USD) Mean (USD) Standard deviation 
1(Poorest) 2051.56 30.17 31.95 
2 340.05 22.67 14.32 
3 3938.00 44.75 95.74 
4 12562.90 47.95 74.09 
5(Richest) 4324.32 65.52 97.10 
Total sample 23217.58 47.00 77.17 
 
 
Analysis of the trends in the household expenditure per capita by socio-economic quintiles 
(table 5.1.2) shows that, with the exception of quintile 2, the average household expenditure 
per capita increases progressively moving across quintile 1 to quintile 5.  This is to be 
expected since those in higher quintiles are considered to be wealthier.  Food expenditure per 
capita, follows a similar trend.  In fact, households in the lowest quintile have an average 
(per capita) food expenditure that is less than half that estimated for those in the richest 
                                                          
24
 Equivalized household expenditure is the household expenditure divided by the household 
equivalent scale 
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quintile.  The findings on food expenditure are of significant importance in this study, as 
they reveal the impact that poverty has on the ability of households to purchase one of the 
prerequisites of health, namely, adequate (and possibly nutritious) food.  Lack of adequate 
nutrition could lead to higher incidence of diet-related illnesses, which necessitate the use of 
health care.   
With respect to employment status, the majority of household heads reported that they 
had some form of employment.  This is contrary to what is expected for Zimbabwe, 
considering that unemployment is estimated at 80% (Kapp 2007).  However, this study is not 
nationally representative and focussed mainly on urban households.  In Zimbabwe, the rural 
population is estimated at 80% whereas in this study, the rural population comprised about 
20%.  The higher likelihood of employment for those in urban areas could have influenced 
this finding.   
 
Another important variable that is important in this study is ownership of medical aid.  
In this study, about 20% of households reported having at least one member who owned 
medical aid.  This study also showed that educational attainment within the study population 
is very high, with more than 80% of household heads having received secondary or higher 
education.  Similar conclusions were reached in the ZDHS survey which found out that more 
than 63.0% of respondents had secondary or higher education.   
 
Other descriptive statistics for demographic variables such as demographic 
composition, and household size are also included in the table.  These variables will also be 
used to aid discussions of findings in later sections of this chapter.  
 
5.1.2 Illness profile in the study area 
This section shows the proportion of individuals that reported suffering from illness within 
the study population as well as the types of illnesses reported.   Table 5.1.4 below shows the 
results of this analysis. 
 
Table 5.1.4: Proportion of individuals suffering from illness by asset index quintile 
  Household asset index quintiles   
  1 (bottom) 2 3 4 5 (Top) Total  
Percentage of individuals with illness  26.06 29.31 13.35 13.13 10.76 15.00 
       Percent of households where at least 52.94 60.00 34.88 41.25 34.85 40.89 
one member experienced an illness episode             
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The results of this analysis show that in this survey, about 41% of households had at least 
one household member who experienced an illness episode in the month preceding the 
survey.  There were 317 individuals (representing 15% of individuals) for these 204 
households that experienced at least one episode of illness during this period.  This suggests 
that, some households had more than one member who experienced an illness episode.  
These findings also indicate that, the burden of illness was quite high within the study 
population.  Analysis of the trends in the proportion of individuals reporting illness across 
the asset quintiles reveals that, the burden of illness was significantly high amongst 
households belonging to the 2 poorest quintiles.  Nonetheless, the burden of illness was also 
quite high amongst wealthier households.   
The episodes of illness that were reported in this study were classified according to the 
respondent‘s self-reported illness.  In total, there were 20 different types of illnesses in this 
study as shown in the table 5.1.5 below.   
 
Table 5.1.5: Types of illnesses reported  and pattern of health care utilization by illness type 
Illness  
Number of illness 
episodes reported 
Incidence of illness 
as a % of total illness 
episodes 
Number of 
episodes for 
which care was 
sought 
Other 102 23.56 47 
Flu/Common cold 57 13.16 11 
Diarrhoea/Gastroenteritis 42 9.70 14 
Asthma 31 7.16 7 
High blood pressure 30 6.93 18 
Injury 29 6.70 11 
Physical disability 22 5.08 11 
Fever 19 4.39 7 
Cardiovascular conditions 17 3.93 7 
HIV infection 16 3.70 4 
Diabètes 15 3.46 6 
Mental disability 13 3.00 4 
Allergies 11 2.54 10 
Tuberculosis 9 2.08 9 
Stroke 7 1.62 2 
Malaria 6 1.39 2 
Hepatitis B 3 0.69 1 
Kidney problems 2 0.46 2 
Cirrhosis of the liver 1 0.23 1 
Measles 1 0.23 1 
Total  433 100.00 175 
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This table shows that next to illnesses that are clustered into the category termed ―other‖, 
colds/flu was the most commonly reported illness in this study.  During the time this study 
was conducted, the cholera outbreak, which was occasioned by poor sanitation and lack of 
safe drinking water, was still a major problem throughout Zimbabwe.  This is reflected in 
this study by the high proportion of individuals who reported suffering from diarrhoeal 
illnesses.  The findings of this study also show that the proportion of individuals who 
reported suffering from chronic conditions namely; asthma, high blood pressure and HIV 
infection was quite high in this study.   
 
With respect to number of illness episodes, 433 episodes of illness were reported.  In 
addition, 18 visits related to antenatal care which resulted in households incurring OOP 
payments were also reported.  Visits that were related to antenatal care were specifically 
included in this study because of the pilot study which informed that households were in fact 
incurring significant OOP payments as a result of seeking antenatal care.  The table 5.1.6 
below also shows the distribution of reported illness episodes according to the illness 
categories of communicable, non-communicable, injuries and other illnesses.   
 
 Table 5.1.6: Distribution of illness episodes by different categories of illness   
 
These results indicate that the proportion of individuals who reported suffering from both 
communicable and non-communicable illnesses was quite high in Harare urban and Seke 
rural districts.   
 
5.1.1 Health service utilization 
 
Although 204 households (317 individuals) reported having at least one member who 
experienced an illness episode during the recall period, only 195 households gave 
Category of illness  Illness episodes reported  
Number of episodes reported as  
 as proportion of total illness episodes 
Communicable  153 35.33 
Non-communicable 149 34.41 
Other 102 23.56 
Injuries 29 6.70 
 Total 433 100.00 Un
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information on whether health care was sought and where the consultation took place.  In 
about 42% of these cases no form of health care was sought as shown in table 5.1.7 below. 
 
This table also reveals that, contrary to expectation, health care utilization was higher in the 
poorest quintile compared to quintiles 1 up to 4.  This is possibly because those in the 
poorest quintiles seek alternative sources of care such as faith healers who are cheaper when 
faced with illness as shown in table 5.1.8.  The findings of this study also show that non-
utilization of health care was also high amongst individuals who belong to wealthier 
households.  This finding suggests that, OOP payments may have affected health care 
utilization even amongst those individuals who belong to relatively wealthier households.  
However, other factors such as physical access barriers and no self-perceived need could 
also explain this trend.  Nonetheless, in this study 60% of respondents identified lack of 
money to pay for treatment as the major reason why health care was not sought.   
 
The type of health service utilized is an important factor that influences the amount of OOP 
payments a household may incur.  In this study, the types of health services that were used 
following illness or injury are shown in table 5.1.8 below.   
 
Table 5.1.8: Health care utilization by asset index quintiles 
  Where consultation took place   
Asset 
Quintile 
Public 
facilities None Pharmacy 
Private 
Clinics/GPs 
Private 
hospitals 
Prophets/
Faith 
healers Total 
                
1 
(Poorest) 40.00  30.77 1.54 15.38 0.00 12.31 100 
2 21.45 64.29 0.00 14.29 0.00 0.00 100 
3 25.58 55.81 2.33 16.28 0.00 0.00 100 
4 25.36 44.20 5.07 21.01 4.35 0.00 100 
5 
(Richest) 37.50 28.13 0.00 34.38 0.00 0.00 100 
                
Total 29.79 42.12 3.08 20.21 2.05 2.74 100 
 
Table 5.1.7: Health care utilization by asset index quintile (as a percentage) 
   Asset quintile   
Sought health care 1 (Poorest) 2 3 4 5 (Richest) Total 
Yes 69.23 35.71 44.19 59.80 71.87 57.88 
No 30.77 64.29 55.81 40.20 28.13 42.12 
Total  13.58 2.77 15.25 53.30 15.11 100.00 
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This table shows that the majority of individuals in the poorest quintile and in the wealthiest 
quintile utilized public health facilities (such as government hospitals, health centres and 
clinics) following illness or injury.  However, utilization of private health care (pharmacies, 
private clinics, private general practitioners and hospitals) was also high, with about 25% of 
individuals in the total sample seeking care at the private facilities.  Bearing in mind that, 
private health facilities are generally expensive, the high utilization of private health care 
even amongst the poorer households is concerning.  In this study however, the closure of 
most public hospitals during the later part of 2008 in Zimbabwe, which extended to about 
end of February 2009, seems to have encouraged a significant proportion of patients to seek 
care directly at the private sector. 
 
5.2 INCIDENCE OF OUT-OF-POCKET HEALTH CARE PAYMENTS 
In this survey, out of the 126 households who reported having at least one member who 
sought some form of health services and/or used medicines during an illness episode, 110 of 
these incurred OOP payments.  In 11 cases, households were exempted from paying user 
fees at the health facility visited, whilst in the remaining 5 cases the medical aid plan paid for 
the full cost of the service.  During the recall period, households in the study population 
spent a minimum of USD0.20 and a maximum of USD770.00 paying for health care.  On 
average, households paid USD13.68 on health care per month.  This figure represents 7.55% 
of their average household expenditure per month and 16.96% of their average capacity to 
pay.   
 
5.2.1 Distribution of OOP payments 
The table 5.2.1 below shows the average OOP payments, average household expenditure and 
average capacity to pay in each quintile.  The average OOP payment is the summation of all 
the OOP payments made by households (HHs) in each quintile divided by the total number 
of households in that quintile.  Average household expenditure (HE) is the sum of household 
expenditure for all households in each quintile divided by the number of households in each 
quintile.  The same applies for average capacity to pay (CTP).  
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Table 5.2.1: Incidence of OOP payments by asset index quintile 
Asset 
quintile 
Number 
of HHs 
Mean 
OOP 
payment 
Mean 
household 
expenditure 
(USD) 
Mean 
capacity 
to pay 
(USD) 
Mean OOP 
payments as 
share of 
mean HE 
Mean OOP 
payments as 
share of mean 
CTP 
1 (Poorest) 68 13.45 84.67 42.15 15.89% 31.91% 
2 15 10.73 115.98 36.73 9.25% 29.21% 
3 88 9.48 131.51 53.8 7.21% 17.62% 
4 259 13.62 184.31 80.48 7.39% 16.92% 
5 (Richest) 66 20.7 325.55 171.88 6.36% 12.04% 
Total 496 13.68 181.09 80.69 7.55% 16.96% 
 
 As expected with greater capacity to pay, average OOP payment is higher for 
households in the wealthiest quintile compared to households in all other quintiles. However, 
results of the one-way anova analysis (prob>F = 0.6698) indicate that there is no sufficient 
evidence to demonstrate a significant difference, at the 5% significance level, among the 
different populations means. Table 5.2.1 also shows that, the mean OOP payments as share 
of mean CTP and mean OOP payments as share of HE, is highest in the poorest quintiles.  
This is to be expected since poorer households generally have fewer resources and much of 
their expenditure is dedicated towards food as shown by the low value of CTP (non-food 
expenditure).  This finding suggests that poorer households are bearing a heavy financial 
burden due to OOP health expenditures in Harare urban and Seke rural districts.  Notably, 
the OOP payment as share of mean CTP is less than the threshold level of 40% of CTP for 
all wealth quintiles. This is possibly because households across all wealth quintiles had low 
utilization of health care 
 
5.3 INCIDENCE OF CATASTROPHIC HEALTH PAYMENTS 
This section presents results of the incidence and intensity of catastrophic health 
expenditures for the different threshold levels of capacity to pay.  However, in this section 
(and in subsequent sections), all explanations shall focus around CHE estimated at the 40% 
threshold level.  The other threshold levels are included to allow the reader to see the 
proportions for alternative threshold values.  Nonetheless, the same explanation given for the 
40% threshold level will apply for the alternative threshold levels.   
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Table 5.3.1: Incidence and intensity of CHEs for health payments share of capacity to pay  
 OOP payment as share of CTP 
Threshold levels Zcat 15% 25% 40%                
Headcount measure      
Headcount (Hcat) 18.03% 17.00% 15.23%            
Confidence Interval (95%) (14.65-21.42) (13.35-19.91) (12.07-18.39) 
    
Gap measure    
Overshoot (Ocat) 11.31% 9.59% 7.24% 
Confidence Interval (95%) (6.81-15.80) (5.24-13.93) (3.09-11.39) 
 
In the month preceding the survey, as much as 15% of the sample recorded OOP payments 
in excess of 40% of their capacity to pay.  However, the literature reviewed indicated that, 
the highest incidence of CHEs (based on nationally representative surveys) is estimated to be 
around 10.5%.  The value obtained in this study is therefore much higher than that reported 
for other countries.  The mean overshoot, which tells us the average degree by which OOP 
payments (as a proportion of CTP) exceed the threshold, was also relatively high and 
estimated at 7.24%.   
 
5.3.1 Incidence of CHE by asset quintiles 
Table 5.3.2 below shows the proportion of households in each quintile that incurred CHEs 
for different threshold values of z.  As already discussed in chapter 3, the threshold value z is 
the household‘s OOP spending as a proportion of capacity to pay.   
 
Table 5.3.2: Catastrophic OOP payments by asset quintiles 
  Out-of-pocket spending as share of Capacity to pay 
Asset quintile                     z = 15% z = 25% z = 40% 
1 (Poorest) 22.06% 19.12% 19.12% 
2 20.00% 20.00% 13.33% 
3 14.77% 14.77% 13.64% 
4 19.08% 17.56% 15.65% 
5 (Richest) 13.64% 12.12% 12.12% 
Total Sample  18.03%  17.00% 15.23% 
 
The findings of this study reveal that, significant proportions of households from all levels of 
wealth experienced catastrophic health expenditures in this study.  The fact that this is so 
indicates that, even relatively wealthier families paid high OOP payments for health care in 
this study.  The analysis of variance (Appendix 3) also shows that there is insufficient 
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evidence to demonstrate a significant difference (p = 0.8212), at the 5% significance level, 
among the different population proportions. This implies that the proportion of households 
incurring CHEs was the same across the asset quintiles and was about 15%.  This finding 
possibly reflects the impact of type of health care utilized, on the level of OOP expenditures 
a household incurs.  As previously discussed, it was the wealthier households in this study 
that had the highest utilization of private health care which generally offer higher cost 
services (see table 5.1.8).  On the other hand, the majority of individuals who belonged to 
households in the poorest quintile utilized public facilities and also sought more affordable 
health care from faith healers.   
 
5.4 IMPOVERISHING IMPACT OF OOP PAYMENTS 
This section presents results of the incidence of poverty due to OOP health payments.  Table 
5.4.1 below shows the results of this analysis by asset quintiles.  
 
Table 5.4.1: Impoverishment by quintile 
 
 
As shown in the table 5.4.1 above, 2.81% of households in this study were pushed into 
poverty as a result of OOP health care payments.  No households in quintile 1 and 2 were 
pushed into poverty, yet 5 households in each of quintiles 3 and 4 were pushed to poverty 
due to OOP health expenditures.  To aid understanding of these results which seem to go 
against intuition, the manner in which impoverishment was calculated in this study is 
reiterated below. 
 
As already mentioned in chapter 3, the variable for calculating impoverishment is only 
defined for those households whose total expenditure is equal to or higher than subsistence 
spending.  When household expenditure after deduction of OOP payments for health care is 
  Expenditure quintile   
  
1  
(Poorest) 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5  
(Richest) Total 
Number of households 
impoverished 0 0 5 5 4 14 
Percentage of households 
impoverished 0% 0% 5.68% 1.91% 6.06% 2.81% 
Percentage of households 
pushed  deeper  
Into poverty  20.59% 20.00% 15.91% 13.13% 10.60% 14.43% 
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less than subsistence spending for these households, then OOP payments are considered to 
have impoverished the household.  Households, whose total expenditure is already less than 
subsistence spending before OOP payments, are already poor and are not impoverished, they 
can only be brought deeper into poverty.  This is the reason why no households were pushed 
below the poverty line in quintile 1 and 2.  For the same reason, the proportion of households 
that are impoverished in the rural district is expected to be lower since rural districts are 
expected to have a higher proportion of households who are already poor.  In this study, only 
1 household was impoverished in the rural district.  The other 22 who incurred OOP costs 
were already poor.  
 
In summary, the results presented above for impoverishment, indicate that; not only 
did OOP payments push households into poverty, they also pushed those households already 
poor deeper into poverty as shown in table 5.4.1 above..   
 
5.5 DETERMINANTS OF CATASTROPHIC HEALTH EXPENDITURE 
Section 5.3 presented results of the incidence of CHEs in this study.  In this section, the 
results of the logistic regression analysis that was conducted to determine the variables that 
influence the occurrence of CHEs are shown in the table 5.5.1 below, the full Stata output is 
attached as an appendix.  Logistic regression analysis is used to examine the effect of an 
explanatory variable, keeping the effects of all other variables constant.  As already 
explained in chapter 3, the coefficients used in logistic regression are odds ratios that provide 
the odds in favour of or against a household experiencing a catastrophic health event. In this 
study, logistic regression analysis was conducted at all cut off-levels of capacity to pay.  Su 
et al. (2006) suggests that, setting one threshold value to determine catastrophic health 
expense may result in inaccurate estimation, which would lead to misinterpretation of 
important factors.   
The results from the test for multicollinearity indicated that, the associations between 
independent variables were less than 0.7, thus all the independent variables were included in 
the analysis.  The results of this test are included in the appendix.   
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Table 5.5.1: Logistic regression on determinants of catastrophic health expenditure at 
different threshold levels of capacity to pay 
Variable  Odds ratios 
P-value Confidence 
Interval  
  15% 25% 40% 
 
40% 
 
40% 
Number of times health services were 
utilized 3.42* 2.74* 2.73* 
 
<0.001 
 
2.10 - 3.56 
Household size 1.05 1.04 1.04 
 
0.635 
 
0.90 – 1.19 
Household has member above 65 
years 2.85* 3.45* 4.03* 
 
0.002 
 
1.65 -9.86 
Household has member below 5 years  0.87 0.96 0.91 
 
0.789 
 
0.45 – 1.85 
At least one sick household member 
has medical aid  1.24 1.39 1.06 
 
0.898 
 
0.46 – 2.41 
Gender of household head 0.39* 0.39** 0.35* 
 
0.003 
 
0.17 – 0.69 
Educational level of household head 1.02 0.99 0.99 
 
0.823 
 
0.92 -1.07 
Household has at least one disabled 
member 0.38** 0.31* 0.28* 
 
0.024 
 
0.09 – 0.85 
Household has at least one member 
with chronic illness 2.34* 2.15* 1.89** 
 
0.080 
 
0.93 – 1.07 
Employment status of household head 1.18 1.19 1.53 
 
0.262 
 
0.73 – 3.22 
Location of household  0.93 1.06 1.04 
 
0.926 
 
0.46 – 2.33 
Socioeconomic status of household 1.77 1.87** 1.82** 
 
0.097 
 
0.90 – 3.70 
 N 499 499 499   
Prob>F 0 0 0.001   
* Statistically significant at 5%         
 ** Statistically significant at 10%, otherwise not significant 
  
 Dependent variable: Catastrophic health expenditure defined in relation to threshold levels of: 15%, 
25% and 40% of Capacity to pay                                                                                                
  
  
 
Based on the results of the regression analysis, the major factors influencing the occurrence 
of a catastrophic health expense are:  
 number of times that health services were utilized  
 being poor  
 having at least one sick member with a chronic illness  
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 gender of the household head  
 having an elderly household member (greater than 65 years old)  
 having a disabled member in the household   
 
The results of this study show that, the probability that a household incurred CHEs increased 
with greater use of health services in the household.  Since households in the poorest 
quintiles carried the heavier burden of illness compared to wealthier households, this finding 
indicates that, poorer households in the study population are at higher risk of incurring CHEs 
compared to wealthier households.  Poor households in this study were in fact, 1.82 times 
more likely to incur CHEs compared to their non-poor counterparts.  Both these findings are 
consistent with results from other studies (Xu et al. 2003; Xu et al. 2006). 
 
The results of this study also showed that female headed households were 2.86 times 
more likely to incur catastrophic health expenditures in comparison to male headed 
households.  As can be expected, households in which at least one member suffered from a 
chronic illness were 1.89 times more likely to incur CHEs in comparison to those households 
where no member suffered from a chronic illness.  Having an elderly household member in 
this study also significantly increased (p= 0.002) the probability that a household incurred 
catastrophic health expenditures.  In fact, households with elderly members were 4.05 times 
more likely to incur catastrophic health expenditures when compared to households with no 
elderly members.  This result is again consistent with findings from other studies (Xu et al. 
2005; Joglekar 2008).   
 
Another variable which influenced the occurrence of a CHE is having a disabled 
member in the household.  The results show that, households with at least one disabled 
member are less likely to incur catastrophic health payments.  This differed from the 
assumptions made in this study.  Su et al. (2006) have however, reported similar findings.  
 
The results of this study also show that the following variables had no effect on the 
probability that a household incurs CHEs:  
 household size  
 ownership of medical aid  
 educational level of the household head  
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 employment status of the household head   
 having a very young household member (less than 5 years old)  
 Household location 
 
The results above are inconsistent with expectations and other empirical studies on 
catastrophic health expenditure.  However, these results, are best understood when explained 
in the context of the situation that was prevalent in Zimbabwe at the time of the survey.  The 
next chapter provides that detailed discussion 
 
5.6 HOUSEHOLD COPING STRATEGIES 
One of the objectives of this study was to determine the coping strategies that households 
employ to deal with OOP payments of illness.  Although the recall period for this study was 
very short, 15 households reported having done one of the following to cope with OOP costs 
of health care: Borrowing (4 households); Selling assets (8 households); substituting labour 
(1 household) and using savings (2 households).  The OOP payments for those households 
who borrowed money to pay for treatment ranged from USD3.00 to USD10.00.  The 2 
households that used savings had OOP payments of USD37.00 and USD60.00.  Selling 
assets was the frequently employed strategy to cope with illness in this study.  OOP 
payments for those who sold assets ranged from USD17.00 to USD2940.00.  There were 4 
households that had OOP payments in excess of USD500, for those households that sold 
assets.  
 
The results of this study also show that out of the 15 households that employed several 
coping strategies to meet the OOP costs of health care, 9 were poor, whilst the other 6 were 
non-poor.  These results clearly suggest that even modest OOP costs of health care can be 
quite burdensome for a household. A longitudinal analysis of these households would have 
been a more appropriate manner of assessing household welfare over time.  However, since 
this was not possible due to time and money constraints these results are used to explain the 
possible impact of OOP costs on household welfare over time.   
 
5.7 SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
This chapter presented results of different analyses that allow us to draw some conclusions 
concerning the impact of OOP payments on financial protection of households.  The results 
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of this study show that, OOP costs of health care represent a significant proportion of 
household expenditure in Harare urban district and Seke rural district.  With respect to OOP 
share as a proportion of capacity to pay, the poorest households dedicated a higher 
proportion of their total household expenditure and non-food expenditure towards OOP 
payments compared to wealthier households.  However, even wealthier households in this 
study contributed a significant proportion of their non-subsistence expenditure towards OOP 
financing. For the wealthier households, this could possibly be a consequence of utilization 
of more expensive health care.   
 
An analysis of how the disease burden was distributed within the study population revealed 
that, although households in the poorest quintiles carried the heavier burden of illness, the 
proportion of wealthier households that reported suffering from illness was also quite high.  
Analysis of the different types of illnesses that were reported within the study population 
also revealed that, the proportion of households who reported suffering from communicable 
illnesses particularly diarrhoeal illnesses was very high amongst the study population.  
However, the number of households who also suffered from non-communicable illnesses 
was also quite high.  
 
Impoverishment due to OOP payments was 2.81% in this study, a figure which can be 
considered high when one considers that poverty is one of the major challenges in the 
country.  The results of this study indicate that, poor households were brought even deeper 
into poverty as a result of health care payments.  The results from the regression analysis 
suggest that: the number of treatment episodes; having at least one sick member with a 
chronic illness; gender of the household head; being poor, having an elderly household 
member and having a disabled member in the household are all important factors that 
influence the occurrence of a CHE.   
 
Analysis of the different ways that households used to cope with OOP health costs 
revealed that the most popular strategy used by most households was selling of assets.  Other 
coping strategies included; borrowing, use of savings and substitution of labour. Taking into 
consideration that about 58% of individuals who were ill or injured reported not using health 
services for several reasons, it would have been interesting to see whether avoiding to seek 
care was a coping strategy employed by households when faced with OOP costs.  However, 
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the design of the questionnaire did not take this into consideration, making this a limitation 
of this study.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
6 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter gives a detailed discussion of the results presented in the preceding chapter.  
The results are discussed in the context of the objectives set forth. 
 
6.1 INCIDENCE OF CATASTROPHIC HEALTH EXPENDITURES 
The overall research objective of this study was to investigate the burden of illness and 
paying for health care using OOP payments in Zimbabwe.  In this regard, the measures of 
catastrophic health expenditures and impoverishment estimated in this study are used to 
approximate this burden.  Prior to discussing the results of this study, it is however 
imperative that the limitations of this study that could influence the extent to which this 
research objective has been met be highlighted.   
 
Firstly, this study is likely to have under-estimated the economic burden of illness for 
several reasons.  The household OOP medical costs were the only costs measured in this 
study.  The transport costs, income losses or time costs due to illness have not been 
measured.  According to Gertler and Gruber (2002) such costs may be more important in 
measuring household welfare than the direct medical costs of health care.  Adhikari et al. 
(2009) even go further to estimate that, using direct medical costs in estimating catastrophic 
payments results in under-estimation of the magnitude of the catastrophic impact by between 
15-22%.   
 
Secondly, the measures of CHEs used in this study only focussed on those who sought 
health care.  Many poor households simply avoid seeking care due to financial 
considerations; therefore presented figures could underestimate the reality (Gotsadze et.al. 
2009).  Saksena et al. (2006) acknowledges this limitation and proposes a simulation 
approach for estimating the catastrophic health expenditure, using not only observed OOP 
expenditure but also predicted OOP expenditure.  Using data from the Kenyan Household 
Health Expenditure and Utilization Survey of 2003, this study finds that the catastrophic 
impact increases significantly especially amongst the poorest quintiles, with the lowest 
quintile having an increase of about 12%.  In this study, about 42.0% of individuals did not 
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seek care following illness or injury, with lack of money to pay for treatment being 
highlighted as the major reason why health care was not sought.  Therefore, the measures in 
this study may well underestimate the prevalence of catastrophic health expenditure amongst 
the households in Harare urban and Seke rural district.   
 
Thirdly, at the time this study was conducted, the cholera epidemic was still high in 
Zimbabwe.  Sampling during such a period when there is an epidemic may result in over-
estimation of the catastrophic impact particularly if the households had to pay for treatment.  
In this study however, only 14 episodes of diarrhoeal illnesses resulted in a medical visit 
which required households to pay for treatment. The rest of the diarrhoeal illness episodes 
were either treated for free at the cholera treatment centres (if it was cholera), or individuals 
self-treated using oral rehydration solution.   
 
Notwithstanding the above limitations, this study showed that, about 15% (at the 40% 
threshold level) of the study population faced catastrophic health expenditures.  This figure 
suggests that OOP payments have become a major drain on household resources through 
diverting regular consumption resources to health care expenditure.  Whilst comparison with 
results from other countries is not valid in this study, it is still interesting to note that, the 
proportion of households that incurred CHEs in this study was significantly higher (p<0.001) 
than that reported for a low income district in Burkina Faso (Su et al. 2006).  This suggests 
that CHE is a major problem that warrants policy attention in Zimbabwe.   
 
There could be several reasons to explain why such a large proportion of households 
experienced CHEs within the study population. Amongst these are the apparent decline in 
the proportion of population that is currently benefiting from health insurance coverage, the 
high poverty levels, the heavy reliance on OOP payments and the high levels of OOP costs 
of health care.  These factors have been shown to play a predictably large role in influencing 
the occurrence of CHEs at the national level (Xu et al. 2003).  Focussing on poverty first, the 
fact that 64% of the households in Harare and Seke rural districts were poor suggests that the 
majority of households were already vulnerable to even the smallest expenditure on health 
care.  In fact, Joglekar (2008) even argues that, any expenditure on health care should be 
considered catastrophic for households below the poverty line since these households are 
unable to meet the subsistence consumption.  Thus, the results of this study are consistent 
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with literature which suggests that; CHE tends to be highest in countries or settings with high 
poverty levels (van Doorslaer et al. 2007; Saksena et al. 2006; Xu et al. 2005).   
  
The apparent decline in the proportion of households benefiting from health insurance 
coverage, at a time when households were experiencing high burdens of illness possibly also 
explains the high incidence of CHEs observed in this study.  Since health insurance coverage 
protects households from the unexpected costs of health care, the ―absence‖ of it within the 
study population highlights the extent to which households are vulnerable to the unexpected 
costs of health care.  This situation is probably exacerbated by the fact that government 
expenditure as a proportion of total health expenditure has declined in real terms in 
Zimbabwe (WHO 2007).  In addition, the percentage of total government expenditure 
allocated to health is estimated at 9.2% in Zimbabwe, a figure which is below the Abuja 
target of 15% (Govender et al. 2008).  Since the Abuja target of 15% is considered a fair 
reflection of the minimum level of government funding necessary to allow citizens access to 
adequate health at an affordable cost, one can infer that the high levels of CHEs in this study 
is a consequence of the low commitment of the government to health care funding.   
 
To cite an example, Namibia has one of the highest total health expenditures on health as a 
percentage of GDP in Africa and this is estimated at 6.8% of the GDP (WHO 2007), whilst 
the  percentage of total government expenditure allocated to health is about 14%  (Govender 
et al. 2008).  In addition, government expenditure as a proportion of total health expenditure 
reached a high of 70% in 2005, in comparison to about 44.8% in Zimbabwe.  Not only is 
government health spending high in relative terms, but out-of-pocket expenditures as a 
proportion of total health expenditures were estimated at 5.6% in 2004 in Namibia in 
comparison to 26.2% in Zimbabwe (WHO 2007).  Whilst this study was not nationally 
representative and cannot be directly compared with studies from other countries, it is 
reasonable to infer that Namibia‘s low level of CHEs (estimated at about 0.11% in 2003) is 
attributed to high levels of government funding and low level of OOP payments. On the 
other hand, the low levels of government funding in Zimbabwe could be playing a major role 
in influencing the incidence and level of CHEs in Zimbabwe. 
 
Over and above these findings, this study also showed that, the proportion of 
households that incurred CHEs was not statistically different across the different wealth 
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quintiles in this study, Findings from other studies suggest that the incidence of CHE shows 
a significant decline moving from poorer to wealthier quintiles (Saksena et al. 2006).  What 
this implies therefore is that, in real terms, households represented in the wealthiest quintiles 
in this study are probably not as wealthy as households in the fifth quintile of other countries.  
Other reasons that could explain this situation include; heavy reliance on OOP payments to 
pay for health care, limited health insurance coverage and greater utilization of higher 
quality, higher price health services by the wealthier households.   
 
The following section presents a discussion of the results from the statistical analysis 
that investigated the determinants of CHEs in Zimbabwe.  The factors discussed above 
namely; ownership of health insurance and being poor are also discussed focussing on 
whether they have a statistically significant effect on the occurrence of a catastrophic health 
event.   
 
6.2 DETERMINANTS OF CATASTROPHIC HEALTH EXPENDITURES 
The preceding chapter laid out a conceptual framework for analyzing the different factors 
that influence the incidence of catastrophic health expenditures.  These factors include: 1) 
household characteristics 2) health services utilization and 3) the environment.  In this 
section, the results of the regression analyses are discussed, by exploring how these factors, 
independently and through various inter-links influenced the probability that households in 
the study population experienced CHEs.  The discussion will first focus on the factors that 
were shown to have a significant effect on the probability that a household incurred 
catastrophic health expenditures in this study.  These factors include:  
(i) being poor  
(ii) having at least one sick member with a chronic illness 
(iii) female headed households  
(iv) greater user of health services   
(v) having an elderly household member (greater than 65 years old) 
(vi) having a disabled member in the household 
 
Based on the results of this study, poor households in Zimbabwe are at a significantly 
higher risk of incurring CHEs in comparison to non-poor households.  This finding is 
consistent with evidence from empirical and theoretical literature (Su et al. 2006; Riveira et 
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al. 2006).  Given that, the majority of households in this study were classified as poor and 
that overall utilization of health care was also low; the findings of this study capture the 
possible dilemma poor households in the study population currently face – Do they seek care 
and risk financial catastrophe or do they forego treatment knowing the sustained ill health 
will reduce their ability to work and generate income?  Beyond this, the findings of this 
study are also important for Zimbabwe in that, they reveal the inadequacy of the currently 
available financial protection systems, within the health care system, which are targeted at 
the poor.  As highlighted in previous sections, Zimbabwe instituted a user fee exemption 
policy for those on low incomes (i.e. Z$400, at the time USD220) in 1980; a policy which 
targets financial protection of the poor (Loewenson & Masotya 2009).  The findings of this 
study however, are clearly not in line with this policy.  The possible explanation for the latter 
could be that, user fee exemptions have continued to be difficult to implement, even more so 
in a hyperinflationary environment which would necessitate constant reviewing of the 
income level at which exemptions should apply.  As highlighted earlier, only 11 households 
reported being exempted from user fees despite 63.93% of the study population being 
considered poor.  In addition to this at least 30% of households who incurred CHEs had used 
government facilities, showing that utilization of public care did not protect households from 
CHEs, possibly because user fees were still imposed on the poor. 
 
Secondly, the frequent drug stock outs in the government facilities (Loewenson & 
Masotya 2009), might have contributed to this effect by forcing patients from poor 
households to purchase medicines at the private facilities.  Furthermore, the closure of most 
public hospitals during the later part of 2008 which extended to about end of February 2009, 
seems to have encouraged a significant proportion of patients to seek care directly at the 
private sector.  This is reflected by the descriptive analysis presented in the previous chapter 
that showed that utilization of private health care was also significantly high amongst 
individuals belonging to the poorer households.  In view of the fact that some private 
providers who continued to operate during this time were charging fees ranging from 
US$200 in cash for a consultation, US$500 for an in-patient bed, and US$3,000 for a 
caesarean section; the type of provider consulted could be one of the major reasons why poor 
households faced significantly high CHEs in this study (Physician for Human Rights 2009).  
Available evidence from literature also suggests that the type of health service utilized is a 
significant predictor of catastrophic health expenditures (Limwattananon et al. 2007; Xu 
2003; Su et al. 2006).   
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Another factor that was shown to have a significant influence on the incidence of a 
catastrophic health event in this study was having at least one household member who 
suffers from a chronic illness.  Chronic illnesses often require lifetime treatment, thus costs 
incurred by the household are recurrent (Gotsadze et al. 2009).  This partly explains why 
chronic illnesses pose a significant burden on household resources.  Most often, the chronic 
illnesses may also require expensive treatment that takes up a significant proportion of the 
household budget.  In this study, the incidence of chronic illnesses was quite high amongst 
the study population which possibly explains why many households incurred CHEs in this 
study.  Other studies such as the one conducted in Burkina Faso and in other developed 
countries have reported similar findings (Gotsadze et al. 2009; Su et al. 2006).  The 
economic burden of illness due to chronic diseases implies that, the Zimbabwean health 
system faces yet another challenge to provide relatively more expensive health services to 
address the chronic disease burden.   
 
The results of this study also showed that, as the number of treatment episodes 
increased, the probability that a household incurred CHEs also increased.  This can be 
expected since greater use of health services increases the share of the household budget that 
is dedicated towards health care (Joglekar 2008).  However, contrary to our hypotheses that 
disabled persons are likely to be sicker and utilize more health care, this study finds that 
having a disabled member in the household decreases the probability of incurring CHEs.  
Other studies that have reported similar findings have attributed this to an intra-household 
bias in allocation of resources towards non-disabled members of the family that are 
considered to be economically productive (Su et al. 2006).  However, this investigation was 
beyond the scope of this study and recommendations are made for research concerning 
inequality of health care for the disabled to be undertaken in the study area.  This is 
particularly so given that the prevalence of disabilities was very high within the study 
population.  Nonetheless, the government‘s Macro-Economic Policy Framework for 2005-
2006 that set the basis for the creation of a specific fund for the poor with disabilities and 
other extraordinary ailments seems to be a step in the right direction (Government of 
Zimbabwe 2003) 
 
Consistent with evidence from other literature sources, this study found that 
households with elderly members are more likely to incur CHEs.  This finding however goes 
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against expectation given that the policy for free health care for the elderly above 65 years of 
age was instituted in Zimbabwe in 1995.  Taking into account that recent evidence suggests 
that this policy is still being implemented successfully (Loewenson & Masotya 2009), push 
factors towards the private sector could explain why households with elderly members 
experienced CHEs in this study.  These push factors include; drug stock outs at the public 
facilities as well as the closure of some public facilities that occurred prior to the conduct of 
this study. 
 
In addition to the factors highlighted above, this study found that female headed 
households were more likely to incur CHEs.  Other studies have found that female headed 
households are less likely to incur CHEs (Knaul et al. 2007), and still others have found that 
the risk is the same as that for male headed households (Su et al. 2006).  For Zimbabwe 
however, these findings are possibly a consequence of the poverty distribution between male 
and female headed households in the country.  According to a report published in 2006 after 
the Beijing +11 conference in 2004, 72% of female headed households in Zimbabwe were 
considered poor compared to 58% of male headed households (Crew 2006).  Thus the 
vulnerability of female headed households towards CHEs seems to be occurring via the 
poverty pathway.  What these findings imply is that, the challenge of fighting CHEs also 
needs to be extended towards the social protection system in general with existing projects 
aimed at alleviating poverty amongst women being strengthened.   
 
Besides the factors highlighted above other factors that did not have a significant 
effect on the probability that a household incurred CHEs included most of the household 
predisposing factors that were investigated.  These variables were: household size; having a 
very young child below the age of 5; employment status of household head and educational 
level of household head.  These findings were in contrast to our assumptions.  However 
possible reasons for the observed findings are discussed below. 
 
Zimbabwe instituted a free health care policy for children below the age of 5 in the 
public facilities; a policy which based on recent evidence is still being implemented 
successfully (Loewenson & Masotya 2009).  The findings of this study therefore reflect the 
fact that households with very young members possibly sought care at private health 
facilities, which offer them no financial protection.  Alternatively, an age bias in intra-
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household allocation of resources towards adult household members that could ensure 
productivity may also explain the findings of this study (Su et al. 2006).   
This study also found that education level and employment status of the household head had 
no effect on the probability that a household incurred catastrophic health expenditures.  This 
result is again inconsistent with most of the literature, which has consistently shown that 
having a household head that is employed and/or has higher levels of education reduces the 
probability that a household faces CHEs (Joglekar 2008; Riveira et al. 2006).  The 
theoretical arguments that have been presented in literature include the fact that, those who 
are employed and have higher levels of education are argued to have higher incomes, hence 
higher capacity to meet non-subsistence expenditure.   
 
In Zimbabwe however, being employed and having a higher level of education seems 
to have very little correlation with one‘s capacity to meet non-subsistence needs, particularly 
if one is a government employee.  Prior to February 2009, a middle income citizen was 
estimated to earn about USD128.00
25
, a value which was significantly less than the value of 
USD282.00 estimated by CCZ to be the amount of money a family of 5 needs to meet the 
basic subsistence needs (Bateman 2006).  From February 2009 to date, the government 
resorted to giving USD100 per month to all its employees regardless of income grade as a 
stop‐gap measure (USAID 2009).  This situation explains to a great extent why being 
employed showed no impact on the probability of a household incurring CHEs.  
Furthermore, some households in which the household head was unemployed reported 
receiving fairly high remittances from family members living outside the country.  These 
remittances were often in the ranges of USD100 to USD500; levels much higher than the 
salary scales in Zimbabwe.  In effect, whether a household head was employed or not made 
very little difference on the levels of income a family had in this study. 
 
Regarding educational level, some studies have shown that primary and secondary 
levels of education reduce the probability of incurring catastrophic OOP health expenditure, 
whilst the gains are not visible at higher levels of schooling (Joglekar 2008).  In this study, 
more than 65% of household heads had completed secondary education, with only 2% of 
household heads reporting that they had not attended school. The high levels of education 
                                                          
25
 All estimates of currencies are valued using the 2008 currency conversion rates 
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reported in this study possibly explain why educational level had no influence on the 
distribution of CHEs.   
 
Household size is another factor that showed no effect on the incidence of CHEs.  
However, evidence from literature has also provided conflicting views on the effect of this 
variable with some studies suggesting a positive impact (Xu 2003); others a negative (Knaul 
et al. 2007) and still others no effect (Su et al. 2006).  The fact that ownership of medical aid 
showed no effect on the probability that a household incurs CHEs is probably a result of the 
fact that most of the respondents who reported owning health insurance were not deriving 
any benefit from it.  Thus, effectively one could conclude that a sizeable proportion of the 
study population did not have access to health insurance.   
 
In this study it was also shown that, whether a household lived in a rural area or an 
urban area had no influence on the probability that they incurred CHEs.  This is contrary to 
what we expected considering that health care is free at all rural primary health centres.  
However, bearing in mind the above discussion on drug stock outs at government facilities, 
it is possible that some households might have resorted to seeking health care at the private 
facilities.  Another point to consider is the fact that, in 2008 the ―Access to Health Services‖ 
study showed that user fees are being imposed on the poor at rural health centres, which 
would imply seeking health care at government facilities fails to protect these households 
financially.  In addition, removal of user fees at primary health centres does not protect 
households from expenditures incurred at higher level facilities.  
 
Also, in view of the fact that poverty estimates in both districts were also relatively 
high, the findings of this study that show that rural-urban location is a non-significant 
predictor of CHEs are not surprising.  Beyond this, these findings also indicate that even 
households in urban areas still face the same risk of CHEs as rural households.  This shows 
that the current focus on the rural population is in fact missing out many urban households 
for whom financial protection from OOP payments is critical.   
 
6.2.1 Summary 
What can be concluded from the above discussion is that, many households in Harare and 
Seke rural district face the risk of incurring CHEs.  Several factors such as: the presence of 
chronic illness - which imposes a severe burden on household resources; the need to use 
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health services frequently, having an elderly household member and being a female headed 
household are some of the factors influencing the probability that households incur CHEs in 
Zimbabwe.  Apart from these factors, the relatively low income bases in Zimbabwe, high 
rates of poverty, concurrent with high cost of services means that even those households who 
are relatively well-off face the risk of catastrophe as a result of OOP payments.  The latter is 
indicated by the fact that a significant proportion of wealthier households faced CHEs in this 
study.  There is very limited coverage of health insurance in Zimbabwe at the moment, a 
situation which exacerbates the risk of CHEs.  In addition to this, current policies that are 
targeted at the poor and those in rural areas are either being implemented poorly or are being 
severely affected by the chronic shortages of supplies at government facilities.  The latter 
encourages the poor and those in rural areas to seek health care directly at the private 
facilities which offer them no financial protection.   
 
6.3 Incidence of poverty due to OOP payments 
The results of the impoverishing impact analysis suggest that non-poor households within 
the study population are pushed into poverty because of OOP health expenditures.  
Considering the high prevalence of poverty within the study population, having an additional 
2.81% of households being brought down the poverty line due to OOP payments is very 
concerning and highlights the urgent need to reduce OOP payments.  In addition to 
impoverishing households this study indicated that OOP payments seem to have a much 
greater impact on the intensity of poverty than on poverty incidence, as reflected by the 
greater proportion of households who sank deeper into poverty.  What this implies is that 
OOP payments are posing a great threat on current poverty reduction strategies in 
Zimbabwe, at a time when the government and the international community are placing 
much focus on strategies that will aid poverty alleviation amongst the citizens 
 
6.4 HOUSEHOLD COPING STRATEGIES 
This section discusses the coping strategies that were employed in this study by households 
to cope with the OOP payments for health care.  Household coping strategies were 
investigated in this study to assess the possible impact of OOP payments on household 
welfare over time.  Prior to this discussion however, it is important that we highlight that 
assessing household welfare over time, is best achieved from a longitudinal analysis which 
allows follow up of households over a longer period of time.  This was however not possible 
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for this study due to time and money constraints.  The findings of this study should thus be 
interpreted bearing this limitation in mind.  
 
In this study, a total of 15 households reported having borrowed, sold assets, 
substituted labour or used savings to finance their OOP payments.  This value is significantly 
high as it represents about 14% of the households who sought health care in this study.  
Several other studies that have been conducted in Zimbabwe have also found that, 
households employ several different coping strategies when faced with OOP payments.  
These strategies include those highlighted in our study as well as others such as; purchasing 
cheaper food, reducing food consumption, avoiding expenditure by going into debt for 
school fees, electricity and water bills amongst other things (Mutyambizi 2002).   
 
The selling of assets in this study was the most popular strategy that was employed by 
households to cope with OOP payments.  The use of this strategy can however be quite 
concerning particularly if productive assets such as cars which have the potential to generate 
future earnings are sold.  Losing such assets may mean that in subsequent periods 
households become even more vulnerable to future income shocks (Mutyambizi 2002).   
 
Borrowing, which was the second most popular strategy employed by households in 
this study can have a significant impact on future livelihood of households particularly if, 
households have to repay the debt in subsequent periods at high interest rates.  Adhikari et 
al. (2009) explored the impact of method of financing OOP payments on CHEs and finds 
that, both the amount of OOP payments and the use of loans have a significant impact on the 
household economy.   
 
Use of savings to fund OOP payments has been reported in literature as having a 
severe negative impact on things like investments in education for children.  According to a 
study in Ethiopia, households which had used available cash to pay for health care had 
intended to use the money for basic consumption needs including food, fuel, clothes and 
education (Russell & Abdella 2002).  This study however did not collect information 
regarding what the households had intended to use their savings for.   
 
Another significant finding of this study is that out of the 15 households who 
employed the different coping strategies, 9 were poor.  This finding is important in that it 
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reinforces the other findings of this study that OOP payments pose a significant burden on 
poor households.  However, the fact that non-poor households also utilized these strategies 
also shows that even the relatively wealthier households are at risk of disruptions of 
household welfare as a result of paying OOP for health care.   
 
6.5 SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 
What can be concluded from the above discussion is that the triad of poverty, high OOP 
payments and low prepayment levels vis-à-vis lack of adequate financial protection seem to 
be the major reasons why households in Harare urban and Seke rural districts experience 
CHEs.  In addition, households at all levels of wealth are affected suggesting that, the 
manner in which health care is financed in Zimbabwe (i.e. using OOP payments), is placing 
a heavy financial burden on the majority of households in Harare and Seke districts, even 
those that are relatively wealthier.  In situations where households cannot meet the full cost 
of OOP payments, households employ strategies that make them economically vulnerable in 
future.  This makes it very difficult for households particularly those who are already poor to 
escape the poverty spiral.
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CHAPTER 7 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
7 CONCLUSIONS 
 
This chapter presents conclusions arising from the discussion of results and presents 
recommendations based on these. The study sought to measure the economic consequences 
of health care payment by estimating the catastrophic health expenditure and impoverishing 
impact caused by OOP payments for health care services.  In addition, the study sought to 
determine the characteristics of households that experience CHEs as well as evaluate 
whether current policies in Zimbabwe are offering vulnerable households financial 
protection from OOP payments.  The key conclusions that can be drawn from this study are 
presented below. 
 
In Harare and Seke rural districts, where the majority of households are poor and lack 
access to basic goods and services, OOP payments have become a major drain on household 
resources.  The high level of CHEs observed in this study as well as the poverty due to OOP 
payment both point out to this.  However, the economic burden imposed on households by 
OOP payments seems to be exacerbated by a variety of factors.  Amongst these are the 
declining levels of health insurance coverage, low levels of government funding and 
inadequate financial protection of the vulnerable households.  At the same time, the lack of 
access to public health services which are affordable also seems to be playing a role in 
driving households into catastrophic and impoverishing health expenditures.  Thus, there is a 
clear and urgent need to strengthen mechanisms that are aimed at protecting households from 
the economic burden of OOP payments within the 2 districts.  Such mechanisms would 
include in particular, improved health insurance coverage, improved government 
commitment to health funding as well as improved access to public health services.   
 
Catastrophic and impoverishing health expenditures are also a major concern amongst 
households of differing socio-economic status.  The results of this study clearly showed that 
the proportion of households facing CHEs was similar across socio-economic quintiles, and 
that OOP payments acted as a physical access barrier for both poor and non-poor 
households.  Furthermore both poor and non-poor households were forced to finance their 
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OOP payments through strategies that jeopardize their future livelihoods.  This confirms the 
extent to which households from all levels of wealth are struggling to cope with OOP 
payments.  So whilst it may be more feasible under the current economic climate to 
strengthen financial protection of the poorest households and possibly of vulnerable 
populations such as the elderly, the ultimate goal should aim at providing all households 
financial protection through universal health coverage. Such a strategy would inevitably 
ensure that not only are poor households protected from CHEs, but non-poor households are 
also shielded from CHEs and impoverishment. 
 
The findings of this study also showed that, the majority of policies that are targeted at 
financial risk protection of households in Zimbabwe, such as targeted exemptions for the 
poor and the elderly fall short of expectations.  The fact that this is the case suggests that 
either these policies are inadequate or are not being implemented.  As a result, there is a 
critical need to review these policies particularly since major developments have taken place 
in the economic environment and the health sector since the institution of these policies. 
 
In the situation of insufficient tax-based funding and a harsh economic environment, 
short term flexible responses are needed to address the situation of financial risk protection 
in Zimbabwe.  In the long term however, the aim should be to develop prepayment 
mechanisms such SHI and tax-based financing.  For this reason, the next section presents 
policy recommendations that focus on both short term and long term strategies to address the 
issue of financial risk protection amongst households in Harare urban and Seke rural 
districts.  In addition, strategies that extend beyond the health sector are also presented.  
 
7.1 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
7.1.1 Short term responses 
Whilst institution of social health insurance and a sound general tax base in Zimbabwe are 
probably the preferable long-term solutions that will ensure that the majority of households 
have adequate financial protection, certain factors pose doubt on the ability of the 
government to develop such strategies in the short term.  These factors include the current 
harsh economic environment, small formal sector employment and the volatile political 
environment. In order to make a stepwise movement towards achievement of these goals, 
short-term flexible strategies are needed first that will ensure that the vulnerable have 
adequate access to health services at public facilities.  These strategies may form the bridge 
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towards development of a health system, which is funded through general tax funds and 
social health insurance or a mix of these prepayment mechanisms.   
 
7.1.1.1 Resource mobilization through donor funds 
Increased donor funding, both for the development and functioning of public health care 
provision as well as pro-poor donor funding, are some of the initial strategies that could play 
a significant role in ensuring that adequate services are available at the public health sector.  
An improvement in public services is likely to be accompanied by a reduction in the 
proportion of households that seek health care directly at the more expensive private health 
care sector.  Pro-poor (or health equity) donor funding on the other hand ensures that 
resources are actually available at the public sector for the vulnerable groups, to the point 
that exemptions of the vulnerable is not limited by level of resources that are available within 
the health system.  
 
At this point, it is important to stress that constant reviewing of the income levels at 
which exemptions should apply becomes a crucial step towards ensuring that exemptions for 
the poor are effective and that they target the rightful beneficiaries.  In addition, strategies 
such as issuing of an exemption certificate become critical in order to reduce challenges of 
identifying the individuals that qualify for exemption.  Furthermore, it is essential that 
relevant institutions follow up the process of exemption to ensure that policies are being 
implemented successfully and uniformly especially at the primary care level.   
 
Challenges 
It is understood that donor-funding has its limitations, and can be unreliable, but in highly 
resource constrained environments such as Zimbabwe, donor funding is possibly the best 
initial strategy needed to accumulate resources.  However, governments and donor agencies 
still need to agree on that solution.  At present, it is possible that the donor community will 
be willing to bring in funds taking into account the recent recommitment by the donor 
agencies to rebuild financial relationships with the new power-sharing government in 
Zimbabwe.  Nonetheless, this recommitment comes with its conditions to the point that, the 
government still needs to strengthen economic conditions for and the level of tax based 
financing as a primary measure in the event that donors pull out.   
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7.1.2 Intermediate responses 
Whilst improvement of public health services is likely to reduce the number of individuals 
who are exposed to CHEs within the study population, there is still a danger that exemptions 
of the poor particularly in urban areas may still continue to be difficult.  At the moment, the 
Zimbabwean health system has made considerable efforts in improving financial risk 
protection of the rural population through the institution of a free health care policy in rural 
facilities.  However, equity gains could be achieved from blanket abolition of user fees at 
primary care and district level services including in urban areas.  This move would ensure 
that the majority of poor households in urban areas are also financially protected at the same 
time circumventing the problems that accompany exemption systems particularly at the 
primary care level.  In addition, the fact that district level services, are at least higher level 
services ensures that households are also protected from costs incurred at higher level 
facilities.  However, this strategy can only be effective if it is accompanied by supply side 
responses such as improved drug stocks in the public sector, and increased funding to 
services in the lowest income areas, reason why resource accumulation through donor funds 
is an important initial step (Loewenson, Masotya 2009).   
 
Other advantages that accompany removing user fees at the primary care level include 
the fact that, it encourages utilization of health services amongst individuals who would not 
normally have sought health care due to financial constraints.  Seeking health care in the 
early stages of illness ensures that, the illness does not progress to such an extent that it 
necessitates the use of more expensive treatment - expensive treatment would ultimately lead 
to catastrophic health expenditures.  In addition, timely utilization of health care ensures that, 
the low productivity capacity and income deprivation that result from consequent 
deterioration of health are reduced.  Furthermore, the removal of user fees at primary level 
facilities will encourage most patients to utilize the primary health care first, before 
progressing to the higher level facilities.  In this regard, primary health facilities act as 
gatekeepers, thus encouraging optimal use of resources since resources at higher level 
facilities will no longer be used to meet primary health care needs.   
 
It is important to mention that high cost-care such as that for hospitalization may not 
be covered at this point.  However, dedication of resources towards services dealing with the 
heaviest burden of ill health in the community, for which effective interventions exist, can be 
considered an allocatively efficient manner of dealing with scarce resources at this point.   
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Once the economic environment permits it would be important that the social health 
insurance debate be resumed in Zimbabwe.  Certain factors need to be considered however 
before this policy is implemented.  These include the fact that a very small formal sector 
currently exists.  Thus, in the initial stages, coverage of SHI may only benefit the relatively 
few formal sector workers.  Taking into account the immense benefits that a SHI scheme 
offers on both access and financial risk protection, it would be important that strategies such 
as the ones highlighted below be considered in the long run.  These include: 
1. Extending the population coverage 
2. Extending coverage to the poor and vulnerable 
3. Providing benefit packages and cost sharing 
4. Considering strategies that go beyond the public sector  
 
7.1.3 Long-term responses 
i. Extending the population coverage 
Transition to universal coverage is a challenging task and different approaches can be taken.  
In Zimbabwe for example, coverage of SHI could first be extended to the dependents of the 
formal sector employees, with the government providing services to the poor or covering 
their contributions.  To extend coverage to wealthier households (who may be largely 
concentrated in the informal sector), the role of private health insurance could be expanded 
so that the limited public funds can be largely allocated to the poor.  At this point it is 
important to mention that small tax funded public subsidies would offer an incentive for 
wealthier households to join the schemes.  However, these must not consume a large 
proportion of the health expenditure to the point that it reduces the resources that ought to be 
freed for the poor.   
 
ii. Extending coverage to the poor and vulnerable 
Extending coverage to the informal sector workers, the poor and the vulnerable is a 
challenging task.  This is particularly so for several reasons. The first is identification of 
these individuals and accommodating their reduced capacity to contribute towards the SHI.  
In Harare and Seke districts, this can be a great challenge considering the large pool of 
persons who belong to poor households as indicated by the results of this study.  In addition 
arranging for specific needs and health risks becomes crucial.  Within the two districts that 
were under investigation in this study, formation of community-based health insurance is an 
option that is worth exploring in order to risk-share and pool resources at the level of 
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communities for the poor, informal sector workers and unemployed.  Health care providers 
(e.g hospitals), NGOs and local associations can initiate such programmes.  However, these 
schemes tend to be unsustainable because the level of funds within the risk pool is usually 
low.  Subsidization of these schemes through government funds or external funds would 
therefore ensure financial stability of these schemes, and reduce the average cost that each 
household has to contribute towards the scheme.   
 
iii. Providing adequate benefit packages and adjusting cost -sharing 
The nature of the benefits package that can be funded by the SHI and CBHI schemes and the 
range of services offered need to be carefully considered, to strike a balance between cost 
and risk protection.  While a restricted benefits package will cost less than a generous 
package, it may well be less successful in protecting against CHEs.  This study showed that 
chronic illnesses, which usually require more expensive treatment, were highly prevalent in 
the study population and exposed households to risk of incurring CHEs.  However, a short-
term solution may be to focus particularly on funding services and interventions that have 
been proven to be cost-effective ways to improve the majority of people‘s health.  Such 
interventions include those targeted at reducing burden of diarrhoeal illnesses that were quite 
common amongst the study population.   
 
7.1.4 Strategies that extend beyond the health sector 
There is potential to improve financial risk protection of households beyond the boundaries 
of the health sector. This could be facilitated through the implementation of integrated social 
development and poverty alleviation programmes that include health, nutrition and micro-
finance.  In addition, improving labour activities for households would ensure that 
households have an adequate income bases that would make them resistant to health 
financing shocks.  In addition, programmes targeted at improving the economic 
empowerment of women are expected to have the long term benefits of increasing the 
income bases of female headed households; thus reducing risk of incurring catastrophic 
health expenditures.   
 
7.2 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE WORK 
Although this study has provided some useful evidence concerning the economic impact of 
OOP payments within 2 districts in Zimbabwe, it would be important to know if these results 
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are applicable to the rest of the country.  It is recommended therefore that this study be 
scaled up to a national level.   
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APPENDIX 1: HOUSEHOLD QUESTIONNAIRE 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR HOUSEHOLDS OF ILLNESS AND OF PAYING FOR HEALTH CARE 
 IN ZIMBABWE: A CASE STUDY, 2009 
CENTRAL STATISTICAL OFFICE 
1            STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL WHEN COMPLETED B Interviewer Visits 1 2 3 4 
 Date     
A Identification Province District Ward Sector EA Household   Results ***     
                     
 
 
 
C Background characteristics:                                                                                           D       Education: 
 For all Persons 0 – 17 years 12 years + For Persons age 5 years  and above 
         2           3      4          5 6 7        8          9       10             11 
P 
e 
r 
s 
o 
n 
 
N 
u 
m 
b 
e 
r 
List names of household members, starting 
with the head of the household 
 
 
What is (name’s) relationship 
to head of household? 
 
1. Head 
2. Spouse 
3. Son/Daughter 
4. Brother/Sister 
5. Nephew/ 
Niece/Cousin 
6. Grandchild 
7. Parent 
8. Other relative 
9. Not related 
10. Not Known 
 
Is (name) male or 
female? 
 
1. Male 
 
2. Female 
    
How old was 
(name) at 
his/her last 
birthday? 
 
Enter age in 
completed years 
("00" for 
children less 
than 1 year) 
Is (name‘s) 
biological 
mother alive? 
 
1. Yes 
 
2. No 
 
3. Don‘t 
   know 
 
 
 
 
  
Is (name’s) 
biological 
father 
alive? 
 
1. Yes 
 
2. No 
 
3. Don‘t 
   know 
What is (name’s) 
marital status? 
 
1.Never married 
 
2. Married 
 
3. Divorced /  
separated 
 
4. Widowed 
Has (name) ever 
Attended 
 school? 
 
1. Never been 
 
2. At school 
 
3. Left school 
If code 1 in Q.9 
What is the 
main reason 
why (name) 
never attended 
school? 
 
1.Financial 
constraints 
2. School too 
far away 
3. Ill/sick 
4. Still too 
   young 
5. Other 
  (specify) 
 
What is (name’s) highest 
level of education 
completed? 
 
00. ECD (Early childhood 
development) 
01-07. Grade 1 to 7 
11-16. Form 1 to 6 
20. Diploma/Ce-rtificate after 
Primary 
21. Diploma/Ce-rtificate after 
Secondary 
22. Graduate/ 
Postgraduate 
           
1  1  2   3   4  5                    
 6  7   8   9 10 
    1      2   1    2     3  1    2     3  1    2   3    4 1    2     3 1     2       3  
   4       5  
 
2  1  2   3   4  5   
 6  7   8   9 10                 
    1      2   1    2     3 1    2     3 1    2   3    4 1    2     3 1     2       3  
   4       5 
 
3   1  2   3   4  5   
 6  7   8   9 10                 
    1      2   1    2     3 1    2     3 1    2   3    4 1    2     3 1     2       3  
   4       5 
 
4  1  2   3   4  5   
 6  7   8   9 10                 
    1      2   1    2     3 1    2     3 1    2   3    4 1    2     3 1     2       3  
   4       5 
 
5   1  2   3   4  5   
 6  7   8   9 10                 
    1      2   1    2     3 1    2     3 1    2   3    4 1    2     3 1     2       3  
   4       5 
 
6  1  2   3   4  5   
 6  7   8   9 10                 
    1      2   1    2     3 1    2     3 1    2   3    4 1    2     3 1     2       3  
   4       5 
 
7  1  2   3   4  5   
 6  7   8   9 10                 
    1      2   1    2     3 1    2     3 1    2   3    4 1    2     3 1     2       3  
   4       5 
 
8  1  2   3   4  5   
 6  7   8   9 10                 
    1      2   1    2     3 1    2     3 1    2   3    4 1    2     3 1     2       3  
   4       5 
 
9   1  2   3   4  5   
 6  7   8   9 10                 
    1      2   1    2     3 1    2     3 1    2   3    4 1    2     3 1     2       3  
   4       5 
 
10  1  2   3   4  5   
 6  7   8   9 10                 
    1      2   1    2     3 1    2     3 1    2   3    4 1    2     3 1     2       3  
   4       5 
 
*** Result Codes: 1. Completed                         2. No household member at home or no competent respondent at home at time of visit     3.  Entire household absent for extended period     4. Postponed 
                              5. Refused                             6. Dwelling vacant                                           7. Dwelling destroyed                                  8. Dwelling not found             9. Other (Specify)------------------------------------------------- 
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A Identification   Province    District      Ward Sector EA Household   
              
 
E Employment Activity: For Persons age 5 years and above. Health insurance cover 
 For all Persons 
  12 13 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
P 
e 
r 
s 
o 
n 
 
N 
u 
m 
b 
e 
r 
Is (name) 
employed 
 
1. Yes 
 
2. No 
 
If no skip 
to Q17 
What is 
(name’s) 
employment 
status 
 
1. formally 
employed 
 
2. Casual 
labourer 
 
3. Student 
 
4 Other 
(specify)------
----------------- 
Did (name) usually work but happen 
to be absent because of leave, sickness, 
bad weather, or industrial disputes & 
transport constraints? 
 
1. Yes 
 
2. No  
What were the 
main tasks or 
duties in the 
last 30 days? 
 
Describe in 2 to 
4 words e.g. 
"Communal 
Farming/" Bus 
Driving ". 
What is the 
total monthly 
income that is 
received by 
this household 
after tax 
deductions? 
 This amount 
should include 
money paid for: 
-temporary work 
done 
- money from 
outside sources 
- money from 
pension fund 
Note: all money 
should be 
converted to USD 
 
Do you have a medical 
aid insurance cover? 
 
1. Yes 
 
2. No 
If code 1 in Q18 Who is 
paying for the medical 
insurance cover 
contributions? 
 
1. Self 
2. Employer 
3. Other (Specify)-----------
----------------------------- 
Has (name)  
ever been  
injured  
/suffered  
Illness 
in the  
last 30 
days? 
 
1. Yes 
 
2. No 
 
 
 
Is there a person with disability in this 
household? 
 
1. Yes 
 
2. No 
 
         
 
1 
 
1          2 1       2      3  4 1          2   1          2  1          2 1          2 
 
2 
 
1          2 1       2      3  4 1          2   1          2  1          2 1          2 
 
3 
 
1          2 1       2      3  4 1          2   1          2  1          2 1          2 
 
4 
 
1          2 1       2      3  4 1          2   1          2  1          2 1          2 
 
5 
 
1          2 1       2      3  4 1          2   1          2  1          2 1          2 
 
6 
 
1          2 1       2      3  4 1          2   1          2  1          2 1          2 
 
7 
 
1          2 1       2      3  4 1          2   1          2  1          2 1          2 
 
8 
 
1          2 1       2      3  4 1          2   1          2  1          2 1          2 
 
9 
 
1          2 1       2      3  4 1          2   1          2  1          2 1          2 
 
10 
 
1          2 1       2      3  4 1          2   1          2  1          2 1          2 
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                                              STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL WHEN COMPLETED     
 
           
 F Health and  Food Expenditure and  incidence on main illnesses / injuries    
     
 
22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33  
   
P 
e 
r 
s 
o 
n 
N 
u 
m 
b 
e 
r 
 
 
 
 If code 1 in Q20   
What was the main nature 
 of (name’s) illnesses/injuries? 
1. Tuberculosis   2. Asthma 
3. Malaria          4. Rheumatic heart disease 
5. High blood pressure  6. Measles 
7. Hepatitis B        8. Kidney problems 
9. Stroke             10. Cirrhosis of the liver 
11. Diarrhoea/Gastroenteritis 
12. Flu                         13. Fever 
14. Injury 
15. Violence related injury 
16. Cancer 
17. Allergies 
18. Diabètes 
19. HIV infection 
20. Mental disability 
22. Physical disability (Specify)---- 
 
23. Other (Specify)------------------ 
 
 
Did (name‘s) 
 Illness 
 prevent 
 the person  
from  
carrying 
 out his/her 
 normal  
Activities? 
 
 
1. Yes 
 
2. No 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
illness/injury        
 
 
 
What 
 was  
the total  
number  
of days 
 (name)  
 Missed 
due to  
illness/  
sickness 
/ Injury? 
 
Who was  
consulted  
to deal with  
illness or  
injury ? 
1. Government 
   Mission/ 
   Council 
2. Private Clinic 
    Or Doctor 
3. Private hospital 
4. Traditional 
 Healer/ Herbalist 
5.Prophets/Faith/ 
 Spiritual healers 
6.  Pharmacy 
7. Other (Specify) 
8.None 
 (if code 8 skip to  
             Q31) 
 
How much  
was paid by 
the medical  
insurance 
cover for 
the main illness 
/ injury? 
 
 
Note: all  
money should  
be converted to  
USD 
 
How much did 
(name) pay  
for medicines? 
Note: all money 
should be 
converted to USD 
 
How much did 
(name) pay  
in cash 
for the 
service 
at the facility  
visited? 
 
Note: all money 
should be 
converted to USD 
If code 8  in 
Q28, 
What was the 
 main reason  
why  (name)  
did not visit a  
health  
facility? 
 
1.Facility too  
far Away 
2. Cannot  
afford 
3. Home  
Treatment 
4. Treatment 
 not  
Necessary 
5 Other 
specify)----------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------
------- 
 
How many  
times did 
the  person 
 use 
health  
services 
as a result of 
the illness or  
Injury? 
 
In general how much did 
your family spend on 
food in the past month? 
This excludes food that 
has been bought for 
resale or exchanging for 
commercial purposes? 
 
 Note: all money should be 
converted to USD 
 
Besides food 
expenditure, what 
is the total amount 
of money that this 
household pays on 
other things such as 
transport, monthly 
bills, and payment 
of domestic labour 
etc every month? 
(PLEASE USE 
NOTEBOOK 
PROVIDED TO STATE 
ALL RELEVANT 
ALTERNATIVES 
INCLUDING HEATH ) 
 
Note: all money should 
be converted to USD 
 
Number of  
meals  
taken per  
day by the 
household 
members 
 
1. one 
2. Two 
3. Three 
4. More than 
    three times 
 
   
               
1  1      2  1       2         3         
    4    5  6  7    8  
  1       2     3   
    4    5    
1    2   
  3      4  
    
2 1 2 3 4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13   
14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22 23 
1      2  1       2         3         
 4    5   6  7   8   
  1       2   3   
  4   5    
1    2   
  3      4  
   
3 1 2 3 4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13   
                                       14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23 
1      2  1       2         3         
  4   5  6  7    8  
  1    2    3  
  4     5    
1    2   
  3      4   
  
4 1 2 3 4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13 
14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22 23 
1      2  1       2         3         
 4   5  6   7   8  
  1      2    3   
  4   5    
1    2   
  3      4  
   
5 1 2 3 4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13 
14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22 23 
1      2  1       2         3         
 4   5  6  7   8  
  1  2    3   
   4     5    
1    2   
  3      4   
  
6 1 2 3 4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13 
14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22 23 
1      2  1       2         3         
 4   5  6  7   8  
  1   2   3   
   4     5    
1    2   
  3      4  
   
7 1 2 3 4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13 
14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22 23 
1      2  1       2         3         
  4  5  6   7   8  
  1   2    3    
  4     5    
1    2   
  3      4   
  
8 1 2 3 4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13 
14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22 23 
1      2  1       2         3         
   4   5  6   7    8  
  1   2    3   
   4     5    
1    2   
  3      4  
   
9 1 2 3 4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13 
14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22 23 
1      2  1       2         3         
  4   5  6   7   8  
  1    2    3  
    4    5    
1    2   
  3      4   
  
  
10 1 2 3 4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13 
14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22 23 
1      2  1       2         3         
  4   5  6   7    8  
  1    2    3   
   4   5    
1    2   
  3      4  
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                                                               STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL WHEN COMPLETED     
A  
Identification 
Province District Ward Sector       EA Household 
            
 
                                      
 
 
                                                                                    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         
 F Health and  Food Expenditure and  incidence on other illnesses / injuries 
 
 
34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 
P 
e 
r 
s 
o 
n 
N 
u 
m 
b 
e 
r 
 
 
 
 If code 1 in Q20   
What was the other nature 
 of (name’s) illnesses/injuries? 
1. Tuberculosis      2. Asthma 
3. Malaria        4. Rheumatic heart disease 
5. High blood pressure 6. Measles 
7. Hepatitis B          8. Kidney problems 
9. Stroke          10. Cirrhosis of the liver 
11. Diarrhoea/Gastroenteritis 
12. Flu                         13. Fever 
14. Injury 
15. Violence related injury 
16. Cancer 
17. Allergies 
18. Diabètes 
19. HIV infection 
20. Mental disability 
22. Physical disability (Specify)--- 
-------------------------------------- 
23. Other (Specify)------------------ 
 
Did 
 (name‘s) 
 Illness 
 prevent 
 the person  
from  
carrying 
 out his/her 
 normal  
activities? 
 
 
1. Yes 
 
2. No 
 
 
 
E.g.  3 = 1 
   19 = 2 
 
 
 
 
What 
 was  
the total  
number  
of days 
 (name)  
 Missed 
due to  
illnesses/  
sickness 
/ Injuries? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
E.g.  3 =  3 days 
   19 = 2 days 
Who was  
consulted  
to deal with  
illness or  
Injury?  
1. Government 
   Mission/ 
   Council 
2. Private Clinic 
    Or Doctor 
3. Private hospital 
4. Traditional 
 Healer/ Herbalist 
5.Prophets/Faith/ 
 Spiritual healers 
6.  Pharmacy 
7. Other (Specify) 
8.None 
 
E.g.  3 = 6 
19 = 4 
 
How much  
was paid by 
the medical  
insurance 
cover for 
the other  
illnesses 
/ injuries? 
 
 
Note: all  
money should  
be converted to  
USD 
 
 
 
 
E.g.  3 = USD 40 
      19 = USD 100 
How much did 
(name) pay  
for medicines? 
Note: all money should 
be converted to USD 
 
E.g.      3 = USD 40 
      19 = USD 100 
How much  
did 
(name) pay  
in total 
for the 
service 
at the facility  
visited? 
 
Note: all money should 
be converted to USD 
 
E.g.  3 = USD 40 
  19 = USD 100 
If code 8  in 
Q37, 
What was the 
 main reason  
why  (name)  
did not visit a  
health facility? 
1.Facility too  
far Away 
2. Cannot 
 afford 
3. Home  
Treatment 
4. Treatment  
not Necessary 
5 Other specify)----------------------
----------------------------- E.g.   
 3 = 1 
19 = 3 
How many  
times did 
the  person 
use health  
services 
as a result of 
the illness or  
Injury? 
 
1. once 
2. two times 
3. three times 
4. four times 
5. more than  
    four times 
E.g. 
3 = 3 
19 = 5 
        
1 1 2 3 4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13   
14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23 
 
        
2 1 2 3 4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13   
14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23 
        
3 1 2 3 4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13   
14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23 
        
4 1 2 3 4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13   
14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23 
        
5 1 2 3 4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13   
14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23 
        
6 1 2 3 4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13   
14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23 
        
7 1 2 3 4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13   
14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23 
        
8 1 2 3 4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13   
14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22 23 
        
9 1 2 3 4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13   
14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  
          
1
0 
1 2 3 4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13   
14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22 23  
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                                                                                   STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL WHEN COMPLETED     
A  
Identification 
Province District Ward Sector       EA Household 
            
 
 F Health and  Food Expenditure and  incidence on pregnancy    
    
 
43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52  
   
P 
e 
r 
s 
o 
n 
N 
u 
m 
b 
e 
r 
 
 
 
 Is / has been (name) 
pregnant in the last 30 
days? 
 
1. Yes 
 
2. No 
 
If code 2 then skip to  
Q54 
Did (name‘s) 
 pregnancy 
 prevent 
her from  
carrying 
 out her 
 normal  
activities? 
 
 
1. Yes 
 
2. No 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
What was  
the total  
number  
of days 
 (name)  
 Missed 
due to  
pregnancy? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Did name 
Incur 
 medical  
expenditures 
in the last 30  
days as a  
result of the 
Pregnancy? 
 
 
 
1. Yes 
 
2. No 
 
 
 
 
Who was  
consulted  
to deal with  
pregnancy? 
1. Government 
   Mission/ 
   Council 
2. Private Clinic 
    Or Doctor 
3. Private hospital 
4. Traditional 
 Healer/ Herbalist 
5.Prophets/Faith/ 
 Spiritual healers 
6.  Pharmacy 
7. Other (Specify) 
8.None 
 
 
 
How much  
was paid by 
the medical  
insurance 
cover for 
the pregnancy 
expenses? 
 
 
 
Note: all  
money should  
be converted to  
USD 
 
 
 
 
 
How much did 
(name) pay  
for medicines? 
Note: all money 
should be 
converted to USD 
 
 
How much did 
(name) pay  
in total 
for the 
service 
at the facility  
visited? 
 
Note: all money should 
be converted to USD 
 
 
If code 8  in 
 Q47, 
What was the 
 main reason  
why  (name)  
did not visit a  
Health facility? 
1.Facility too  
far Away 
2. Cannot 
 afford 
3. Home  
Treatment 
4. Treatment  
not Necessary 
5 Other specify)----------------
-------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------- 
 
How many  
times did 
the  person 
use health  
services 
as a result of 
the  
Pregnancy? 
 
1. once 
2. two times 
3. three times 
4. four times 
5. more than  
    four times 
 
 
   
            
1 1       2  1       2   1       2  1 2 3 4 5 
 6  7  8  
 
   1   2   3 
 4  5  
1  2   3 
 4  5 
    
2 1       2  1       2   1       2  1 2 3 4 5 
 6  7  8  
 
   1  2   3 
 4  5 
1  2   3 
 4  5  
   
3 1       2  1       2   1       2  1 2 3 4 5 
 6  7  8  
 
   1  2   3 
 4  5 
1  2   3 
 4  5   
  
4 1       2  1       2   1       2  1 2 3 4 5 
 6  7  8  
 
   1  2   3 
 4  5 
1  2   3 
 4  5  
   
5 1       2  1       2   1       2  1 2 3 4 5 
 6  7  8  
 
   1  2   3 
 4  5 
1  2   3 
 4  5   
  
6 1       2  1       2   1       2  1 2 3 4 5 
 6  7  8  
 
   1  2   3 
 4  5 
1  2   3 
 4  5  
   
7 1       2  1       2   1       2  1 2 3 4 5 
 6  7  8  
 
   1  2   3 
 4  5 
1  2   3 
 4  5   
  
8 1       2  1       2   1       2  1 2 3 4 5 
 6  7  8  
 
   1  2   3 
 4  5 
1  2  3 
 4  5  
   
9 1       2  1       2   1       2  1 2 3 4 5 
 6  7  8  
 
   1  2   3 
 4  5 
1  2   3 
 4  5   
  
  
1
0 
1       2  1       2   1       2  1 2 3 4 5 
 6  7  8  
 
   1  2   3 
 4  5 
1  2   3 
 4  5  
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                                                   STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL WHEN COMPLETED CENTRAL STATISTICAL OFFICE 
A Identification Province District Ward Sector EA Household   
                     
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
F                                                                                                                                                                                          G 
 Health &  Coping Strategies : All Persons 
 
  
Socio economic status of  the household: 
 53 54 55 56 57 
          
58 59                  60 61 62 63 
P 
e 
r 
s 
o 
n 
 
N 
u 
m 
b 
e 
r 
Have  you done any  
of the following to  
meet your treatment 
Costs? 
 
1. Sell assets 
2. Substitute labour 
3. Take extra job 
4. Reduce food  
   expenditure 
5. Use savings 
6. Borrowing 
7. Other 
If code 1 in 
q53, How 
much was 
contributed 
through 
the sell of 
assets? 
 
 
Note: all 
money should 
be converted 
to USD 
 
Did you 
make 
any other 
health 
payments 
within 
the 
previous 
month 
not 
related to 
the 
illnesses? 
 e.g. 
check-up 
 
1. Yes 
 
2. No 
 
Who finally paid for 
the medical 
treatment  
(more than one 
answer is 
acceptable). 
1. Workers 
Compensation 
Insurance Fund 
(WCIF). 
2. Employer. 
3. Parents/      
guardian 
4. Self/Medical    aid. 
5. Free 
6. Other (Specify)-----
- 
 
Does 
anyone 
in this 
family 
suffer 
from a 
chronic 
illness? 
 
1. Yes 
 
2. No 
 
Does any member of the household 
own the following: 
1. Watch                8. Television 
2. Bicycle               9. Mobile telephone  
3. Motorcycle          10. Non-mobile 
                                     telephone 
4. Animal                11. Refrigerator 
  drawn cart  
5. Car or truck  
6. Boat with a motor 
7. Radio 
 
Multiple answers allowed 
Does this 
household own 
any livestock, 
herds or farm 
animals? 
  
1. Yes 
2. No 
 
Types of  livestock, 
herds or farm 
animals owned by 
the household 
 
If none, enter 00 
 
If more than 97, enter 
97 
 
If unknown , enter 98 
 
 
Does 
anyone in 
this 
household 
have a 
bank 
account? 
1. Yes 
 
2. No 
 
Does your household 
have access to land for 
agricultural purposes? 
1. Yes 
 
2. No 
 
How many acres of land are used 
by the household members for 
agricultural purposes? 
            
1 1   2   3   4   5   6  7  1       2  1       2 
1       2 
1       2 
1       2 
1       2 
1       2 
1       2 
1       2 
1       2 
1       2 
1       2 
1       2 
1    2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9      10       11     
 
1          2  
Cattle = ------ 
Horses/mules =   
----------------- 
Goats = ------- 
Sheep = ------- 
Poultry = ------ 
Pigs = --------- 
 
 
 
1    2       1    2        
2 1   2   3   4   5   6  7          1       2  1       2 1    2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9           10    11     
  
1          2 1    2       1    2        
3 1   2   3   4   5   6  7          1       2  1       2 1    2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9           10   11     1          2 1    2       1    2        
4 1   2   3   4   5   6  7          1       2  1       2 1    2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9           10    11     1          2 1    2       1    2        
5 1   2   3   4   5   6  7          1       2  1    2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9           10    11     1          2 1    2       1    2        
6 1   2   3   4   5   6  7          1       2  1       2 1    2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9           10   11     1          2 1    2       1    2        
7 1   2   3   4   5   6  7          1       2  1       2 1    2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9           10    11     1          2 1    2       1    2        
8 1   2   3   4   5   6  7          1       2  1       2 1    2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9           10   11     1          2 1    2       1    2        
9 1   2   3   4   5   6  7          1       2  1    2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9           10    11     1          2 1    2       1    2        
10 1   2   3   4   5   6  7          1       2  1       2 1    2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9           10    11     1          2 1    2       1    2        Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
  
 
131 
 
 
 
                                              STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL WHEN COMPLETED     
A  
Identification 
Province District Ward Sector       EA Household 
            
       
 
      H 
 
 
Housing Characteristics 
 
64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 
P 
e 
r 
s 
o 
n 
N 
u 
m 
b 
e 
r 
 
 
 
What is the 
tenure status 
of the 
household? 
1
1. 
Owner/purchas
er 
2
2. Tenant 
 
3. Lodger 
4
4. Tied 
accommodation 
 
5. Parents' / 
Guardian's / 
Relative's  
House. 
 
6 Other 
(Specify) -------
--------- 
Type of 
dwelling unit 
1. Traditional 
2. Mixed 
3.Detached /  
semi- detached 
4. 
Flat/Townhouse 
5. Shacks 
6. Other  
(Specify)-------
------ 
                             
 
Does the 
household have 
access to 
electricity? 
 
1. Yes 
2. No 
What is the household’s  
main source of water for 
drinking and cooking? 
1. Piped water inside house 
2. Piped water  outside 
 house (on  premise) 
3. Communal tap 
4. Well/borehole protected 
5. Well unprotected 
6.River/Stream/ dam 
7. Other (Specify)--------- 
------------------------------ 
What type of toilet 
 facility is used most  
 by this household? 
1. Flush toilet 
2. Blair  toilet 
3. Pit toilet with slab 
4. Pit toilet other 
5. None 
 
What is the household’s main 
source of energy for cooking? 
1. Wood 
2. Paraffin 
3. Electricity 
4. Gas 
5. Coal/ charcoal 
6. Gel 
7. Other (Specify) 
-------------------------------- 
 
What are the main 
materials used for the 
roof?  
1.  No roof 
2. Thatch 
3.  Rustic mat 
4.  Wood 
5.  Planks 
6.  Metal   
7.  Wood  
8.  Asbestos 
9. Tiles 
10. Cement 
11. Other---------------- 
 
 
What are the main 
materials used for the 
wall?  
(record observation) 
1. Cane/Trunks 
2. Mud 
3. Stone with Mud 
4. Plywood 
5. Carton 
6. Reused wood 
7. Cement 
8. Stone with lime/cement 
9. Bricks 
10. Bricks 
11. Cement blocks 
12. Wood Planks 
13. Other----------- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What are the main materials 
used for the floor? 
1.Earth/Sand/Dung 
2. Wood  
3.  planks 
4. Parquet or  
polished Wood 
5. Vinyl or Asphalt Strips 
6. Ceramic Tiles  
7. Cement  
8. Carpet 
9. Other-------------------------- 
    2 I 3 Total number of 
persons in household 
Comments 
1      
2       
3      Male                                                     
           
         Female                               
                                     
         Total 
  
 
 
 
 
 
cf 4     Female    
   
5     
Total    
   
6     Physical address of the household  Enumerator‘s Name            Date  
7       
8      Team Leader‘s Name        Date 
9       
10      Supervisor‘s Name            Date 
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 APPENDIX 2: INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
 
Version 1.0 
 
12/01/2009 
 
 
 
PROJECT TITLE: THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR HOUSEHOLDS OF 
ILLNESS AND OF PAYING FOR HEALTH CARE IN ZIMBABWE: A CASE 
STUDY  
 
Principal Investigator: Miss Mandy Maredza 
Address: 19 Jels Court, 19 Ceres Road, Avondale, Harare, Zimbabwe 
Contact number: 0912902096 
   
WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE STUDY 
 Joining this study is completely voluntary. This means you can refuse to take 
part in this research or agree to participate now then change your mind later. 
 You also have the right to refuse to answer some questions  
 Whatever you decide will not affect you in any way. This means future 
relations with the research personnel and associated institutions will not be 
affected. 
 You may not receive any direct benefit from being in the research study. 
However if the results of this study are useful, you and other people may 
benefit in future 
 Details about this study are discussed below. This includes the purpose of the 
study and risks and benefits of the study. It is important that you understand 
this information so that you can decide carefully if you would like to take part 
in the study 
 You should ask the researchers, any questions you have about this study at 
any time. 
  
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
You are being asked to take part in a research study that is looking at the medical 
costs that families face when one or more of the family members use health care 
services. The purpose of this study is to find out if paying for health care out-of 
pocket (meaning using cash) can lead families into poverty while increasing poverty 
of those who are already poor. This research also seeks to find out whether medical 
costs affect lives of families by causing them to cut down on food bought and eaten 
in the house, borrow money or stop children from going to school among other 
things. In addition this study seeks to find out factors that cause some families to be 
affected by costs of medical care more than others 
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Why have you been invited to participate? 
You have been randomly selected from a list of households in this area where the 
research is being conducted. 699 other households are part of this research 
 
What will your responsibilities be? 
If you decide to take part in the research you will be expected to answer some 
questions that you will be asked by an interviewer. The interview will take 
approximately 20 minutes. 
 
Are there any risks involved in taking part in this research? 
There are no risks involved with this research 
 
Who will have access to the information that you provide? 
All the information will be kept confidential and will only be accessed by the 
research team and used by the researcher for purposes of this study. In addition to 
protect your identity, no names will be recorded in this study, codes will be used 
instead. 
 
What if you have questions about your rights as a research subject? 
All research on human volunteers is reviewed by a committee that works to protect 
your rights and welfare.  If you have questions or concerns about your rights as a 
research subject you may contact, anonymously or without telling the researcher if 
you wish the Research ethics committee at the Medical Research Council in 
Zimbabwe, P O Box CY 573, Causeway, Harare or on telephone 791792 or 791193. 
 
Questions concerning the study 
If you have any questions concerning the study please feel free to ask before you sign 
the consent form. You may also take as much time as is necessary to go over the 
information 
 
Authorization 
By signing this form you are agreeing to take part in the study. You are also 
indicating that you have read and understood all information and had your questions 
answered.  
 
The date you sign this document to enroll in this study, that is, today‘s date, MUST 
fall between the dates indicated on the approval stamp that is on each page.  These 
dates indicate that this form is valid when you enroll in the study but do not reflect 
how long you may participate in the study.  Each page of this Informed Consent 
Form is stamped to indicate the form‘s validity as approved by the MRCZ 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - -  
Subject’s Agreement:  
 
I have read the information provided above.  I have asked all the questions I have at 
this time.  I voluntarily agree to participate in this research study. 
_________________________________________ _________________ 
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Signature of Research Subject Date 
 
_________________________________________ 
Printed Name of Research Subject 
 
_________________________________________ _________________ 
Signature of Person Obtaining Consent Date 
 
_________________________________________ 
Printed Name of Person Obtaining Consent 
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APPENDIX 4: DETECTING HIGH LINEAR CORRELATIONS BETWEEN 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 
 
pwcorr  CATA40 Utilization hh_size Age_65 Age_5 Medaid Gender_hh Head_edulevel 
Disable_memb chronic_illness Employ_HH District POOR 
 
             |   CATA15 Utiliz~n  hh_size   Age_65    Age_5   Medaid Gender~h 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
      CATA40 |   1.0000  
 Utilization |   0.5185   1.0000  
     hh_size |   0.1313   0.1820   1.0000  
      Age_65 |   0.2057   0.1623   0.1995   1.0000  
       Age_5 |   0.0197   0.0457   0.2689  -0.0369   1.0000  
      Medaid |   0.0091   0.0365   0.0862  -0.0391   0.0183   1.0000  
   Gender_hh |  -0.1343  -0.0205   0.0558  -0.0765   0.0771   0.0818   1.0000  
Head_edule~l |  -0.1100  -0.0695  -0.1221  -0.3714   0.0323   0.2174   0.2705  
Disable_memb |   0.0389   0.1715   0.2170   0.1451   0.0278  -0.0320  -0.0865  
chronic_il~s |   0.2174   0.1834   0.0680   0.0571   0.0465   0.0557   0.0050  
   Employ_HH |  -0.0812  -0.0802  -0.0517  -0.2712  -0.0294   0.2308   0.2764  
    District |  -0.0361  -0.0377  -0.0569  -0.0814  -0.0522   0.1446   0.1285  
        POOR |   0.0376  -0.0835  -0.0336   0.0064  -0.0228  -0.1204  -0.0849  
 
             | Head_e~l Disabl~b chroni~s Employ~H District     POOR 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------ 
Head_edule~l |   1.0000  
Disable_memb |  -0.1712   1.0000  
chronic_il~s |   0.0628   0.0088   1.0000  
   Employ_HH |   0.3182  -0.0597   0.0533   1.0000  
    District |   0.1643  -0.0985   0.1214   0.0897   1.0000  
        POOR |  -0.1231   0.0786  -0.0212  -0.1060  -0.0668   1.0000  
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APPENDIX 5: LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS FOR DETERMINANTS OF 
CATASTROPHIC HEALTH EXPENDITURE 
 
logistic  CATA40 Utilization hh_size Age_65 Age_5 Medaid Gender_hh Head_edulevel 
Disable_memb chronic_illness Employ_HH District POOR 
 
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =        499 
                                                  LR chi2(12)     =     152.50 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -136.66586                       Pseudo R2       =     0.3581 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      CATA40 | Odds Ratio   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Utilization |     2.7345   .3672729     7.49   0.000     2.101611     3.55798 
     hh_size |   1.035154   .0754232     0.47   0.635     .8973975    1.194057 
      Age_65 |    4.03387   1.840095     3.06   0.002     1.649821    9.862955 
       Age_5 |    .907633   .3291583    -0.27   0.789     .4458792    1.847581 
      Medaid |   1.055425    .445458     0.13   0.898      .461493    2.413736 
   Gender_hh |     .34761   .1224896    -3.00   0.003     .1742404    .6934827 
Head_edule~l |   .9918803   .0360495    -0.22   0.823     .9236823    1.065113 
Disable_memb |   .2805184    .157924    -2.26   0.024      .093059    .8455981 
chronic_il~s |   1.889267   .6875739     1.75   0.080     .9257844    3.855467 
   Employ_HH |   1.531719    .582021     1.12   0.262     .7273452    3.225654 
    District |   1.039026   .4295819     0.09   0.926     .4620614    2.336431 
        POOR |   1.822574    .659381     1.66   0.097     .8968769    3.703716 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
logistic CATA25 Utilization hh_size Age_65 Age_5 Medaid Gender_hh Head_edulevel 
Disable_memb chronic_illness Employ_HH District POOR 
 
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =        499 
                                                  LR chi2(12)     =     154.89 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -147.11891                       Pseudo R2       =     0.3449 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      CATA25 | Odds Ratio   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Utilization |   2.736878   .3663242     7.52   0.000      2.10535    3.557842 
     hh_size |   1.042375   .0725902     0.60   0.551     .9093827    1.194816 
      Age_65 |    3.45319     1.5242     2.81   0.005     1.453816    8.202218 
       Age_5 |   .9551001    .328987    -0.13   0.894     .4862393    1.876064 
      Medaid |    1.39132   .5438964     0.84   0.398     .6466576    2.993503 
   Gender_hh |   .3865147   .1310339    -2.80   0.005     .1988827    .7511647 
Head_edule~l |   .9927813   .0347369    -0.21   0.836     .9269802    1.063253 
Disable_memb |   .3069274   .1631774    -2.22   0.026      .108267    .8701127 
chronic_il~s |   2.149399   .7431737     2.21   0.027     1.091457    4.232798 
   Employ_HH |   1.189893   .4286383     0.48   0.629     .5873231    2.410674 
    District |   1.058198   .4239831     0.14   0.888     .4825254    2.320672 
        POOR |   1.865244   .6474654     1.80   0.073      .944639    3.683033 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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logistic  CATA15 Utilization hh_size Age_65 Age_5 Medaid Gender_hh Head_edulevel 
Disable_memb chronic_illness Emplo 
> y_HH District POOR 
 
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =        499 
                                                  LR chi2(12)     =     186.25 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood =  -142.3735                       Pseudo R2       =     0.3954 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      CATA15 | Odds Ratio   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Utilization |    3.42362   .5232665     8.05   0.000     2.537393    4.619375 
     hh_size |   1.052673   .0741104     0.73   0.466     .9169955    1.208426 
      Age_65 |   2.847958   1.287831     2.31   0.021     1.173883     6.90943 
       Age_5 |   .8691101    .301904    -0.40   0.686     .4399382    1.716951 
      Medaid |   1.237195   .4843344     0.54   0.587     .5743961      2.6648 
   Gender_hh |   .3869614   .1324279    -2.77   0.006     .1978632     .756781 
Head_edule~l |   1.016215   .0363083     0.45   0.653     .9474864    1.089929 
Disable_memb |   .3774017    .197281    -1.86   0.062     .1354725    1.051372 
chronic_il~s |   2.336194   .8103982     2.45   0.014     1.183688    4.610847 
   Employ_HH |   1.180064   .4251762     0.46   0.646     .5823962    2.391073 
    District |   .9275917   .3699773    -0.19   0.851     .4244713    2.027054 
        POOR |   1.766061   .6131564     1.64   0.101     .8942897    3.487653 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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APPENDIX 6: ANOVA TESTS FOR DETECTING STATICAL SIGNIFICANCE 
ACROSS WEALTH QUINTILES 
 
oneway  CATA40  Asset_quintile2, t 
 
5 Household |   Summary of Catastrophic health 
      asset |         expenditure at 40% 
  quintiles |        Mean   Std. Dev.       Freq. 
------------+------------------------------------ 
          1 |   .19117647   .39615137          68 
          2 |   .13333333   .35186578          15 
          3 |   .13636364   .34514092          88 
          4 |   .15648855   .36401323         262 
          5 |   .12121212   .32887461          66 
------------+------------------------------------ 
      Total |   .15230461   .35967648         499 
 
                        Analysis of Variance 
    Source              SS         df      MS            F     Prob > F 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Between groups      .198901624      4   .049725406      0.38     0.8212 
 Within groups      64.2259481    494   .130012041 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    Total           64.4248497    498   .129367168 
 
Bartlett's test for equal variances:  chi2(4) =   2.6626  Prob>chi2 = 0.616 
 
 
 
anova   oop_hh Asset_quintile2 
 
                           Number of obs =     499     R-squared     =  0.0048 
                           Root MSE      = 181.321     Adj R-squared = -0.0033 
 
                  Source |  Partial SS    df       MS           F     Prob > F 
             ------------+---------------------------------------------------- 
                   Model |  77634.1274     4  19408.5318       0.59     0.6698 
                         | 
             Asset_qui~2 |  77634.1274     4  19408.5318       0.59     0.6698 
                         | 
                Residual |  16241416.1   494  32877.3605    
             ------------+---------------------------------------------------- 
                   Total |  16319050.2   498  32769.1772    
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APPENDIX 7: STATA COMMANDS FOR GENERATING VARIABLES 
 
Generating Household asset score 
 
gen Household_Assetscore = 0.163*( cattle-2.188)/5.681+0.046*( horses_mules-
0.286)/1.767+0.114*(goats-1.90)/4.44+0.01*( sheep-0.19)/2.055+0.005*( poultry-
5.169)/10.103+0.079*( pigs-0.164)/2.657+0*(pipedwateroutsidehouseonpremise-
0.1)/0.3+0.103*(pipedwaterinsidehouse-0.249)/0.433-0.234*( wellboreholeprotected-0.264)/0.441-
0.027*( communaltap-0.049)/0.216-0.112*( wellunprotected-0.121)/0.326-0.009*( riverstreamdam-
0)/0.104-0.483*( blairtoilet-0.002)/0.049-0.254*( none-0.313)/0.464-0.14*( pittoiletother-0.046)/0.21-
0.227*( pittoiletwithslab-0.068)/0.252+0*( flushtoilet-0.032)/0.175+0*( asbestos-
0.527)/0.499+0.238*( tiles-0.184)/0.134-0.015*( metal-0.049)/0.216-0.102*( thatch-
0.394)/0.489+0.034*( rusticmat-0.001)/0.033+0.034*( wood-0)/0.029+0.028*( Other_roof-
0.001)/0.034+0.129*( Bike-0.268)/0.531+0.096*( motorbike-0.026)/0.376+0.119*( Animalcart-
0.197)/0.531+0.246*( Car_truck-0.082)/0.472+0.085*( Boat_wmotor-0.021)/0.39+0.227*( Radio1-
0.486)/0.551+0.323 *( TV1-0.309)/0.517+0.299*( Mobile_phone-0.143)/0.439+0.222*( 
Non_mobilephone-0.089)/0.357+0.323*( Fridge-0.188)/0.446+0.101*( Livestock1-
0.197)/0.531+0.078*( Access_land-0.683)/0.533+0.167*( Watch1-0.58)/0.566+0.296*( Electricity-
0.367)/0.543 
 
Generate asset quantiles 
 
Cut off levels were calculated from the DHS survey and quintiles for the study calculated as follows: 
 
generate Asset_quintile =.    
label var Asset_quintile "5 Household asset quintiles"  
replace  Asset_quintile=1 if (Household_Assetscore <= -2.32)  
replace  Asset_quintile=2 if (Household_Assetscore >= -2.29) & (Household_Assetscore <=-1.50)  
replace  Asset_quintile=3 if (Household_Assetscore >= -1.49) & (Household_Assetscore <=-0.258) 
replace  Asset_quintile=4 if (Household_Assetscore >= -0.256) & (Household_Assetscore <=2.856) 
replace  Asset_quintile=5 if (Household_Assetscore >= 2.857)  
  
 
 
Generating other variables 
 
generate eqsize = hh_size^0.56  
 
generate eqexp_h = exp_h/ eqsize  
label variable eqexp_h "Equivalised per capita household expenditure"  
 
generate CTP = exp_h - food_exp  
label var CTP "capacity to pay" 
 
 
Estimating proportion with catastrophic expenditure 
  
generate oopctp = oop_hh/CTP 
label var oopctp "OOP as share of CTP"  
generate cata40 =.  
label var cata40 "Catastrophic health expenditure"  
replace cata40=1 if oopctp>0.4 | oopctp==0.4  
replace cata40=0 if oopctp<0.4  
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generate cata15 =.  
label var cata15 "Catastrophic health expenditure at 15%"  
replace cata15=1 if oopctp>0.15 | oopctp==0.15  
replace cata15=0 if oopctp<0.15  
 
generate cata25 =.  
label var cata25 "Catastrophic health expenditure at 25%"  
replace cata25=1 if oopctp>0.25 | oopctp==0.25  
replace cata25=0 if oopctp<0.25  
 
 
gen OVER_15=cata15*(oopctp-(15/100)) 
gen OVER_25=cata25*(oopctp-(25/100)) 
gen OVER_40=cata40*(oopctp-(40/100)) 
 
summarize cata15 cata25 cata40 
 
summarize OVER_15 OVER_25 OVER_40 
 
tabstat oop_hh, by( Asset_quintile) stat(mean)  
tabstat eqexp_h, by( Asset_quintile) stat(mean)  
tabstat CTP, by(  Asset_quintile) stat(mean)  
 
Estimating poverty  
 
sca PL = 64.13 
generate se = PL*eqsize  
 
generate poor=.  
replace poor=1 if exp_h<se  
replace poor=0 if exp_h>se | exp_h==se 
label var poor "1=poor household; 0=nonpoor"  
 
 
OR ALTERNATIVELY (Gives same results) 
generate poor1=.  
replace poor1=1 if eqexp<PL  
replace poor1=0 if eqexp>PL | eqexp==PL 
label var poor1 "1=poor household; 0=nonpoor"  
 
 
*Identification of households impoverished by OOP payments  
 
generate OOPi = oop_hh/ eqsize  
generate impoor=.  
replace impoor=1 if eqexp_h>PL & (eqexp_h - OOPi)<PL  
replace impoor=0 if impoor!=1  
label var impoor "impoverishment"  
 
generate impoor1=.  
replace impoor1=1 if total_hhexp>se1 & (total_hhexp - oop_hh)<se1  
replace impoor1=0 if impoor1!=1  
label var impoor1 "impoverishment"  
 
tab impoor Asset_quintile, col  
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tab impoor1 Asset_quintile, col  
 
tab poor Asset_quintile, col  
tab poor1 Asset_quintile, col  
 
Checking for high linear correlations* 
 
pwcorr  CATA40 Utilization hh_size Age_65 Age_5 Medaid Gender_hh Head_edulevel 
Disable_memb chronic_illness Employ_HH District POOR 
 
Logistic regression analysis* 
 
logistic  CATA40 Utilization hh_size Age_65 Age_5 Medaid Gender_hh Head_edulevel 
Disable_memb chronic_illness Employ_HH District POOR 
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